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This thesis investigates the key factors that govern the economic behaviour of Australian households over
their life cycle and contributes to the study of optimal income taxation within an overlapping generations
(OLG) framework. Of the thesis’s five chapters, three are empirical in nature making use of Australian
household panel data1 to estimate the underlying preference parameters of Australian households and key
aspects of the economic environment in which they make their decisions. These chapters go some way to
addressing the lack of available Australian evidence on these crucially important parameters. The other
two chapters comprise: a short but novel Monte Carlo study that compares the statistical performance
of dynamic wage models estimated in levels versus growth rates; and a study of optimal income taxation
in the presence of dual-earner households and marital risk which extends the existing OLG literature in
this area.
A brief summary of each chapter follows.
Chapter 1 explores the life cycle pattern of wage inequality in Australia, specifically, the rise in wage
inequality with age. Using panel data on male wages, it explores the relative importance of unobserved
worker heterogeneity versus random wage shocks in explaining this empirical regularity for Australia.
It finds significant heterogeneity in wage levels (via differences in starting wages) but no evidence of
systematic heterogeneity in wages growth. Instead, highly persistent wage shocks are found to account
entirely for the rise in wage inequality with age. The chapter also considers the factors behind the upward
trend in wage inequality since the early 2000s, providing evidence that this trend reflects permanent rather
than transitory factors.
Chapter 2 explores the statistical properties of the generalised method of moments (GMM) estimator
which underpins the empirical results of Chapter 1. In particular, this Monte Carlo study explores
whether GMM estimation of dynamic wage models is more accurate at recovering key parameters when
specified in levels or growth rates in the context of relatively short panel data sets.
Chapter 3 uses panel data to explore risk aversion among Australian households. Using households’
share of risky assets, it tests whether relative risk aversion is constant in wealth. After accounting for
measurement error, the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) assumption cannot be rejected. Using
a consumption Euler equation that adjusts for measurement error in consumption data, I estimate the
coefficient of relative risk aversion in the CRRA utility function. Point estimates from the preferred
non-linear models suggest a moderate degree of risk aversion for the typical Australian household, with
values ranging from 1.2 to 1.4. These findings can provide guidance for calibrating household preferences
in macroeconomic models of the Australian economy.
Chapter 4 provides estimates of the Frisch (or wealth-compensated) elasticity of labour supply for
Australian workers using 17 waves of panel data. This wage elasticity is central to many economic and
policy questions, yet very little empirical evidence exists on its value in Australia. Critically, the chapter
1In particular, I make extensive use of the Household, Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey. As
elaborated upon elsewhere in this thesis, the HILDA survey collects data annually on a broad range of economic and social
topics. It began in 2001 and the latest year of data is 2017.
vuses an estimation approach that incorporates the extensive (employment) as well as the intensive (hours
worked) labour supply response, and finds that the resulting aggregate elasticity is large, ranging from 1.5
to 2.4 using a variety of techniques. This is well above the 0 to 0.5 range typically found in international
labour supply studies of prime-age men that ignore the extensive margin. The chapter’s sub-aggregate
results confirm a relatively large wage elasticity for women and older age groups, especially along the
extensive margin of labour supply.
Chapter 5 re-examines optimal taxation of capital in the long run. Recent studies using OLG models
cast doubt on the classic public finance result of Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976) that the optimal tax is zero.
The chapter explores whether these findings carry over to a more realistic environment that includes dual-
earner households and life cycle marital risk. Analytical results are first derived from a simple two-period
model. For plausible parameter values, the saving of married households is higher and, conversely, the
saving of single households is lower than in a world without divorce and marriage risk. The net impact
of these competing effects is to reduce saving in the most empirically relevant cases. The chapter then
examines optimal tax in a fully-fledged life cycle model with dual earners and marital risk (in addition
to other standard features) calibrated to the United States’ economy. The optimal steady state tax on
capital is found to be zero. The main reasons are twofold: first, a relatively low tax on capital mitigates
the tendency for lower saving induced by marital risk demonstrated in the two period model. Second, the
dual labour supply margin available to married households acts as a substitute for precautionary saving,
making aggregate saving more elastic to interest rate changes. This increases the welfare costs of capital
taxation. This chapter also highlights the role that dual labour supply plays as an insurance mechanism
(in addition to savings) against idiosyncratic wage uncertainty. In doing so, it establishes an important
link between optimal taxation and the study of partial insurance in incomplete market environments (e.g.
Blundell et al. (2016)).
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Chapter 1
The drivers of life-cycle wage
inequality in Australia
1.1 Introduction and related literature
It is a well established empirical fact that wage inequality rises with age. But what are the factors
that lie behind this widening dispersion over the life cycle? What is the relative importance of worker
heterogeneity (such as skills and talents) versus random wage shocks? What portion of life-cycle wage
inequality can be attributed to initial differences in wages when a cohort of workers first enters the labour
market? We address these questions in an Australian context, and in doing so become the first Australian
study to directly confront two major controversies raised in the empirical literature on life-cycle wage
dynamics.
The first of these controversies involves two fundamentally different views of individual wage dynamics.
In the first view, known as the heterogeneous income profiles (HIP) model, fixed differences between
workers (in talents, skills and other characteristics) result in individual-specific wage trajectories over the
life cycle. While not denying a significant role for random wage shocks, the HIP model interprets these
fixed differences in wage growth rates between workers as a large contributor to the observed increase
in wage inequality with age.1 In the rival model, known as the restricted income profiles (RIP) model,
workers are viewed as having a common rate of expected wage growth over their life cycle, with any ex
post deviation from this expected growth rate entirely driven by idiosyncratic wage shocks. The RIP
model thus attributes rising wage inequality purely to the cumulative effect of random wage shocks.2
A second related debate concerns the degree of persistence of wage shocks faced by individuals over their
1The HIP model is usually defined in terms of years of labour market experience rather than age. In this paper, we use
age as a shorthand for experience. We show in Appendix 1.C that this is an innocuous assumption.
2The RIP model, like the HIP model, does not rule out an important role for worker heterogeneity in explaining differences
in starting wages, and therefore differences in wage levels. Indeed, this is exactly what we find in our results below.
1
2working lives. At one extreme, the stochastic component of wages is modelled as a unit root process,
so that wage shocks have a permanent effect on a worker’s subsequent earnings level (as in the classical
permanent income hypothesis). In the alternative model, the wage process is a persistent, but ultimately
mean-reverting process.
Using 14 years of Australian panel data on male wages, we estimate a model that encompasses these
competing theories of individual wage dynamics. Our results reject the HIP model. This finding is
robust if we replace hourly wage rates with labour income (or ‘earnings’), and holds across sub-samples
broken down by educational attainment. It is also robust to whether the model is estimated using
moments constructed from wage levels or wage growth rates. Second, we reject a unit root in the wage
process, with an estimated autocorrelation coefficient of around 0.95, implying highly persistent but not
permanent wage shocks. Given the well-established difficulty of detecting heterogeneous wage growth
rates and a unit root in short, unbalanced panels (Gustavsson and O¨sterholm, 2014), we address this
concern using evidence from Monte Carlo simulations. We show that our particular estimation strategy is
relatively effective at delineating between the RIP and HIP models, and generally provides more accurate
estimates of the autocorrelation coefficient than the alternative strategies.3
Our study goes beyond the few previous Australian studies on life-cycle income dynamics. Chatterjee,
Singh and Stone (2016), the Australian study most comparable to ours, impose rather than test both
the RIP and unit root assumptions in their model of individual wages.4 Our econometric approach also
differs to theirs, as they use a small subset of information provided by wage autocovariances, whereas we
fit our model to the entire autocovariance matrix using generalised method of moments (GMM). Guvenen
(2009) shows that these higher-order autocovariances can shed light on the true model. We also divide
the sample into four cohort groupings, which enables us to exploit the resulting age variation across
the covariance matrix.5 Our estimation approach also allows us to undertake a full decomposition of
wage inequality, not just changes in wage inequality as in Chatterjee et al.6 More generally, our results
confirm Chatterjee et al. insofar as we find a roughly similar relativity in the variances of transitory and
persistent wage shocks. We are also able to reconcile much of the discrepancy noted in Chatterjee et al.
(2016) between estimates based on wage levels and wage growth rates by making the sample adjustments
suggested in Manovskii et al. (2015).
Our study also adds to a more extensive international literature on individual wage dynamics.7 Despite
3The relative performance of levels versus growth-based GMM estimates has not previously been examined to our
knowledge. Doris et al. (2010) look at the performance only of levels-based estimates, and their wage model does not allow
for either heterogeneous growth or purely transitory shocks. Likewise, Dmytro (2012) focuses only on the performance of
growth-based estimation, whereas Manovskii et al. (2015) look at levels versus growth-based estimation but only in relation
to reconciling differences in estimates of persistent and transitory shocks.
4Dollman et al. (2015) allow for a non-unit root but do not test for heterogeneous growth. However, the HIP model
seems less relevant in their application, as they were attempting to explain the dynamics of disposable household income
rather than individual wages or earnings.
5This point is also demonstrated in our Monte Carlo analysis in Chapter 2.
6Chatterjee et al. also use wage levels, but proceed to first-difference the moments in adjacent periods, which removes
the accumulated impact of the persistent wage shock and any fixed effect. This means they can only comment on changes
in inequality, not the level of inequality.
7Early examples include Lillard and Weiss (1979) and MaCurdy (1982). Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) provide a thorough
survey of the key analytical techniques, main findings and ongoing controversies with a focus on the US literature. Recent
examples outside the US include the Canadian study by Baker and Solon (2003), the UK study by Blundell and Etheridge
3the large number of studies, particularly in the United States (US), no consensus has been reached on
either the heterogeneous growth or unit root questions.8 Guvenen (2009), whose methodology we follow
closely, finds strong support for the HIP model in the US, but this finding has been recently challenged
by Dmytro (2012). Nonetheless, in Section 5.6 we discuss why our finding with regard to the HIP model
may differ to Guvenen’s US finding, including the influence that differing labour market policies may
have on each country’s life-cycle wage dynamics.
We also see our attempt to gain a deeper understanding of life-cycle wage dynamics as a useful input into
broader economic and policy analysis in Australia. This recognises that life-cycle wage dynamics have
important implications for many other economic questions, and are a primary determinant of lifetime
welfare (Storesletten et al., 2004; Huggett et al., 2011). A realistic depiction of individual wage dynamics
is also a key input for dynamic stochastic models with incomplete markets, which are becoming a standard
tool for quantitative tax and broader policy analysis where distributional effects are important.9
In Australia, our study of life-cycle wage dynamics complements wider research into wage and income
inequality.10 Indeed, it is worth noting that our paper only investigates the proximate causes of wage
inequality in a reduced form, and no attempt is made to add to the distinct literature that explores
the underlying causes of wage inequality, be it socio-economic (for example, Whiteford (2015)) or innate
worker heterogeneity (for example, Barrett (2012)).
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 4.4 presents the key life-cycle features of the
wages data, including the need to control for possible time and cohort effects. Section 4.2 presents
the model for individual wages and discusses ways of allowing for non-stationary features of the wages
data, particularly time effects. Section 1.4 emphasises the difficulty in delineating between the HIP and
RIP models empirically, and discusses alternative identification strategies. Section 5.6 presents the main
results, compares them with other studies and discusses the implications for trends in wage inequality
and mobility. Section IV provides some concluding remarks.
1.2 Data and empirical context
1.2.1 Data
This paper uses individual-level wage data from HILDA. The main results are based on the real hourly
wage rate of working-age men.11 This is constructed by dividing weekly gross wages and salaries by
(2010) and Manovskii et al. (2015) who investigate both Danish and German administrative data. The 2010 Special Issue of
the Review of Economic Dynamics by Krueger et al. (2010) summaries inequality trends across a range of other countries.
8See Table 2 in Meghir and Pistaferri (2011), which summarises the findings of studies based on the US Panel Survey of
Income Dynamics (PSID).
9Guvenen (2011) and Heathcote et al. (2009) provide recent surveys of this research area.
10Borland and Coelli (2016) provide a recent survey of Australian empirical studies in this area. Some earlier Australian
studies, such as Barrett et al. (2000) have also looked at wage dynamics, but were limited by the lack of panel data at the
time.
11Appendix 1.C demonstrates that the paper’s main results regarding the HIP model are unaffected if earnings are used
in place of hourly wages.
4hours per week usually worked in all jobs then deflating by the Australian Consumer Price Index. We aid
comparison with previous studies by selecting a similar sample of men aged between 23 and 60 inclusive
whose, usual hours are between 10 and 98 hours per week.12 The estimation period spans 2001 to 2014
inclusive. To maximise the number of observations, we opt for an unbalanced panel and allow anyone
who appears in at least two consecutive waves to feature in the sample. This leaves a total of around
40,000 observations across 14 years to be used in the main results.13
1.2.2 Empirical context
Focusing on a few key dimensions of the wages data will guide our choice of model specification below.
First, average wages display an upward trend over the life cycle, peaking when workers reach their mid-
50s. This is a familiar empirical fact, consistent with workers’ rising productivity as they gain experience
and on-the-job skills with more time in the labour market. This common age profile (along with other
observable factors) explains only a small portion of wage variability and is removed in a first stage
regression as explained further below.
Second, the dispersion in both log hourly wages and earnings increases almost monotonically with age:
the key motivation for our study (Figure 1.1).14 This aggregate picture is confirmed by Figure 1.2, which
plots the variance of log wages for four equally-populated cohort groupings born in the years indicated.
Although each cohort appears to experience a widening wage dispersion over time, the increase seems to
be more pronounced at younger ages. Notwithstanding some variation between cohorts, the age profile
appears to be broadly concave, although not far from being linear.15 Also, the rise in the variance of log
wages is concave in age, regardless of whether one controls for time or cohort effects, although the profile
is somewhat steeper in the latter case (Chatterjee et al., 2016).16
Lastly, Figure 1.3 shows a moderate but clear upward trend in wage inequality over the sample period.
This highlights the possible need to allow for non-stationarity in our model of wages below. To summarise,
the wages data suggest that any model of wages will need to allow for: a) life-cycle trends in both the
mean and variance of wages; b) an age profile in the variance of wages that is non-linear (that is, concave);
and c) non-stationary variances over the sample period.
1.3 The empirical model
Our model specification nests the alternative models of individual wages discussed in the introduction,
and is similar to that used in Guvenen (2009).
12In particular, our sample selection follows Guvenen (2009) and Chatterjee et al. (2016) where practical.
13Further details of the sample selection process are contained in Appendix 4.A.
14The similar age-profile for hourly wages and earnings (or labour income) is consistent with there being no obvious life-
cycle trend in average hours, at least among prime age males. The hours data show a similar pattern in the US (Heathcote
et al., 2010).
15Hahn, Miller and Yang (2016) also find a concave life-cycle profile when examining earnings data from HILDA.
16In the US, it is well known that controlling for cohort effects yields a much steeper age profile than controlling for time
effects (Guvenen, 2009; Heathcote et al., 2010, 2005).
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Figure 1.1: Dispersion in male wages
Source: HILDA Release 14; ABS Consumer Price Index
We begin by making the usual distinction between the part of wages that can be attributed to common
observable factors and the part that is unobservable. The observable part of wages is removed through a
first stage regression of log wages on a second degree polynomial in age (interacted with year dummies)
and dummies for year, cohort, marital status, region and non-English speaking background (NESB).17
The remaining, unobservable component of wages forms the basis of our analysis. It can be broken down
further into a part that reflects individual heterogeneity and the portion that reflects idiosyncratic ‘wage
uncertainty’ or ‘risk’, which we outline in turn.
1.3.1 Modelling unobserved worker heterogeneity
We allow the life-cycle wage profile for each individual i to have its own intercept (αi) and slope (βi):
yHetero.i,h = αi + βih (1.1)
where h is actual age less 22.18 The idea behind the HIP model is demonstrated in Figure 1.4, which
presents stylised age profiles of log wages for two workers, A and B, as well as the mean profile.19
In essence, testing the HIP model amounts to testing whether there is systematic differences between
workers’ slope term βi, that is, whether the variance, σ2β , differs from zero. As is clear in Figure 1.4, any
systematic difference in the slope of workers’ wage profiles will tend to result in rising wage dispersion as
17The first stage regression only explains a small portion of wage inequality with an R2 of 0.18. Adding extra controls
for educational attainment, family type, occupational status and union membership increases the R-squared to 0.33. This
results in a lower estimated transitory variance (around 0.035) in GMM estimation, but does not materially affect the
estimates of other parameters.
18h is therefore a simple measure of (potential) labour market experience. In Appendix 1.C we show that our results are
largely unchanged when we substitute a measure of actual labour market experience.
19Of course, the actual mean life-cycle wage profile is closer to being ‘hump shaped’ than log-linear.
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Figure 1.2: Wage dispersion by cohort
the workers age.
The intercept term αi allows for heterogeneity in wage levels even when there is no heterogeneity in
wage growth. Whether the variance σ2α is different from zero is therefore a conceptually distinct question
and is neither necessary nor sufficient for the HIP model to hold. The intercept (αi) and slope (βi) are
permitted to be correlated in either direction.20
1.3.2 Modelling the stochastic component of wages
The stochastic part of wages is modelled as a first-order autoregressive process (zi,h = ρzi,h−1 +ηi,h) plus
a purely transitory shock (νi,h). We assume each shock, ηi,h and νi,h, is independently and identically
distributed with mean zero and variance σ2η and σ2ν . Allowing for purely transitory wage shocks νi,h
recognises that most previous empirical studies have found an important role for such shocks. As well
as genuine year-to-year wage instability, this component captures measurement error in the income data
that inevitably arises in household surveys.21 The autoregressive coefficient ρ is freely estimated rather
than imposing ρ = 1 (a unit root) as in many other studies.
1.3.3 The overall model
Putting this altogether, the unobserved wage for individual i of age h of a particular cohort is given by:
20This parameter could therefore be used to test competing labour economic theories. For example, a negative sign would
be consistent with the theory that individuals who undertake larger investments in human capital might experience lower
wages initially but higher wage growth rates as their careers progress.
21As noted above, it is well recognised that (classical) measurement error cannot be separately identified without additional
assumptions. See Meghir and Pistaferri (2004) for a discussion of this point.
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Figure 1.3: Wage inequality over time
yˆi,h =
Unobserved part of wages︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ind. heterogeneity︷ ︸︸ ︷
αi︸︷︷︸
Ind. fixed effect
+ βih︸︷︷︸
Ind. growth
+
Wage uncertainty︷ ︸︸ ︷
zi,h︸︷︷︸
Persistent(AR(1))
+ νi,h︸︷︷︸
Transitory
(1.2)
where zi,h = ρzi,h−1 + ηi,h. The variances of the individual-specific intercept and slopes are σ2α and σ2β .
This produces the following variance-covariance matrix:
var(yˆi,h) = σ2α + h2σ2β + 2σαβh+ ρ2var(zi,h−1) + σ2η + σ2ν
cov(yˆi,h, yˆi,h+n) = σ2α + h(h+ n)σ2β + (2h+ n)σαβ + ρnvar(zi,h) (1.3)
for n=1,...,13.
Given the recursive structure of the AR(1) process, var(zi,h) incorporates the accumulation of past shocks
up to h. In practice, we do not have complete work histories for each cohort and must make an assumption
about the size of shocks prior to the beginning of the sample. For this purpose, we assume that:
var(zi,1) = σ2η
var(zi,h1) = σ2η
h1−1∑
j=0
ρ2j (1.4)
In other words, we assume that the variance of zi,h is zero at age 22 and that the variance of ηi,h in years
prior to the person being first observed is equal to the variance of ηi,h over the estimation period. The
assumption that the variance of the persistent process zi,h is zero at age 22 enables σ2α to be identified.22
22Choosing a slightly different age (for example age 24) to initialise var(zi,h−1) has a negligible impact on the paper’s
main results.
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Figure 1.4: Stylised heterogeneous wage profiles
1.3.4 Allowing for time and cohort effects
We also consider numerous extensions of this basic model. In particular, we attempt to capture the
observed non-stationarity in the wages data (as evidenced by the upward trend in wage inequality shown
in Figure 1.3) through the inclusion of calendar time factor loadings pit and λt on the permanent (αi)
and transitory (νi,h) components of wages.23 In this context, higher values of pit can be interpreted as
increased returns to unobserved skills, and associated with greater inequality in long-run earnings. In
contrast, higher values of λt imply greater year-to-year ‘scrambling’ in the income distribution which is
then unwound in the following year (Baker and Solon, 2003). We also include cohort factor loadings on
the permanent component of wages, but omit these for brevity.24 This results in the following modified
model variances and covariances:
var(yˆi,h,t) = pi2t σ2α + h2σ2β + 2σαβh+ var(zi,h) + λtσ2ν
cov(yˆi,h,t, yˆi,h+n,t+n) = pitpit+nσ2α + h(h+ n)σ2β + (2h+ n)σαβ + ρnvar(zi,h,t) (1.5)
for n=1,...,1325
23We also experimented with time factor loadings on ηi,h instead of αi as an alternative way of capturing the non-
stationary in the wages data. The results were very similar and did not affect our conclusion regarding the HIP model.
24It is well-known that one cannot simultaneously control for age, time and cohort effects in a linear regression. However,
the age terms in our model are non-linear, making it possible to include all three in this case.
25We normalise each set of factor loadings to be equal to 1 in first year/cohort, which permits identification.
91.4 Identification strategy
1.4.1 Problems with estimation based wage growth rates
Before proceeding further, it is worth demonstrating why it is inherently difficult to distinguish empir-
ically between the RIP and HIP models, particularly using moments based on wage growth rates. The
problem arises because hypothesised values of σ2β under the HIP model, while economically large, are
numerically small (Baker, 1997).26 This means that empirical tests designed to detect heterogeneous
growth are inherently low-powered (Guvenen, 2009), especially early versions that were based on wage
growth moments, such as the test proposed by MaCurdy (1982). To see this, observe that the wage
growth autocovariances for our basic model in Eq. (1.2) are given by:
cov(∆yˆi,h,∆yˆi,h+n) = σ2β − ρn−1
(
1− ρ
1 + ρσ
2
η
)
(1.6)
for n ≥ 2.
In the case of a unit root, the second term is zero and the HIP model makes a very clear prediction:
all autocovariances beyond order 1 should be positive. Although potentially lacking in power due to the
small size of σ2β , a simple test against the null of these terms being equal to zero is likely to detect the
existence of heterogeneous growth in a moderately-long panel (Baker, 1997; Hryshko, 2012).
However, for ρ < 1, a test based on Eq. (1.6) becomes less clear-cut. This is because the second term
is now negative, which makes the sign of these autocovariance terms parameter- and lag-dependent. In
fact, the sign of Eq. (1.6) is now likely to switch from negative to positive at some critical lag order,
say n?, with a higher value of ρ (for ρ < 1) implying a higher n? all else equal. In such cases, Guvenen
(2009) shows that a test based on these autocovariance terms being positive will often fail to detect
heterogeneous growth even when it is present.
A more promising approach explored by Hryshko (2012) is to fit the wages model to the entire covariance
matrix of wage growth rates using GMM. His Monte Carlo study shows that this approach can accurately
recover the true value of σ2β (and the model’s other parameters) across a wide range of specifications and
parameter values. However, he also finds that this approach is less able to detect the heterogeneous
growth term when the true model contains a highly persistent autoregressive process (ie, ρ ≈ 0.95).27
Unfortunately, the international evidence – as well as the Australian evidence presented below – suggests
that the true value of ρ may actually lie in this corridor of uncertainty.28
26For example, the estimate for σ2β of just 0.0008 found in Baker is considered to be economically large. It implies that
a worker with wage growth rate one standard deviation above the mean would open up a 30 per cent wage advantage after
10 years compared with a worker experiencing average wage growth rate over the same time.
27In particular, Hryshko shows that GMM estimation based on wage growth rates from a simulated small, unbalanced
panel produces insignificant estimates of σ2β when the true model contained heterogeneous growth (σ
2
β=0.0004).
28Two recent panel studies (Gustavsson and O¨sterholm, 2014; Browning et al., 2010), which employ more sophisticated
methodologies that allow for heterogeneity in ρ, both reject a unit root in wages for most workers. They instead find support
for a moderately to highly persistent wage process. While a Dickey-Fuller style test might seem like another good way of
proceeding, these tests offer little insight as they overwhelmingly favour the null of a unit root in short panels (Andrews,
10
Manovskii et al. (2015) raise another concern in using wage growth rates to estimate the model’s pa-
rameters. They find that the well-documented discrepancy between growth- and levels-based estimates
of the persistent wage shock variance in unbalanced panels is caused by greater wage volatility among
individuals in their first (last) year after (before) entering (leaving) the panel.29 They show that this
results in a substantial upward bias in estimates of σ2η when estimation is based on wage growth rates.
We investigate this issue below for Australia.
1.4.2 Estimation using wage levels and cohort groupings
We follow Baker and Solon (2003), Heathcote et al. (2005) and Guvenen (2009) among others in using
covariance information from wage levels to identify the model’s parameters, although we also estimate
our model using wage growth rates for comparison.30 Besides being able to recover additional parameters
(the accumulated value of zh, σ2α and σαβ ), using wages levels exploits covariance information that is lost
when the data is differenced. In particular, the HIP model should generate a convex increase in the
variance of log wages by age, which follows from the quadratic term h2 contained in Eq. (1.3) (Guvenen,
2009). Intuitively, even a small difference in wage growth rates between workers will contribute to a larger
and larger gap in levels over time due to the effects of compounding. By contrast, a purely autoregressive
process can generate at most a linear increase with age (in the case of a unit root with ρ = 1), and will
be strictly concave if wage shocks are anything less than permanent (ρ < 1).
The autocovariance function can similarly provide evidence of the underlying wage process. The HIP
model predicts that the autocovariance between wage levels multiple periods apart should eventually rise,
especially at higher ages (again because of a h2 term in Eq. (1.3)). On the other hand, the RIP model
suggests that the covariance function should be strictly declining at a rate that depends directly on ρ.
In order to exploit the information in wage levels, we need sufficient variation in average age across the
empirical autocovariance matrix.31 To achieve this, we divide the sample into four cohorts, as defined in
Figure 1.2, with each sub-sample containing a roughly equal number of observations. We retain enough
observations to reliably calculate sample moments for each year-year-cohort cell.32 Our approach departs
from studies that pool all cohorts into a single estimation sample, which generates very little variation in
average age.33
1993).
29This discrepancy is found in Heathcote et al. (2010) for the US. Table 2 in Chatterjee et al. (2016) documents the
discrepancy for Australia and a number of other countries.
30In addition to Eq. 1.6, the model moments in growth rates are var(∆yˆi,h) = σ2β+
2σ2η
1+ρ +2σ
2
ν and cov(∆yˆi,h,∆yˆi,h+1) =
σ2β −
(1−ρ)σ2η
1+ρ − σ2ν .
31As noted by Baker and Solon (2003) “this is just an application of the point, familiar from introductory econometrics
textbooks,...that aggregation causes inefficiency in parameter estimation when the aggregation discards within-aggregate
variation in the relevant variables.”
32Ideally, we would estimate a TxT covariance matrix for each birth-year cohort, but the small sample and impact of
attrition make this approach impractical with survey data. Using a large administrative dataset drawn from Canadian
income tax records, Baker and Solon (2003) are able to estimate a much richer model than would be possible here.
33Specifically, an unbalanced panel generates only minor variation in age between years, while a balanced panel implies
that (average) age rises by exactly 1 each year making it difficult to disentangle age from time effects.
11
How well does our estimation strategy work? In Chapter 2, we present evidence from Monte Carlo
simulations that our strategy produces more accurate GMM estimates of ρ than GMM estimation based
on wage growth rates, regardless of whether or not the true model contains heterogeneous growth.34 We
also find that our estimation strategy is more likely to correctly detect the HIP model when the true
wages model contains heterogeneous growth.
1.4.3 Visual evidence from sample covariances
Before turning to GMM estimation, we briefly examine the wage data visually for any clues about the
underlying wage process. Firstly, Figure 1.1 shows that the age profile of the variance of log wages appears
to be strictly concave. This provides preliminary support for an RIP model and a model in which ρ is
somewhat less than 1. Similarly, Figure 1.5 plots the covariance function (Cov(yh,yh+n)) for each age
beginning with those aged 25. The plotted covariances have been smoothed by age to reduce the noise in
the raw covariances and are adjusted for cohort effects.35 Again, the graph looks generally inconsistent
with the HIP model. While there is an occasional up-tick in higher-order autocovariances, this is likely to
be the result of fewer observations at higher orders leading to greater sampling error. The other notable
feature of Figure 1.5 is that the covariance functions seem to decline almost linearly. Again, this points
to a value of ρ close to one.
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Figure 1.5: Sample autocovariance function by age
34This finding extends Hryshko (2012), which only considers the performance of estimation based on growth rates.
35Specifically, we follow the approach in Guvenen (2009) by using a rolling 5-year window for age to increase the number
of observations contributing to each covariance calculation. The covariances for each age-cohort cell are then regressed on
a full set of year-of-birth dummies. The resulting residuals are averaged across cohorts, and it is these covariances that are
plotted in Figure 1.5.
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1.5 Results
1.5.1 Main results
We use minimum distance methods (or GMM) to estimate the models parameters, details of which
are provided in Appendix 1.B. Columns (1) to (3) in Table 1.1 show the results when we allow for
heterogeneous growth, while column (4) shows estimates for the restricted (RIP) model. Columns (1),
(2) and (4) use moments based on wage levels while the third column estimates the model based on
first-differenced wage data. Column (2) uses a diagonal weight matrix for comparative purposes, while
all other GMM estimates are based on the identity weight matrix consistent with most other ‘covariance’
studies.36
Beginning with the HIP v RIP question, all three specifications that allow for heterogeneous growth
produce estimates of σ2β that are small and insignificantly different from zero, providing no support for
the HIP model.37 In contrast, estimates of σ2α – the variance of the intercept term – are significant and
economically large in all levels-based estimations. Overall, this suggests that unobserved heterogeneity is
important in explaining the level, but not the profile, of inequality over the life cycle. Unsurprisingly, the
estimated covariance between starting wages and wage growth rates (σαβ) is also insignificantly different
from zero (see columns (1) and (2)).
For the estimates based on wage levels, the variance of the transitory shock is four to five times that of the
persistent shock. In contrast, estimation based on wage growth rates data (column (3)) yields a smaller
transitory variance and a much larger persistent variance. These findings, including the discrepancy
between levels- and growth-based estimates, are consistent with most past studies including the Australian
study by Chatterjee et al. (2016).38 We attempt to reconcile this discrepancy in the next subsection.39 In
relation to the estimated transitory variance, we again note that a sizeable (but unidentifiable) proportion
is likely to be measurement error.
The point estimates for the autoregressive coefficient ρ range from of 0.92 to 0.95, and these are sig-
nificantly different from one in the levels-based estimations, but insignificant in the growth rate-based
estimation (column (3)). Using differenced wage data seems to reduce the precision of the ρ estimates,
a proposition that we confirm in our Monte Carlo simulations in Chapter 2. On balance, we interpret
these estimates of ρ as moderate evidence against a unit root in wages.40
36The time effects on the transitory shock and cohort effects on the permanent shock are generally insignificant (against
a null hypothesis of 1), so are omitted for brevity.
37We experimented with many other levels-based specifications that allowed for non-stationarity through various combi-
nations of factor loadings on the variance terms. All specifications failed to reject σ2β = 0 at standard significance levels.
These results are available from the authors on request.
38See their Table 2 for summary of international findings.
39For example, our estimates of the persistent and transitory variances are similar to those in Heathcote et al. (2010)
(when they use wage levels) and in Guvenen (2009) when the RIP model is imposed.
40The availability of large administrative datasets in a number of countries has allowed more sophisticated ways of testing
for a unit root in wages. See for example Gustavsson and O¨sterholm (2014) who examine this question using Swedish
administrative data on male wages. They reject the unit root model.
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Table 1.1: Minimum distance estimates - test for HIP
(1) HIP (2) HIP (3) HIP (4) RIP
Fixed effect (σ2α) 0.0305∗ 0.0298∗ 0.0335∗∗
(0.0183) (0.0178) (0.0042)
Heterogenous growth (σ2β) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0002
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0003)
Correlation (σαβ) 0.0007 0.0005
(0.0014) (0.0011)
Var. transitory shock (σ2ν) 0.0470∗∗ 0.0472∗∗ 0.0382∗∗ 0.0509∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0026) (0.0064) (0.0012)
Var. persistent shock (σ2η) 0.0137∗∗ 0.0147∗∗ 0.0395∗∗ 0.0121∗∗
(0.0026) (0.0023) (0.0100) (0.0018)
Persistence of AR(1) (ρ) 0.9264∗ 0.9332∗∗ 0.9063∗∗ 0.9522∗∗
(0.0324) (0.0202) (0.0380) (0.0054)
Year effects on σ2α - pi2002 0.9078 0.9121 0.9204∗
(0.0620) (0.0578) (0.0323)
pi2003 0.9100 0.8375∗ 0.9342
(0.0565) (0.0714) (0.0387)
pi2004 0.8534∗ 0.7672∗ 0.8987∗
(0.0697) (0.0995) (0.0471)
pi2005 1.0426 0.9748 1.0745
(0.0853) (0.0578) (0.0429)
pi2006 0.9789 0.7013∗ 1.0323
(0.0728) (0.1284) (0.0489)
pi2007 1.0172 0.8389 1.0749
(0.0972) (0.0927) (0.0559)
pi2008 1.0059 0.8057 1.0880
(0.1074) (0.1108) (0.0599)
pi2009 1.0399 0.7847 1.1027
(0.1140) (0.1150) (0.0614)
pi2010 1.1428 0.9602 1.1904∗∗
(0.1614) (0.0949) (0.0604)
pi2011 1.0969 0.8806 1.1881∗∗
(0.1432) (0.0977) (0.0644)
pi2012 1.1503 1.1384 1.2469∗∗
(0.1622) (0.1560) (0.0659)
pi2013 1.1044 1.0286 1.2050∗∗
(0.1523) (0.1136) (0.0670)
Data Levels Levels First Diff. Levels
GMM weight matrix Identity Diagonal Identity Identity
*significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per cent; one-sided test against null hypothesis of zero for variance
parameters and one for ρ and factor loadings.
Standard errors in parentheses.
While insignificant (compared to a null of 1) in some years and models, the estimates of the time effect
loadings on σ2α in columns (1), (2) and (4) point to a general upward trend in wage inequality, which we
discuss below.41 Finally, we find that the key estimates are very similar when we use the identity and
diagnoal weight matrix (column (1) versus column (2)).
1.5.2 Discrepancy between wage level and growth estimates
The large discrepancy in our estimates of the persistent variance when using wage levels versus growth
rates is similar to the finding in Chatterjee et al., and is a well-known puzzle in the international lit-
erature (see Table 2 in Chatterjee et al. for cross-country results). A recent study by Manovskii et al.
(2015) exploring the reasons for the discrepancy finds that a large part is caused by ‘rare’ transitory
shocks to wages at the beginning and end of spells within the panel.42 They find that removing these
41The absolute value of the time factor loadings, and therefore the significance in particular years, is sensitive to the choice
of numeraire. In any case, we strongly reject the hypothesis that pit = 1 over the whole period, a test that is invariant to
the choice of numeraire.
42In effect, these transitory shocks are misclassified as persistent when estimation is based on wage growth rates.
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noisy observations and relying only on ‘interior’ observations brings the two sets of estimates into closer
alignment.
We investigate whether this factor can account for the discrepancy in our estimates. To do so, we re-
estimate the RIP model after dropping the first and last observations in an individual’s earnings spell
as well as improbably large annual increases (> 400 per cent) and decreases (< 90 per cent) in hourly
wages.43 Table 1.2, which compares estimates using the ‘full’ and ‘interior’ samples, shows that the
interior sample leads to much closer estimates in levels and growth. In particular, the discrepancy in the
estimates of the persistent variance σ2η is largely eliminated. The estimates of ρ are also brought into
closer alignment.
Table 1.2: Minimum distance estimates - interior spells only
(1) Full (2) Full (3) Interior (4) Interior
Var. transitory shock (σ2ν) 0.0504∗∗ 0.0384∗∗ 0.0341∗∗ 0.0212∗∗
(0.0012) (0.0063) (0.0009) (0.0023)
Var. persistent shock (σ2η) 0.0124∗∗ 0.0398∗∗ 0.0131∗∗ 0.0157∗∗
(0.0021) (0.0100) (0.0018) (0.0039)
Persistence of AR(1) (ρ) 0.9483∗∗ 0.9242∗ 0.9528∗∗ 0.9422
(0.0060) (0.0416) (0.0061) (0.0410)
Data Levels First Diff. Levels First Diff.
GMM weight matrix Identity Identity Identity Identity
*significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per cent; one-sided test against null hypotheses of zero for variance
parameters and one for ρ.
Standard errors in parentheses.
1.5.3 Components of life-cycle wage inequality
Having rejected the HIP model, we now use our estimates of the RIP model to decompose life-cycle wage
inequality into its component parts. In doing so, we evaluate σ2α at the average value of the time factor
loadings. This gives the following empirical equation for wage inequality at age h:
var(yˆi,h) = σ2α︸︷︷︸
0.05
+ ρ2︸︷︷︸
0.95
var(zi,h−1) + σ2η︸︷︷︸
0.012
+ σ2ν︸︷︷︸
0.05
(1.7)
where var(zi,h−1) captures the accumulation of shocks since the individual entered the labour market
at age 23. This decomposition is shown in Figure 1.6, and suggests that, from about age 45, around
one quarter of wage inequality can be attributed to variability in workers’ starting wages. A further
half can be attributed to the accumulation of persistent wage shocks, while the remaining quarter is
attributable to purely transitory fluctuations. In other words, the majority (about three quarters) of
wage inequality from the mid-20s onwards is the result of random factors as opposed to unobserved
heterogeneity. While there are no directly comparable Australian studies, the US study by Guvenen
(2009), which finds support for the HIP model, implies a very different life-cycle decomposition: by age
55, worker heterogeneity accounts for almost 75 per cent of wages inequality in the US (cf. Huggett et
43This has the effect of truncating the sample to 2002 to 2013, and reduces the sample to 28,584 observations. Given the
smaller sample, we choose to omit any time or cohort factor loadings in the interior estimations.
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al. (2011); Storesletten et al. (2004))
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Figure 1.6: Decomposition of life-cycle wage inequality
1.5.4 Trends in wage inequality and mobility over time
In our model, the upward trend in wage inequality seems to be well captured by the rising estimates of
pit over the sample period, as shown in Figure 1.3.44 As mentioned earlier, a rise in pit can be interpreted
as an increased return to unobserved skills and talents. While this finding may seem at odds with the
numerous Australian studies that have found no increase in the return to education over this period (for
example Coelli and Wilkins (2009) and Chatterjee et al. (2016)), these studies have focused on returns
to observed differences in education. On the other hand, movements in pit capture changes in the return
to unobserved differences in human capital and other worker attributes, which may well have risen over
this period.45 The increases in pit also imply that the upward trend in observed wage inequality has been
driven mainly by greater inequality in long-run wages rather than increases in short-term (transitory)
wage inequality.46 This is consistent with a reduction in earnings mobility over this period (Baker and
Solon, 2003).47 While identifying the underlying causes of this trend is beyond the scope of this paper,
it is worth noting that increased wages inequality is a common feature in advanced economies over the
past 20 years.48 It is also worth emphasising that this up-trend in wage inequality among working-age
men does not seem to extend to measures of inequality at the household-level in Australia (Wilkins, 2015,
2016).
44A similar fit is obtained if time factor loadings are attached to ηi,h instead of αi.
45In fact, Baker and Solon (2003) make a similar finding in relation to Canadian male workers.
46When factor loadings on the transitory shock were included in the model, they showed a small downward trend over
the sample period.
47As Baker and Solon note, “an increase in pit preserves the order of individuals in the earnings distribution, but spreads
them out further, and this greater spread persists from year to year.”
48Empirical studies have linked this upward trend to numerous factors including the globalisation of e-commerce and
broader forms of skills-biased technical change (see for example Dabla-Norris et al. (2015)).
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Figure 1.7: Model fit
1.5.5 Comparison with US and other overseas studies
As noted at the outset, the HIP v RIP question remains unsettled in the US where the bulk of studies
have taken place. However, given we have closely followed the analytical approach in Guvenen (2009)
– which found strong support for the HIP model – it would be interesting to investigate some possible
reasons for our contrasting findings.
To begin with, the life-cycle features of the US wages data appear very different to those in Australia.
Figure 1.8 plots the age-variance profile for the US and Australian working age men, where the US data
is taken directly from Guvenen.49 Besides exhibiting a much larger rise in wage inequality over the
life cycle, the US age profile is broadly convex particularly among college-educated workers.50 This is
only consistent with the HIP model, which predicts that inequality should rise at an increasing rate as
sustained differences in growth rates between workers accumulate. This picture is confirmed when we
re-apply our estimation methodology to the US dataset. Specifically, we find significant estimates of σ2β
for both the entire and college-only samples, with our numerical results broadly consistent with those in
Guvenen.51
In short, our contrasting finding with Guvenen appears to be the result of differences in the two countries’
underlying wage process rather than merely differences in methodology. So why might Australia and the
US have different processes for individual wages? A standard theoretical justification for the HIP model
is that workers who are more talented or make larger investments in human capital when young should
enjoy a premium in wage growth over their careers (Baker, 1997). This of course relies on the ability of
49To aid comparability, both lines in Figure 1.8 are based on earnings (ie, wages and salaries) after controlling for cohort
effects through dummy variable regressions. Controlling for time effects paints a similar picture. The US data cover the
period from 1968 to 1993, while the Australian data cover 2001 to 2014.
50Guvenen defines college educated’ as at least 16 years of formal education.
51Our estimate of σ2β of 0.0002 for the whole sample was somewhat smaller than Guvenen’s estimate of 0.00039, but was
very similar to Guvenen’s estimate of 0.00049 for the college-only sample.
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Figure 1.8: Model fit
Source: HILDA Waves 1 to 14, ABS and Guvenen (2009)
firms to detect and reward those workers with higher productivity. There is evidence that this may occur
more readily in the US where the labour market is considered to be more competitive and there are less
onerous hiring and firing rules. For example, Australia (28th) ranks well below the US (3rd) on the labour
market efficiency component of the Global Competitiveness Index (Schwab and Sala-i Martin, 2017), and
has had consistently more rigid employment protection legislation than the US, based on OECD analysis
(OECD, 2013).
To explore this question in a more rigorous manner would require detailed cross-country evidence. Un-
fortunately, there are relatively few studies outside the US that have specifically tested the HIP model,
and there is no obvious pattern among the few studies that have. For example, Baker and Solon (2003)
in Canada and Hoffmann (2013) in Germany both examine male earnings using large administrative
datasets, with the former study finding strong support for heterogeneous growth but the latter finding
little evidence. In the United Kingdom, Hoffmann (2013) rejects the HIP model using data from the New
Earnings Survey. Clearly, further cross-country research will be needed to understand whether labour
market features have an influence on individual wage dynamics.
Conclusion
This paper has sought to uncover the key parameters underpinning life-cycle wage dynamics in Australia.
Using 14 years of panel data, our analysis suggests that individual wages can be well summarised as
the sum of three components: 1) a fixed effect in levels driven by unobserved heterogeneity; 2) a pro-
cess consisting of highly persistent wage shocks; and 3) purely transitory wage shocks that include any
measurement error in the data.
The lack of evidence in HILDA for heterogeneous wage growth rates among male workers is a provocative
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finding, and it would be worth confronting our results with alternative sources of data such as individ-
ual tax records. Also, while we have found no evidence of growth heterogeneity in either the overall
labour market or within broad education groupings (see Appendix 1.C), this does not preclude growth
heterogeneity being an important factor within particular occupations or industries.52
Besides shedding light on the observed trends in wage inequality, our results can better inform the way
that heterogeneity and income uncertainty are incorporated into distributional and related policy analysis
in Australia. This is particularly the case for heterogeneous agent models, which depend on a realistic
representation of wage uncertainty at the individual and household level. Such models are becoming
essential tools in the quantitative analysis of government policies and their distributional impact.53
52Indeed the seminal study by Lillard and Weiss (1979) examined heterogeneous wage growth rates among US scientists.
53See Tran and Woodland (2011) for a recent Australian example.
Appendix
Appendix 1.A Data and sample selection
Table 1.A.1: Key variables
Variable Description HILDA code Mean
Earnings ($ per week) Weekly gross wages + salary all jobs nwscei 1334
Hours Hours per week usually worked all jobs njbhruc 45
Real hourly wage ($ per week) Wages divided by hours deflated by CPI derived 33
Age Age last birthday at June 30 nhgage 40
Weight Responding person sample weight hhwtrps
Region dummy ASGC 2001 Section of State hhsos 0.13
NESB dummy Derived from Country of birth ancob 0.11
Married dummy Marital status from person questionnaire mrcurr 0.59
Table 1.A.2: Sample selection
Removal criteria Observations dropped Observations remaining
Initial unbalanced panel 270,942
Missing wages and hours data 156,652 114,290
Implausible wage and hours 10,702 103,588
Not female 49,115 54,473
Missing demographic data 868 53,605
Not in at least two consecutive waves 1,617 46,152
Not working age 6,576 39,576
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Appendix 1.B Estimation details
We follow many other studies in this area by using minimum distance methods (or GMM) to estimate
the model’s parameters. We compute a T x T covariance matrix weighted by HILDA’s cross-sectional
person weights for each of the four cohorts, and stack the resulting 420 unique moments into a column
vector m.54 Likewise, the 420 model covariances, which are a function of the model’s parameter vector
θ are stacked into a column vector Ω(θ).
The problem is to choose a parameter vector θ that minimises the distance between the moments implied
by the model, Ω(θ), and their empirical counterparts m:
min
θ
(m− Ω(θ))′A(m− Ω(θ))
where A is a positive semi-definite weight matrix, and the sample variance of moment conditions is given
by V . We follow most other studies by using the identity weight matrix, which Altonji and Segal (1996)
show is superior to the optimal weight matrix V −1 when estimating models of covariance structures in
short panels.55 We also show results in the main text when the model is re-estimated using the inverse of
the main diagonal of V as the weight matrix as in Blundell et al. (2008). Subject to standard regularity
conditions (see Chamberlain (1984)), the estimator has an asymptotically normal distribution given by:
√
N(θˆ − θ) ∼ N (0,W )
where the asymptotic variance W is:
W = (D′AD)−1D′AV AD(D′AD)−1
and D is the Jacobian matrix evaluated at c = θ:
D = E
(
∂Ω(θ)
∂c′
)
|c=θ
Appendix 1.C Sensitivity analysis
This Appendix shows that the inability to reject the RIP model is robust to: using work experience
instead of age; earnings instead of hourly wages; restricting the sample to tertiary educated workers;
using household level earnings instead of individual wages; and imposing a unit root (columns (1) to (5)
in Table 5.6.2 below). We now discuss each of these in turn.56
54There are fewer moments when the model is estimated using wage growth rates, because one year is lost in the
differencing process.
55In particular, Altonji and Segal show that using (V −1) in short panels biases parameter estimates towards zero and
that this problem is most severe when the V matrix is large, as is the case here. There is also no guarantee that the variance
of the sample moment conditions will be positive semi-definite matrix when working with unbalanced panel data.
56We undertook a range of other sensitivity checks, including testing whether the main results apply to women and
whether our use of sampling weights in forming empirical moments affected the results. In all cases, we could not reject the
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Experience instead of age
Our main results use age (less 22) as a proxy for labour market experience, rather than a more direct
measure.57 Conveniently, the HILDA survey includes a more direct measure of labour market experience
(coded as ehtjb) that is constructed based on each respondent’s work history. After re-estimating the
model using this variable in place of age, the estimated variance of the fixed effect σ2α is somewhat lower
and the estimated autocorrelation coefficient is lower at about 0.87. However, other estimates are largely
unchanged with the heterogeneous growth term remaining insignificant.
Earnings instead of hourly wage rate
In testing for heterogeneous wage growth rates, we have focused on hourly wages. However, as some
other studies have chosen to use earnings (or equivalently ‘labour income’) in testing the HIP model,
we re-estimate our model using HILDA’s current weekly gross wages and salaries (coded wscei) instead.
Following other studies (for example, Chatterjee et al. (2016)), we confine the sample to full time workers
only (as defined by the variable esdtl) to avoid the volatility in hours created by older workers transitioning
into retirement. Again, the results show no evidence of heterogeneous growth. The estimated variance of
the persistent wage shock is slightly higher. Other estimates are largely unchanged, including the values
of the time factor loadings pit (omitted for brevity in Table 5.6.2).
Dividing sample by educational attainment
Guvenen (2009) finds a greater degree of wage growth rate heterogeneity in his college educated sub-
sample. We therefore explore whether there is support for the HIP model among tertiary educated
workers in Australia.58 When Model 3 is re-estimated on tertiary-educated male workers only, the main
results are largely unchanged. Again, the heterogeneous growth term remains insignificant.
Household instead of individual-level earnings
Whether wage growth rate heterogeneity at the individual level – if it exists – should carry over to
household-level income is unclear. Nonetheless, we re-estimate the model using household labour income
(or earnings).59 To avoid double-counting, the sample now consists only of household heads, defined as
the oldest male of each household, or oldest female where no male is present. The estimated variance of
the transitory wage shock is now higher, as is that of the persistence shock. This is not surprising, as
the overall variance in household earnings is on average about 80 per cent higher than that of individual
earnings in the sample period. Again, the heterogeneous growth term remains insignificant.
RIP model.
57Most other studies also use a person’s age or construct an indirect measure of experience by subtracting total years of
schooling from age, as in Guvenen (2009).
58We categorise individuals based on their highest qualification over the whole panel.
59This uses the HILDA variable hiwsfei.
22
Imposing unit root assumption
Finally, we re-estimate the model imposing ρ = 1, noting the difficulties associated with identifying
a unit root in short panel contexts. This results in a significantly smaller estimated variance for the
persistent shock, bringing it closer to the estimates of Chatterjee et al. (2016) who also impose a unit
root.60 However, the heterogeneous growth term remains insignificant.
Table 1.C.1: Minimum distance estimates - sensitivity analysis
Exper. Earnings Tertiary HH level ρ = 1
Fixed effect (σ2α) 0.0868∗∗ 0.0515∗∗ 0.0271 0.0781 0.0762∗∗
(0.0055) (0.0208) (0.0200) (0.0487) (0.0145)
Heterogenous growth (σ2β) 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
(0.0001) (0.0000) (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0000)
Correlation (σαβ) 0.0009 -0.0007 0.0004 -0.0021 -0.0003
(0.0007) (0.0014) (0.0015) (0.0035) (0.0008)
Var. transitory shock (σ2ν) 0.0361∗∗ 0.0296∗∗ 0.0333∗∗ 0.1507∗∗ 0.0636∗∗
(0.0015) (0.0018) (0.0026) (0.0093) (0.0021)
Var. persistent shock (σ2η) 0.0141∗∗ 0.0151∗∗ 0.0153∗∗ 0.0278∗∗ 0.0033∗∗
(0.0024) (0.0021) (0.0028) (0.0051) (0.0003)
Persistence of AR(1) (ρ) 0.8687∗∗ 0.9604∗ 0.9347∗∗ 0.9528∗
(0.0207) (0.0180) (0.0254) (0.0246)
Data Levels Levels Levels Levels Levels
GMM weight matrix Identity Identity Identity Identity Identity
*significant at 5 per cent; **significant at 1 per cent; one-sided test against null hypotheses of zero for variance
parameters and one for ρ.
Standard errors in parentheses.
60Imposing a unit root also results in a substantially poorer fit, with a general Wald test rejecting the restriction.
Chapter 2
GMM estimation of dynamic wage
models: levels or growth rates?
2.1 Introduction
There is a long history of using panel data to estimate dynamic wage models (e.g. Lillard and Weiss
(1979), MaCurdy (1982) and Abowd and Card (1989)). Out of this literature have emerged two main
empirical controversies: firstly, does the stochastic component of individual wages contain a unit root?
And second, does the deterministic trend in individual wages vary between workers? The latter question
is sometimes known as the heterogeneous income profiles (HIP) versus restricted income profiles (RIP)
debate (Guvenen, 2009). Guvenen (2009) demonstrates that distinguishing between these various models
using generalised method of moments (GMM) estimation is very difficult, especially if the true model
contains a highly persistent stochastic process. This is because the pattern of wage covariances generated
by a model with a highly persistent shock that does not contain heterogeneous growth looks very similar
to the pattern generated by a model with a less persistent shock that does contain heterogeneous growth.
This is exacerbated by the inherent noisiness of the data in short unbalanced panels drawn from household
surveys.
In confronting this difficulty, the researcher faces an important choice in estimation: should the model be
estimated in wage levels or wage growth? While a roughly equal number of empirical studies have opted
for each of these alternatives,1 there is very little econometric evidence on their relative performance.
In a recent Monte Carlo study, Hryshko (2012) argues that GMM estimation using wages growth can
accurately recover the true value of all model parameters across a wide range of specifications and
parameter values. However, his results also show that this estimation approach struggles to correctly
detect heterogeneous growth (i.e. the HIP model) when the true model contains a highly persistent but
1Meghir and Pistaferri (2011) provide a survey of the empirical literature from the United States.
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not quite unit root stochastic process, that is, an auto-correlation coefficient of around 0.95. Moreover,
Hryshko (2012) makes no attempt to compare the performance of growth-based with levels-based GMM
estimation.
In this Monte Carlo study, I systematically explore the relative performance of levels versus growth rates
in GMM estimation of dynamic wage models. I also explore a third variation: using wage levels but
dividing the sample into year of birth groupings rather than simply pooling all cohorts into one sample. I
focus on the particularly difficult case where the true model contains a stochastic process that is almost a
unit root. My results show that estimation based on wage levels divided into cohort groupings is the most
accurate means of detecting the true degree of persistence in the stochastic wage process and correctly
rejecting the null hypothesis of a unit root. This finding is an important contribution to the empirical
wages literature as testing for a unit root is a notoriously difficult task in both time series and panel data
settings (see Gustavsson and O¨sterholm (2014)). I also find that wage levels divided into cohorts is the
most effective method for correctly detecting the presence of heterogeneous growth. The intuition for
why the cohort approach works best is simple: wage levels data contain valuable information that is lost
when the data is first differenced. At the same time, dividing the sample into cohorts retains substantial
variation in age between cells in the sample covariance matrix, which would not exist if all cohorts were
pooled into a single group.2 This information is useful in identifying the age-related trend in wages that
would be generated by a HIP model (Baker and Solon (2003) and Guvenen (2009)). Overall, this study’s
findings provide important guidance to practitioners who wish to estimate dynamic wage models using
short unbalanced panels.
2.2 Methodology
I assess the relative accuracy of GMM estimates based on three different estimation strategies: wage levels
dividing the sample into four cohorts (as used in Chapter 1); wage growth rates; and wage levels pooling
all cohorts together.3 The comparison is based on a synthetic panel of 2000 working-age individuals who
are each randomly allocated one of 50 birth-year cohorts. The sample window is chosen to be 16 years,
consistent with a realistic panel length.4 The log wage (yˆi,h) for individual i of age h is generated from
the following encompassing model:
yˆi,h =
Unobserved part of wages︷ ︸︸ ︷
Ind. heterogeneity︷ ︸︸ ︷
αi︸︷︷︸
Ind. fixed effect
+ βih︸︷︷︸
Ind. growth
+
Wage uncertainty︷ ︸︸ ︷
zi,h︸︷︷︸
Persistent(AR(1))
+ νi,h︸︷︷︸
Transitory
(2.1)
2In an unbalanced panel, using a single sample results in almost no variation in mean age between sample covariance
terms.
3I focus on four cohort groupings because this is probably the maximum number that would be viable for panel surveys
with typical sample sizes. Any more than four would result in too few observations for calculating each cohort’s sample
covariance matrix.
4Given individuals are randomly allocated across 50 birth years, restricting the sample window to 16 years automatically
generates an unbalanced panel.
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where the variances of the individual-specific intercept and slopes are σ2α and σ2β , zi,h = ρzi,h−1 + ηi,h is
the stochastic component of wages with persistence parameter ρ. The persistent and transitory shocks,
ηi,h are νi,h, are independent draws from a mean zero normal distribution with variance σ2η and σ2ν . The
values of αi and βi are drawn independently from mean-zero normal distributions with variances σ2α and
σ2β .
I simulate wage profiles for σ2β = {0, 0.0005} and ρ = {0.95, 1} giving four different combinations of
parameter values, and allowing us to investigate how each estimation strategy performs when the true
model is RIP or HIP, and when the true process does or does not contain a unit root. The other
parameter values are the same across simulations and given by σ2α = 0.04, σ2ν = 0.04 and σ2η = 0.015.
The covariance between αi and βi (σαβ ) is set to zero. Tables 2.3.1 to 2.3.4 show the means and standard
deviations/errors (in parentheses) of parameter estimates over 100 simulations, and the rejection rates
for σ2β = 0 and ρ = 1 in each case.5
2.3 Results
The main findings are threefold. First, the approach of dividing the sample into cohort groupings produces
estimates of ρ with the smallest bias in all four cases. This superiority is most obvious when the true
wage process is governed by the RIP model, but it remains the most accurate method when the true wage
process contains heterogeneous growth. Further, this method is relatively effective at correctly rejecting
the null hypothesis (≈ 50 per cent of the time) of a unit root even when the true value of ρ is close to, but
still less than, one. This is notoriously difficult in short panel contexts (Gustavsson and O¨sterholm, 2014).
When the true model contains a unit root (i.e. ρ = 1), the wage levels by cohort and wage growth rate
approaches both produce estimates of ρ that are downward-biased.67 Nonetheless, both these methods
(correctly) failed to reject the unit root the vast majority of the time (≈ 85 per cent). Overall, the results
suggest that estimation using wage levels and cohort groupings is the most robust way of testing for a unit
root in panel data.
Second, estimation based on wage levels by cohort and wage growth rates both provided relatively un-
biased estimates of σ2β . However, estimation based on wage levels divided into cohort groupings again
outperforms estimation based on wage growth rates in its ability to correctly reject σ2β = 0 when the
true model contains heterogeneous growth. However, I find as Hryshko (2012) does that estimates of σ2β
are biased upwards when the true model contains a unit root. Taken together, these results suggest that
failing to reject σ2β = 0 in estimation based on wage levels and cohort groupings provides strong evidence
against heterogeneous growth.
Lastly, the approach of using wage levels without dividing into cohorts is generally poor at recovering
5Rejection rules are based on a one-sided test and 5 per cent significance level.
6This is also a well-known problem in time series contexts. It also confirms the finding in Hryshko (2012), although that
study only investigated estimation based on wage growth rates.
7For the unit root cases, I only compare wage levels divided by cohort and growth rates as GMM estimation using wage
levels with pooled cohorts often failed to converge.
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the model’s parameters. It badly overstates the value of σ2α under both the RIP and HIP models, and
overstates σ2β under the RIP model. Its estimates of ρ also exhibit a large downward bias.
Table 2.3.1: GMM estimates when true model is RIP (σ2β = 0) with no unit root (ρ = 0.95)
Parameter estimates Rejection rate (%)
σ2α σ
2
β σαβ σ
2
ν σ
2
η ρ σ
2
β = 0 ρ = 1
Wage levels by cohort 0.043 0.00001 -0.00037 0.039 0.015 0.949 6 56
(0.0092) (0.00002) (0.0007) (0.0021) (0.0016) (0.0226)
Wage growth 0.00010 0.040 0.016 0.918 6 19
(0.00009) (0.001) (0.0019) (0.0311)
Wage levels pooled 0.228 0.00049 -0.00794 0.038 0.015 0.836 67 87
(0.1568) (0.00018) (0.00502) (0.0017) (0.0025) (0.0716)
Table 2.3.2: GMM estimates when true model is HIP (σ2β = 0.0005) with no unit root (ρ = 0.95)
Parameter estimates Rejection rate (%)
σ2α σ
2
β σαβ σ
2
ν σ
2
η ρ σ
2
β = 0 ρ = 1
Wage levels by cohort 0.042 0.00045 -0.00023 0.038 0.017 0.941 71 47
(0.0282) (0.00022) (0.00179) (0.0039) (0.0036) (0.043)
Wage growth 0.00049 0.040 0.016 0.937 34 19
(0.00018) (0.001) (0.0019) (0.0419)
Wage levels pooled 0.384 0.00122 -0.01361 0.037 0.022 0.854 73 55
(0.3576) (0.0004) (0.01127) (0.0022) (0.0032) (0.067)
Table 2.3.3: GMM estimates when true model is RIP (σ2β = 0) with unit root (ρ = 1)
Parameter estimates Rejection rate (%)
σ2α σ
2
β σαβ σ
2
ν σ
2
η ρ σ
2
β = 0 ρ = 1
Wage levels by cohort 0.028 0.00014 0.00112 0.037 0.017 0.966 39 15
(0.022) (0.00015) (0.00154) (0.0031) (0.0025) (0.0313)
Wage growth 0.00033 0.040 0.016 0.947 20 14
(0.00016) (0.001) (0.0018) (0.0375)
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Table 2.3.4: GMM estimates when true model is HIP (σ2β = 0.0005) with unit root (ρ = 1)
Parameter estimates Rejection rate
σ2α σ
2
β σαβ σ
2
ν σ
2
η ρ σ
2
β = 0 ρ = 1
Wage levels by cohort 0.036 0.00064 0.00085 0.035 0.018 0.953 60 21
(0.0378) (0.00031) (0.00257) (0.0048) (0.0047) (0.0469)
Wage growth 0.00083 0.040 0.016 0.950 38 15
(0.00018) (0.001) (0.0018) (0.039)
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Chapter 3
Risk aversion among Australian
households
3.1 Introduction
Risk aversion is central to individual decision-making under uncertainty, a theory which underpins stan-
dard economic models of inter-temporal consumption and saving behaviour, portfolio choice and labour
supply to name a few. Risk aversion has also been identified as an important factor in many other areas
of economic inquiry including saving rates (Aiyagari, 1994; Carroll and Samwick, 1998), economic growth
(Devereux and Smith, 1994), wage inequality (Caroli and Garcia-Penalosa, 2002) and occupational choice
(Bonin et al., 2007).
The degree of relative risk aversion, for which the standard measure is the coefficient of relative risk
aversion (γ), also plays a crucial role in many areas of policy analysis. For example, the value of γ is
a key determinant of the optimal structure of the tax system (see for example Imrohoroglu (1998) and
Conesa et al. (2009)) and is important in regulating the economy’s response to changes in monetary and
fiscal policy (see for example King and Rebelo (1999)).
While a wide range of international studies, mostly from the U.S., have attempted to estimate γ, this
has proven to be a difficult task in practice and substantial disagreement over the value of γ remains.1
In any event, there is little empirical evidence on the value of γ for Australia.2 As it seems possible that
Australian households might differ substantially from their U.S. counterparts in their attitude towards
risk and therefore their inter-temporal consumption and portfolio choices, it is important to estimate
this parameter for Australia. This will be particularly useful for researchers who build large-scale models
1See Guvenen (2006) for an attempt to reconcile the conflicting empirical estimates.
2As noted below, the only Australian estimates of γ we could find are in the cross-country study by Gandelman and
Hernandez-Murillo (2015) and the recent simulation study by Iskhakov and Keane (2018a).
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of the Australian economy for the purposes of policy advice and scenario analysis. This is our main
contribution in this paper.
We provide Euler equation-based estimates of γ from the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility
function for Australia using longitudinal consumption data from the Household Income and Labour
Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey and data on aggregate interest rates. These are the first Euler
equation estimates using micro data in Australia as far as we are aware.
To preview the results, our preferred non-linear specifications that allow for the well-known and sub-
stantial problem of measurement error suggest γ lies in the range of 1.2 to 1.4 for the representative
household. To put this in context, for the extreme case that γ = 0, the utility function is linear and the
agent exhibits no risk aversion – a situation we soundly reject. On the other hand, our estimates of γ are
not significantly higher than unity, and thus we cannot reject the logarithmic utility assumption that is
often adopted in macroeconomic policy analysis. Overall, our estimates of γ therefore imply a moderate
degree of risk aversion.
While there are no other Euler equation-based estimates for Australia, Gandelman and Hernandez-Murillo
(2015) found a value of 1.17 for Australia in their cross-country study based on subjective measures of
risk aversion. Our estimates of γ are also similar to the value of 1.5 found in the US study by Alan et
al. (2009) whose approach we generally follow. In models that correct for measurement error we also
estimate the household’s discount factor β and find values of 0.92 and 0.96. These values are consistent
with the bulk of empirical evidence internationally (including Alan et al. (2009)).
The CRRA utility function and our estimation approach embed the assumption that relative risk aversion
is constant with respect to a household’s level of wealth. Previous Australian studies have found mixed
evidence regarding this assumption. We also test this assumption and we are unable to reject the
assumption of constant relative risk aversion. We also attempt to explain the variety of findings from
previous Australian studies.
In the next section, we provide some background about the research agenda around estimating risk
aversion. Section 3.3 describes the data we use and Section 3.4 details our tests of the assumption that
relative risk aversion is constant in wealth. Having established some empirical support for the CRRA
assumption, section 3.5 presents our γ (and other parameter) estimates from various Euler equation
models derived from the CRRA assumption. Section 3.6 provides some conclusions and areas where
further research would be useful in the Australian context.
3.2 Background
Given the fundamental interest around risk aversion and its importance in economic modeling, an ex-
tensive body of empirical research attempts to quantify the degree of risk aversion among households.
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Although there are a number of possible ways to proceed,3 this paper follows the ‘Euler equation’ ap-
proach pioneered in Hall (1978). In short, this approach exploits the relationship between consumption
and interest rates derived from the household’s inter-temporal optimisation problem to uncover the risk
aversion parameter in the household’s underlying utility function.
To operationalise the Euler equation approach, a particular form of preferences must be assumed, and
we opt for the constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function U(C) = C1−γ
1−γ , where C is
consumption and γ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion. A particular advantage of CRRA preferences
is that they imply an empirically tractable Euler equation, namely:
Et
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(1 + rt+1)β
]
= 1 (3.1)
where rt is the return on a generic asset at time t, β is the household’s discount factor and the expectation
operator Et indicates that the household’s consumption decision takes place in an environment where the
value of future variables (such as earnings) is uncertain.
CRRA preferences have a number of other desirable properties, which have made them a popular specifi-
cation in models of inter-temporal consumption decisions under uncertainty. This includes the convenient
feature that the standard (Arrow-Pratt) measure of relative risk aversion is constant in wealth and given
directly by γ,4 while the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) is also constant and equal to
1/γ.5 CRRA preferences also have a number of economically appealing aspects, including the presence
of ‘prudence’, which gives rise to a precautionary (or ‘buffer stock’) savings motive when households face
future income uncertainty.6
The Euler equation approach that we use was initially discredited in the early 2000s in the United States
literature because it generally failed to deliver consistent and reliable estimates of γ and β despite the
large number of studies (Carroll, 2001a). This disappointing performance was attributed to a number of
factors including measurement error in consumption data and difficulty in finding suitable instruments for
the endogenous variables, especially in the case of the log-linearised Euler equation as explained below.
More recently, lengthening panel datasets, improved availability of consumption data, and analytical
refinements have allowed estimation of γ and β, using the Euler equation aproach, in a more precise way.
For example, Alan et al. (2009) derive a GMM panel estimator that explicitly allows for measurement
3A more structural approach would be to estimate the degree of risk aversion via simulated method of moments, as
done in Gourinchas and Parker (2002). Alternatively, stock returns can be used to infer the degree risk aversion, which
is the approach underlying the ‘equity premium puzzle’ literature (see Kocherlakota (1996) for example). An entirely
different approach is to estimate risk aversion based on an individual’s attitude towards actual (Levy, 1994) or hypothetical
(Eisenhauer and Ventura, 2003; Kimball et al., 2008) gains and losses.
4For a generic utility function U(C), the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion is given by -CU ′′(C)/U ′(C). For
other preference specifications, the degree of relative risk aversion and the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution (EIS) are
not simple mappings from preference parameters, and instead depend on the current values of consumption (or wealth).
5This simple inverse relationship for CRRA preferences is what allows the Euler equation to identify the agent’s degree
of risk aversion. However, there are more general forms of preferences in which risk aversion and the EIS are governed
by separate parameters. Encouragingly, the one study to test this inverse relationship empirically found in favour of it
(Yagihashi and Du, 2015).
6For CRRA preferences, relative prudence is equal to γ+1. In general, a utility function exhibits prudence when its
third derivative with respect to consumption is positive (Kimball, 1990).
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error in consumption data, while Alan et al. (2018) show that synthetic panel data based on repeated
cross-sections can overcome the endogeneity problems given a long enough time dimension.7
Following these recent refinements in the international literature, we provide Euler equation-based es-
timates of γ for Australia using data from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) survey. Based upon empirical research and simulation studies from other countries, the HILDA
panel is only now becoming long enough to support this kind of analysis, with around 14 years considered
to be the minimum required panel length (Alan et al., 2009).
While CRRA preferences are a convenient assumption, they impose a restriction on the relationship be-
tween risk aversion and wealth, namely that relative risk aversion is constant with respect to a household’s
level of wealth. In fact, the empirical support for this form of preferences is not overwhelming, in part
because there are relatively few studies that have formally tested the CRRA assumption.8 Therefore, we
undertake an initial test of whether the CRRA assumption is in fact a good one for Australian house-
holds, using an approach based on a household’s share of risky assets, similar to that in Chiappori and
Paiella (2011) and Tsigos and Daly (2016) (the latter being a recent Australian study). Once we account
for endogeneity in risk aversion and wealth as well as measurement error – which we show is crucial in
such regressions – we cannot reject the CRRA assumption.9 While constant for a particular household
over time, our analysis reveals considerable variation in relative risk aversion between households with
a median γ of 1.8.10 As a cross-check, we find that the distribution of this ‘objective’ measure of risk
aversion is significantly correlated with the two subjective measures of risk aversion contained in the
HILDA survey.
We next turn to a detailed description of our data and sample selection.
3.3 Data
The HILDA survey began in 2001 and provides annual data on a broad range of economic and social
topics. The samples used in all components of our analysis comprise household heads of working age. A
head is defined as the oldest male member of a household, or the oldest female in households without a
male adult.
Our definition of household head is not important for the results presented below. We identify a ‘household
head’ so that we can follow individuals over time using the xwaveid variable in HILDA. The analysis is
7Both studies use evidence from Monte Carlo simulations to demonstrate the reliability of their proposed estimators
using plausible data generating processes and based on realistic features of the data with regards to panel length and the
extent of measurement error in consumption.
8Some examples include Ogaki and Zhang (2001); Chiappori and Paiella (2011); Tsigos and Daly (2016); Conlin et al.
(2016).
9In Appendix 3.C, we show that failing to take account of measurement error in wealth in a regression of risky asset
share on wealth can result in a negative estimated coefficient on wealth even when the true coefficient is known to be zero.
10While the median value of 1.8 is somewhat above our Euler equation estimates, we note below estimates of γ using
risky asset shares are very sensitive to the definition of risky asset (see Appendix 3.B) and assumptions about the market
portfolio. For this reason, we consider the point estimates from our Euler equation analysis to be a better indicator of γ
for the ‘average’ or ‘typical’ household.
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based upon household-level data so choice of head is rather arbitrary. In our Euler equation estimates
below we only use couples that stay together so choosing the female as the head of household does not
alter the results. We have verified this using alternative definitions of household head and the results
presented below are unchanged.
We use the sum of expenditure on groceries and meals out as a proxy for household consumption. Unlike
other components of household expenditure, information on these components has been collected in
almost all years of the survey.11 Just as importantly, the data quality of these items is probably higher
than other components of expenditure in the HILDA survey (Wilkins and Sun, 2010), although they still
contain significant measurement error as we quantify in Appendix 3.D. These nominal series are deflated
using State-specific consumer price indices for food.
Because of differing data requirements, the samples used in our risky asset share and Euler equation
estimates differ in a number of key respects, as we now describe.12
3.3.1 Risky asset share regressions
The risky asset share regressions rely on HILDA’s wealth module which is included in only four survey
years: 2002, 2006, 2010 and 2014. The sample is based on an unbalanced panel of these four years
consisting of all responding household heads between ages 23 and 59 inclusive.
In the base model, risky assets are defined narrowly as equities, to allow comparability with the two
existing Australian studies, although we consider broader definitions of risky assets in extended models.
The regressions only include households with positive risky assets (however defined) and those with
information on household size and age of household head. The mean value of the risky asset share is
17 per cent based on the narrow definition of risky assets. The instrumental variable (IV) regressions
also require non-missing data on the instruments, that is, household disposable income and household
consumption (which we again proxy using expenditure on groceries and meals out).
3.3.2 Consumption Euler equations
Again, our Euler equation analysis uses grocery and meals out expenditure as a proxy for overall household
consumption, an approach also adopted in most overseas studies.13 The panel encompasses the period
2001 to 2016 inclusive, except for 2002 where information on expenditure was not collected in HILDA.
Our sample selection choices closely follow Alan et al. (2009) to aid comparability with that study. We
restrict the sample to households consisting of couples who were in a stable relationship over the period in
11The expenditure information is taken from the household questionnaire for the years 2001, and 2003 to 2005, and from
the self completion questionnaire for subsequent years.
12Further details are provided in Appendix 3.A.
13This includes the recent US study by Alan et al. (2009). The use of food (and meals out) expenditure as a proxy for
consumption in most US studies is because food was the only component of household expenditure covered in the US Panel
Survey of Income Dynamics (PSID) from the survey’s inception in 1968 until 1999.
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which they feature in the survey. Also, the Euler equation only holds for an interior solution, we exclude
households who are liquidity constrained, which we define as having zero financial assets in any of the
years they feature in the panel. This along with the age restrictions should go some way to overcoming
the bias in estimates of γ generated when households are subject to borrowing constraints, a situation
that is most likely to affect young households (Keane and Wolpin, 2001). In any case, this restriction
removes only 36 observations. The real interest rate series is calculated as the annual-average nominal
3-month bank accepted bill rate less inflation expectations pertaining to that period.14
3.4 Testing the CRRA assumption using share of risky assets
3.4.1 Previous estimates
This section reviews the empirical support for CRRA preferences before we proceed to our Euler equation-
based estimates. We closely follow Chiappori and Paiella (2011), a recent study that analysed whether
relative risk aversion is constant using Italian panel data on risky asset shares. By solving a 2-period
optimisation problem of a risk-averse investor, they show that the share of wealth invested in risky assets
is proportional to investor h’s relative risk aversion, γh:
αh = 1
γh
E[rm − rf ]
σ2m
(3.2)
where αh is the risky asset share, rm is the return on the risky asset, rf is the risk free rate and σ2m is
the variance of the return on the risky asset.
However, they also formally demonstrate that cross-sectional wealth data alone is insufficient to test
whether relative risk aversion is constant. This is because the distribution of risky asset share in the
population depends on the joint distribution of wealth and risk aversion, not just the form of preferences
(Chiappori and Paiella, 2011). For example, if risk aversion is heterogeneous across the population, it
is reasonable to expect that less risk averse people will earn, on average, higher returns and accumu-
late greater wealth over time. This would lead to a negative correlation between relative risk aversion
(measured by risky asset share) and wealth cross-sectionally, even when the underlying preferences were
CRRA. Chiappori and Paiella show that panel data can overcome this problem, by allowing one to test
whether relative risk aversion varies with wealth for a particular household.
In Australia, Tsigos and Daly (2016) test the relative risk aversion assumption using HILDA wealth
data. Using a different measure of relative risk aversion (based on observed portfolio weights for each
household), Tsigos and Daly find a negative correlation between risk aversion and wealth. However, they
find no relationship between relative risk aversion and wealth when they instead use risky asset share
14We experiment with two different measures of inflation expectations: the Reserve Bank of Australia’s survey of market
economists and the inflation rate implied by inflation-indexed bond prices. The key results are not greatly affected by this
choice.
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as their measure of risk as in Chiappori and Paiella (2011). In contrast, Cardak and Wilkins (2009)
find a small positive relationship between risky asset share and wealth. Their study was also based on
the HILDA survey, but they only had access to a single cross-section of wealth data (for 2002) that was
available at the time.
3.4.2 Our approach
Given the mixed findings in Australia, we retest the question of whether relative risk aversion varies with
wealth. Compared to the previous Australian studies by Cardak and Wilkins (2009) and Tsigos and Daly
(2016), we benefit from an additional 3 waves and 1 wave of data respectively. In particular, this allows
us to use the panel dimension of the HILDA survey, which was unavailable to Cardak and Wilkins. We
follow the measure of risk aversion used in Chiappori and Paiella and Cardak and Wilkins based on risky
asset shares.
The basic equation that we estimate is:
log(αht ) = β0 + β1 log(Wht ) + β2Xht + uh + νht (3.3)
where αht is the share of risky assets for household h at time t, Wht is total financial wealth, uh is a fixed
effect and νht is a random error term. To control for the likely endogeneity between risky asset share and
wealth, we also estimate the equation in first differences (FD) which eliminates the possible bias from uh:
∆ log(αht ) = β0 + β1∆ log(Wht ) + β2∆Xht + ∆νht (3.4)
As pointed out in Chiappori and Paiella, measurement error in the wealth data can also result in biased
estimates of the risk aversion-wealth relationship if not adequately dealt with. This is because total
financial wealth is the denominator of the dependent variable and therefore appears on both sides of
equation 3.4. We show in Appendix 3.C that for a mean risky asset share of less than 50 per cent, standard
multiplicative measurement error in the wealth data will result in moderate to severe downward bias in
estimates of β1 given plausible values for the variance of the measurement error.15 To address the problem
of measurement error, we instrument wealth with disposable household income and food consumption
in the levels equation. Similarly, we use growth in disposable income and growth in consumption as
instruments for wealth in the first difference equation. Our final specification also includes year dummies
(to control for macroeconomic effects) and controls for household composition and age.
15In Appendix 3.C, we assume that 20 per cent of the variance in observed wealth is measurement error. While there is
very little evidence on the extent of measurement error in wealth survey data, studies that have examined measurement
error in food consumption suggest that this assumption is conservative (see for example Ahmed et al. (2006); Brzozowski
et al. (2017)). Further, the bias caused by measurement error is likely to be exacerbated in the first difference regression,
because the process of differencing data magnifies the noise-to-signal ratio.
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Table 3.4.1: Risky asset share regressions
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS Level IV Level OLS FD IV FD IV FD IV FD
Risky assets: numerator E E E/FA E E+C+T E+C+T+BE+S
denominator: FA FA FA FA FA FA+BE+S
Total Financial Assets* -0.128 -0.047 -0.313 -0.173 -0.226 -0.033
(0.0122) (0.0452) (0.0191) (0.139) (0.1355) (0.0222)
Year dummies
2006 -0.056 -0.08
(0.0405) (0.042)
2010 -0.229 -0.248 -0.157 -0.136 -0.099 -0.012
(0.0437) (0.0451) (0.0642) (0.0664) (0.0658) (0.0138)
2014 -0.363 -0.391 -0.168 -0.161 -0.166 -0.024
(0.0463) (0.0481) (0.0677) (0.069) (0.0684) (0.0135)
HH size -0.205 -0.218 -0.258 -0.342 -0.211 0.035
(0.0409) (0.0418) (0.0759) (0.1018) (0.0965) (0.0195)
Age 0.076 0.077 0.015 0.012 0.008 0.007
(0.0186) (0.0189) (0.0303) (0.0319) (0.0312) (0.0056)
Age squared -0.081 -0.085 -0.025 -0.022 -0.018 -0.01
(0.0215) (0.0219) (0.0371) (0.0388) (0.0381) (0.0071)
Constant -1.415 -2.199 -0.16 -0.127 0.029 -0.055
(0.3946) (0.5738) (0.6024) (0.6331) (0.6161) (0.1064)
N 6952 6849 3111 3070 3245 10408
Standard errors in parentheses.
E=Equities; C= Cash investments; T=Trusts; BE=Business equity; S=Superannuation; FA=Financial assets = E+C+T+
Bank accounts.
∗ Equal to denominator used to calculate risky asset share.
3.4.3 Results
As suspected, the estimated relationship between risky asset share and wealth is sensitive both to whether
we use instrumental variables to adjust for the impact of measurement error and whether the model is
estimated in levels or first differences (Table 3.4.1). The basic OLS regression in levels (column 1) shows a
strong and highly significant negative relationship (-0.13) between risky asset share and wealth. However,
once we adjust for the impact of measurement error by instrumenting for wealth, the coefficient on wealth
falls in magnitude and becomes insignificant (column 2). As we argued above, there are good reasons
to think that measurement error would contribute to a negative cross-sectional relationship, even when
none truly exists, if the mean risky asset share is less than 50 per cent.16
Column 3 re-estimates the basic model in first differences. The coefficient on wealth is again negative,
but is imprecisely estimated and not significantly different from zero at standard confidence levels.
Columns 4 and 5 experiment with expanded definitions of risky assets. Column 4 adds cash investments
(bonds and the like) and trusts to the measure of risky assets, while the regression in column 5 additionally
includes business equity and superannuation. In the latter regression, the denominator is also adjusted
to include business equity and superannuation. The coefficient on wealth remains insignificant, although
it continues to be negative.
16The mean share of risky assets in the data is well below 50 per cent unless superannuation is included. Including
superannuation as a risky asset results in a mean risky asset share of 73 per cent. If the model in column 1 is re-estimated
using this broader measure of risky assets, the estimated coefficient becomes close to zero, which is what we would expect
based on our simulation graph in Appendix 3.C.
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Given the difference between the OLS and IV estimates, we explore whether the results are robust
to alternative instruments for wealth. One obvious alternative instrument for change in wealth is the
cumulative difference between disposable income and consumption in the intervening periods between
observations on wealth. In other words, this utilises income and consumption data in years that did not
contain a wealth module in HILDA. For example, for 2006 we subtract cumulative food consumption
from cumulative disposable income for each household over the period 2002 to 2006, which yields a ‘flow’
measure of change in wealth. When we use this variable as the instrument in models 3 to 5, the key
results are unaffected.
We also conduct a weak instruments test, and find that our chosen instruments are well correlated with
financial wealth and change in financial wealth.17 A test of over-identifying restrictions fails to reject the
null hypothesis that the chosen instruments are exogenous for models 3 to 5, but does reject the null for
model 2. We also try including labour force participation as a component of Zt, and use its lag as an
instrument. This addition does not affect the main results in Table 3.4.1.
Comparison with Tsigos and Daly’s results
In finding no significant relationship between risky asset share and wealth, our results confirm the results
from Tsigos and Daly’s sensitivity analysis but contradict their main result. However, their main result
– that relative risk aversion falls with wealth – is based on a different measure of risk that uses portfolio
weights calculated using external information on asset returns. Tsigos and Daly do not attempt to explain
why the two approaches yield different results in their paper. It is also worth noting that, compared with
Tsigos and Daly, our test of the risk aversion-wealth relationship benefits from an extra year of wealth
data, giving our test additional power.
While we are unable to reject the CRRA assumption, the estimated coefficient on wealth is negative in all
five specifications albeit insignificant in four cases. We therefore view our results as providing tentative
support for the CRRA, particularly given that the insignificant estimates only arise in the instrumental
variable regressions. Additional years of HILDA data going forward will help us to work out whether risk
aversion really is constant with respect to wealth or not.
Distribution of implied relative risk aversion parameter
Equation 3.2 can be used to calculate the distribution of γh across the population. However, as Chiappori
and Paiella (2011) note, this distribution is only identified up to a scale factor, given by the ratio of the
excess return to the variance of the risky portfolio rm−rfσ2m . Taking the plausible (and simple) case where
this ratio is equal to one, the value of γh is just the inverse of the risky asset ratio for investor h. Clearly,
the derived value of γh will depend inversely on the definition of ‘risky asset’, and will be higher or lower
for narrower and broader definitions respectively. Additionally, very small values of αh will result in
17The correlation between financial assets and income is 0.44 in levels and 0.18 in growth terms, while the correaltion
between wealth and consumption is 0.26 in levels and 0.08 in growth terms.
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very large values of γh. Following Chiappori and Paiella we therefore truncate the distribution of risky
asset shares to exclude values less than 6 per cent and compute the median rather than mean value.
The median estimates of γh are 1.1, 2.2 and 2.4 across the three definitions of risky assets used in our
regressions. We also find little evidence that γh varies by wealth. Table B.1 in Appendix 3.B contains
further details.
Correlation with subjective data on risk aversion
An interesting question is whether the risk aversion measure derived from risky asset shares correlates
with subjective measures of risk aversion contained in the HILDA survey. In particular, the two seperate
survey questions ask respondents to indicate the degree of financial risk they are prepared to take.18 The
risky asset share is significantly correlated with both subjective measures, with a correlation coefficient of
-0.25 for one subjective measure (which measures risk aversion) and 0.05 for the second measure (which
measures risk appetite).
3.5 Estimates of risk aversion using a consumption Euler equa-
tion
Based upon our tentative conclusion that relative risk aversion is constant with respect to wealth, we
now explore Euler equation estimation based on CRRA preferences. The Euler equation approach of
recovering preference parameters began with Hall (1978), and we follow the essence of this approach. In
particular, with CRRA preferences, a time discount factor β and an interest rate r, the Euler equation
linking consumption in period t to consumption in period t+1 for household h is:
(
Cht+1
Cht
)−γ
(1 + rt+1)β exp (θ∆Zht+1 + ∆vht+1)− 1 = t+1 (3.5)
Et [t+1] = 0 (3.6)
Where the expectation operator relates to the time dimension, this implies that the mean of the expec-
tational error, t+1 is equal to 0 for a given household over time rather than for the cross section.
Two other points about Equation 3.5 are worth making. First, this condition holds only for an interior
solution for consumption, and will generally not hold for households subject to binding borrowing con-
straints. Second, Equation (3.5) is derived on the assumption that consumption and leisure are additively
separable in the household’s utility function. As a sensitivity test of our main results, we also consider
the case where consumption and leisure are non-separable.
18The HILDA codes are _firisk and _pntrisk respectively. For the former variable higher values indicate higher risk
aversion, whereas for the latter, higher values imply lower risk aversion.
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3.5.1 Exact non-linear equation versus the linearised version
Previous studies have typically proceeded in one of two ways: estimating the exact, non-linear Euler
equation as it appears in 3.5 using generalised method of moments (GMM); or taking a first- or higher-
order linear approximation of the Euler equation and using OLS or linear IV estimation. Both approaches
have drawbacks.
To begin with, both approaches require instruments for the model’s endogenous variables – consumption
growth and the interest rate. In the non-linear case, economic theory implies that any variables in the
consumer’s information set at time t are valid instruments, including lags of consumption growth and the
interest rate. However, Carroll (2001a) and Alan et al. (2009) show that estimates based on the exact
non-linear equation are biased when the consumption data contains measurement error, which is almost
certainly the case in practice. These studies suggest that estimates of β will be particularly biased in the
presence of measurement error, and this bias does not improve with a longer panel length (Alan et al.,
2009).
The linearised approach overcomes the problem with measurement error,19 but creates its own problems.
To see this, first note that the first-order approximation is given by:
∆ log(Ct+1) =
1
γ
[log(β) + log(1 + rt+1) + θ∆Zt+1 (3.7)
+∆vt+1 + log(1 + t+1) + kt]
where kt includes higher order terms remaining from the approximation process.
The problem is that the composite error term is now likely to be correlated with consumption growth
and interest rates via the higher-order terms in kt. Carroll (2001a) shows that these high-order terms are
inherently endogenous in a standard model of life-cycle consumption behaviour with wage uncertainty,
and that estimates of γ will be severely biased. A further disadvantage of using equation 3.7 is that β can
no longer be recovered as it is subsumed into the constant along with the mean values of the measurement
error and approximation errors.
Various solutions have been proposed to overcome the difficulties with each of these approaches. In the
non-linear case, Ventura (1994), Chioda (2004) and Alan et al. (2009) show that explicitly taking account
of measurement error in consumption can yield relatively accurate estimates of the preference parameters
γ and β even in panels of only moderate length (that is, around 15 years of data). Each of these studies
essentially proceeds by assuming that true consumption (C?t ) is subject to log-normal iid measurement
19With multiplicative measurement error, log-linearising renders the measurement error additive meaning that measure-
ment error would no longer affect the consistency of parameter estimates.
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error ηt with equal variance σ2η across households, such that Ct = C?t ηt. The modified Euler equation is:
Et
[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(1 + rt+1)β exp (θ∆Zt+1)− exp(γ2σ2η)
]
= 0 (3.8)
While this single moment equation does not allow β and σ2η to be separately identified, Alan et al. (2009)
show that an analogous moment condition for two-period apart consumption (Ct+2/Ct) can be used to
identify σ2η (and therefore β).
Alternatively, Alan et al. (2018) show that relatively precise estimates of γ can be obtained using the
linearised model if a long enough time series on consumption is available. However, their paper suggests
that ‘long enough’ equates to perhaps 40 years of data, a requirement that few if any panel surveys satisfy.
As a practical alternative, they show that a synthetic panel formed from repeated cross-sectional surveys
over a long enough period can deliver reliable estimates of γ using the linearised Euler equation.
3.5.2 Our approach
With (at most) 15 years of available consumption data in the HILDA survey, we opt for GMM on the
exact non-linear Euler equation, allowing for measurement error in our preferred specifications. For
reference, we also obtain an estimate of γ from a linearised version of the model, noting the caveats above
in relation to biased estimates in small panels such as ours.
In dealing with measurement error, we consider two approaches. As we use a single moment equation,
neither approach allows us to separately identify the discount rate β and the variance of the measurement
error σ2η without further moment conditions or an ‘external’ estimate of σ2η.20 In the first approach, we
estimate a single parameter, which is some unknown combination of β and σ2η. In the second approach,
we use separate estimates of the variance of the measurement error σ2η, which enables us to recover an
estimate of β. This analysis is reported in Appendix 3.D.
The vector ∆Zt can in principal consist of any variables that may affect the marginal utility of consump-
tion, including endogenous variables such as labour supply choices (Attanasio and Low, 2004). While we
experiment with other variables, our final specification for ∆Zt only includes change in household size
as in Alan et al. (2009). Changes in household size should have a large and direct effect on marginal
utility, and this has been confirmed empirically (Attanasio and Low, 2004). We also include a 2008 year
dummy in some specifications. This dummy would capture a possible structural break in the relationship
between consumption growth and interest rates that may have occurred with the onset of the global
financial crisis.
20We also consider adding a second two-period apart moment condition, which would allow β and σ2η to be disentangled
(Alan et al., 2009). However, we found that the addition of two-period apart moments greatly reduced the precision of the
parameter estimates, resulted in implausible values for γ and often led to non-convergence in our GMM estimation routine.
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Empirical model
Considering all of the above gives the following moment conditions for each period t (where the household
superscript has been suppressed) whose sample counterparts are used in GMM estimation:
Et
{[(
Ct+1
Ct
)−γ
(1 + rt+1)β exp (θ∆Zt+1)− exp(γ2σ2η)
]
Xt
}
= 0 (3.9)
where Xt is the set of instruments at time t, as described in the next section.
As noted above, we also estimate a standard linearised Euler equation:
∆ log(Ct+1) = α+
1
γ
log(1 + rt+1) +
θ
γ
∆Zt+1 + et+1 (3.10)
where α now includes log β as well as the means of the higher-order approximation errors, and et now
includes the household’s expectational error, the measurement error and the time-varying components of
the approximation error.
Choice of instruments
We follow many previous studies in using lags of the interest rate (in addition to a constant) and con-
sumption growth as instruments in our non-linear GMM estimation. There are a number of reasons
why these are likely to be good instruments. First, rational expectations suggest that lagged variables,
which are known to the household at time t, will be uncorrelated with their forecast error the following
period. Second, consumption and interest rates tend to be adequately correlated with lags of themselves,
avoiding the problem of ‘weak instruments’. Lastly, simulation exercises have shown that they are valid
in a standard life-cycle model environment (Alan et al., 2009). We also use change in household size as
an instrument for itself, and do likewise with the 2008 year dummy where present. We also experiment
with dropping lagged consumption growth from our instrument list (see column 4 in Table D.1). This
leaves the lagged interest rate and a constant to identify the two parameters of interest γ and β, which
is essentially the just-identified model applied in Alan et al. (2009). Because the linearised model is a log
transformation of the true model, we substitute log versions of the instruments used in the non-linear
equation.21
All estimates of the non-linear model are based on a standard two-step GMM with robust weight matrix.
Estimation based on an alternative weight matrix, such as iterative GMM, had very little impact on the
results. The linearised model is also estimated using (linear) GMM.
21In fact, by subsuming the measurement error into the error term, the error term becomes an MA(1) process. While
this means that the first lag of the interest rate is no longer a valid instrument, we find that using the second lag of the
interest rate results in implausible (negative) estimates of γ.
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Allowing for non-separable consumption and leisure
The Euler equations (3.5) and (3.10) were derived on the assumption of separability between consumption
and leisure. However, the few international studies that have formally tested separability have generally
found against this assumption.22 As a sensitivity test, we estimate a modified Euler equation derived
from non-separable Cobb-Douglass preferences U = 1ρ1ρ2 (C
ρ1L1−ρ1)ρ2 , where L is leisure. Here, the
coefficient of relative risk aversion is a combination of both utility parameters and is given by 1− ρ1ρ2.
The resulting Euler equation is:
Et
[(
Cht+1
Cht
)ρ1ρ2−1(
Lht+1
Lht
)ρ2−ρ1ρ2
(1 + rt+1)β exp (θ∆Zht+1 + ∆vht+1)
]
= 1 (3.11)
3.5.3 Results
The GMM point estimates of γ range from 1.18 to 1.39 across the four separable specifications tested;
see Table 3.5.0. This equates to an estimated EIS of between 0.74 and 0.85. In the context of Euler
equation-based studies, the GMM estimates are relatively precise with standard errors between 0.17 and
0.24. The estimate for γ of 2.4 from the linearised Euler equation is quite a bit higher than the GMM
estimates, but is very imprecise. This specific finding is very similar to that in Alan et al. (2009) using
PSID data. Their simulation exercise in the same study highlights that estimates of γ based on linearised
models are prone to severe biases in cases where the time dimension is less than 30 years or so (see also
Attanasio and Low (2004)).
As noted above, β and σ2η are not separately identifiable without further assumptions (or additional
moment conditions). In models 4 and 5, we assume that measurement error accounts for 80 per cent
of the overall variance in consumption growth, a proportion guided by our separate estimates in Table
D.1. Given the variance in the Australian consumption data, this implies a measurement error variance
of around 0.095 and yields estimates for β between 0.92 and 0.96 across two specifications.
The coefficient on change in household size gives an explanation for the observed hump-shaped profile of
consumption over the life cycle, and is relevant for the construction of equivalence scales (see Gourinchas
and Parker (2002) among others). Given our sample of households is restricted to couples who have
stayed together, this coefficient basically measures the marginal utility associated with an extra child.
The estimated coefficient averages about 0.3 for the GMM estimator, with a somewhat higher estimate
of 0.48 using the linearised model. These estimates are in the range of those obtained in international
Euler equation studies using food expenditure (for example, as Attanasio et al. (1999)), but somewhat
below those in Alan et al. (2009).
In the non-separable model, we estimate a coefficient of relative risk aversion of 2.23 (column (6)).
22We are not aware of any Australian studies that have examined this question.
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Table 3.5.0: Euler equation estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Log. Lin. EGMM EGMM EGMM EGMM EGMMn
Coeff. of relative risk aversion (γ) 2.381 1.364 1.285 1.389 1.18 2.245
(1.261) (0.166) (0.202) (0.236) (0.199) (0.734)
Discount factor (β) 0.921 0.962
(0.061) (0.023)
β/Meas’nt error in consumption 0.761 0.806 0.744
(0.065) (0.081) (0.226)
Household size (θ) 0.524 0.358 0.329 0.376 0.294 1.445
(0.28) (0.069) (0.077) (0.093) (0.068) (1.115)
2008 dummy -0.074 -0.07
(0.01) (0.05)
Constant 0.007
(0.004)
Inflation measure for real interest rate Survey Survey Survey Survey Bond M. Survey
Instruments**:
Lagged interest rate Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Lagged consumption growth No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Households 7225 6227 6227 7225 6227 3249
Observations 44966 35254 35254 44966 35254 16430
EGMM = exact GMM; EGMMn = exact GMM with non-separable preferences.
Standard errors in parentheses.
* Measurement error variance set to 80 per cent of variance in consumption growth, consistent with our findings
in Appendix 3.D.
** The set of instruments also includes a constant in all equations, as well change in HH size and the GFC dummy
where present for columns (1) to (5). Lagged changes in household leisure time, and age and age-squared of the
household head are also included for the model in column (6).
While somewhat higher than the separable model estimates, the much larger standard error indicates no
statistically significant difference from the separable estimates at standard confidence levels.
We run a series of tests to check the sensitivity of our results to sample selection. We find that the exclusion
of consumption growth outliers has very little impact on the results, nor does introducing a requirement
that a respondent appears in at least five consecutive waves (as per Alan et al. (2009)). However, we
find that including households whose head has begun or ended a marriage or de facto relationship during
their time in the panel leads to implausibly low estimates of γ (well below 1) and instability in the GMM
estimation procedure. In column 5, we experiment with an alternative real interest rate series, which is
calculated using the inflation rate derived from market pricing of inflation-linked bonds. This leads to
an only slightly lower estimate of γ.
Comparison with international estimates
Overall, our point estimates of γ for Australia based on the non-linear Euler equation are within the
range of recent estimates obtained in the US.23 In the most comparable US study, Alan et al. (2009)
shows GMM estimates of γ ranging from 1.15 to 1.53 using data from the PSID, with a preferred point
estimate of 1.45. Our estimates of γ are also within the range of estimates found in Gourinchas and Parker
(2002), who use the quite different approach of simulated method of moments. However, Kocherlakota
23We found very few recent studies outside the US.
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(1996) argue that these moderate estimates of γ conflict with the very high values needed to explain the
large equity premium in the US. Finally, our estimates of 0.92 and 0.96 for β compare to a range of 0.87
(which the authors considered implausibly low) to 0.99 found in Alan et al. (2009). Our estimates of β
are economically plausible, albeit they probably lie towards the lower end of the range of values used to
calibrate macroeconomic models for simulation analysis.
3.6 Conclusion
Testing the CRRA assumption empirically is crucial as it underpins many theoretical and applied models
of decision making under uncertainty, and our paper provides some qualified empirical support for the
CRRA assumption for Australia. That said, given the difficulties associated with measurement error
in the wealth data as well as the deeply endogenous relationship between risky asset share and wealth,
further studies are needed to increase the level of confidence in this result. Such future studies will benefit
from additional waves of panel data and may be able to approach the question from a different angle to
ours, perhaps relying also on the subjective data in HILDA.
While informative, our Euler estimates of the coefficient of relative risk aversion γ are also subject to
uncertainty. Other approaches, such as the more structural simulated method of moments technique
established by Gourinchas and Parker (2002), should be used to confront our results given the heavy
reliance on this parameter in applied policy analysis.
A recent working paper by Iskhakov and Keane (2018a) estimates a value of 0.8 for γ using simulated
method of moments combined with HILDA data. This implies a much lower degree of relative risk
aversion than we find.
Our estimates of γ also have interesting implications for precautionary saving that could be explored
further.24 In particular, Kimball (1990) shows that for consumers who face income (or other) uncer-
tainty, the strength of the precautionary saving motive depends directly on their degree of prudence.25
With CRRA preferences, our preferred estimates of γ imply a coefficient of relative prudence (given by
CU ′′′(C)/U ′′(C)) between 2.2 and 2.4.26 A structural life-cycle model could be used to explore what this
implies for the proportion of household wealth attributable to precautionary saving. We are unaware of
any Australian studies that have looked at this question.27
24There is a large empirical literature devoted to measuring the proportion of household wealth attributable to precau-
tionary saving. Somewhat frustratingly, this literature has produced a very broad range of estimates. See Lusardi (1998)
and Carroll and Samwick (1998) for examples at either extreme.
25Deaton (1991) and Carroll (2001b) among others point out that the prospect of a borrowing constraints can cause
households to engage in precautionary saving even when the utility function does not exhibit prudence.
26As explained above, under CRRA preferences, the degree of relative prudence is simply equal to γ + 1.
27Hanel and Haisken-DeNew (2017), using HILDA data, find a large effect of uncertainty on savings (i.e. a strong
precautionary saving motive), but do not quantify its contribution to overall household wealth.
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Appendix 3.A Sample selection
Table A.1: Sample selection for the risky asset share regressions
Dropped Remaining
Unbalanced panel of respondents 317,738
Keep years for which there are wealth data 241,025 76,713
Keep working age 38,730 37,983
Keep household heads 17,280 20,703
Keep positive risky assets 1,250 19,453
Additional observations were lost in first differencing and because
instrumental variables contained some missing values.
Table A.2: Sample selection for the Euler equation analysis
Dropped Remaining
Unbalanced panel of respondents 317,738
Keep couples who did not split up 36,423 281,315
Keep couples 151,319 129,996
Keep HH heads 54,347 75,649
Keep non credit constrained housheolds 36 75,613
Keep working age 1,717 73,896
Keep non-missing data 19,887 55,726
Additional observations were lost because of the presence of lagged variables
in the equation and the instruments.
Appendix 3.B Relative risk aversion estimates by net worth
Table B.1: Median relative risk aversion estimate based on risky asset share
Net worth quartile Equities and shares +Bond-like assets +Bus. Equity and Super
Bottom 2.24 2.15 1.1
Second 2.6 2.44 1.1
Third 2.47 2.28 1.09
Top 2.43 2.01 1.08
Overall 2.47 2.18 1.09
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Appendix 3.C Impact of measurement error in wealth on risky
asset regressions
Research on the impact of measurement error in household panel data has mainly focused on income
and expenditure data (see Bound, Brown and Mathiowetz (2001) for a discussion), but it is likely that
wealth data also suffers from substantial measurement error. This appendix explores the impact on the
estimated relationship between risky asset share and wealth.
We begin by assuming that the logarithm of household wealth, logW ?h , is normally distributed with mean
µW and variance σ2W? , where the star denotes the true value of the variable.28 Each household invests a
share α? in risky assets W ?p and (1− α?) in risk-free assets W ?f .
Observed assets are subject to multiplicative measurement errors up and uf , so that Wj = W ?j uj for
j = p, f . We also assume that log(up) and log(uf ) are normally distributed with mean zero and variances
σ2p and σ2f respectively. We further assume zero correlation between the two measurement errors.
For simplicity, we also assume that households have a common risky asset share α?h = α¯?. In this setting,
cross-sectional variation in W ?p and W ?f are driven solely by a household’s wealth level. Observed wealth,
W , and the observed risky asset share, α, are then given by:
W = W ?p up +W ?f uf
= α?W ?up + (1− α?)W ?uf
α = α
?W ?up
α?W ?up + (1− α?)W ?uf (3.1)
We are interested in how measurement error of this kind affects OLS estimates of β1 in the following
regression:
log(αh) = β0 + β1 log(Wh) + h (3.2)
In the absence of measurement error, OLS estimates of β1 are unbiased, consistent and equal to zero
given that the correlation between α?h and W ?h is zero by construction. However, in the presence of
measurement error, the covariance between αh and Wh becomes:
Cov(logαh, logWh) = Cov[log(α?W ?up + (1− α?)W ?uf ), log( α?W ?up)
− log(α?W ?up + (1− α?)W ?uf )] (3.3)
This will generally not be equal to zero as measurement error affects both the dependent and independent
variables. This fact also makes the direction of the bias ambiguous, as it will depend on the precise values
28From now on we suppress the subscript h unless it is needed to remove ambiguity.
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of α¯ as well as the relative variances of the measurement errors. While there is no way of analytically
quantifying this covariance expression, and therefore the direction and size of the bias, we can evaluate
it numerically by simulating a large number of draws of W ?, up and uf .29
Figure 3.C.1 shows how the bias in OLS estimates of β1 varies with different values of α¯ based on the
numerical evaluation of equation 3.3. The simulations assume that the variances of log(up) and log(uf )
are equal to each other and impose a signal-to-noise ratio of four (i.e. σ2r and σ2f are one-quarter the
variance in log(W ?)).30 For values of α at or below 0.5, OLS estimates of β1 have a negative bias that
becomes more severe as α¯ gets smaller. For values of α¯ above 0.5, the bias in β1 is positive but of relatively
small magnitude. In short, the most severe (negative) bias in estimates of β1 are likely to occur when
the average risky share is less than 0.5, which is the situation we face in the main text.
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Figure 3.C.1: Bias in OLS estimates of β1
29The covariance depends on non-linear transformations involving the sum of two log-normal random variables, which
itself has no close form.
30The simulations involved 1,000,000 random draws of W ?, up and uf for each value of α¯.
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Appendix 3.D Estimates of measurement error in grocery data
This appendix estimates the variance of measurement error in grocery expenditure data, which is an
input into our Euler equation analysis in the main text.
We begin by making the common assumption that measurement error is multiplicative, so that Cit = ηht C?t
where C?t is the true (unobserved) consumption for each household h.31 We further assume that the
measurement error ηt is an MA(1) process such that log ηt = t + θt−1 where  is a normally distributed
iid error with with constant variance σ2 . Consumption growth is then given by:
∆ct = ∆c?t + t + (θ − 1)t−1 − θt−2 (3.1)
This implies the following variance and first- and second-order autocovariances for ∆ct:
Var(∆ct) = Var(∆c?t ) + σ2 + (1− θ)2σ2 + θ2σ2 (3.2)
Cov(∆ct,∆ct−1) = (θ − 1)σ2 − θ(θ − 1)σ2 (3.3)
Cov(∆ct,∆ct−2) = −θσ2 (3.4)
where the autocovariance in true consumption growth one or more periods apart is assumed to be zero.32
With three equations in three unknowns, the system is identified and can be estimated using generalised
method moments (GMM) given at least four years of panel data.
We fit this model using data on self-reported grocery expenditure from HILDA’s self completion ques-
tionnaire (SCQ) for the response of the household head and separately for the head’s partner.33 We also
provide estimates model based on the spliced grocery and meals out series used in the main text, which
covers a slightly longer period, from 2004 to 2016. In the latter case, the data is averaged across multiple
responses from a single household where applicable.34 Our GMM estimation is based on the identity
weight matrix.35
The estimates in Table D.1 imply that measurement error accounts for between 76 and 87 per cent of the
variance in observed growth of grocery expenditure. This is within the range of international estimates,
albeit towards the upper end. Interestingly, the process of averaging grocery responses across multiple
household members, while reducing the noise, appears to reduce the signal even more so. This results
in a higher estimated proportion of measurement error in this case (see column 3). The estimate of the
31To avoid notational clutter, we suppress the h superscript from now on.
32This key identification assumption is equivalent to assuming that consumption is a martingale with drift, which is a
common assumption in dynamic models of household consumption (see for example Blundell et al. (2008)).
33We restrict the sample to couple households where both members provide a unique response.
34The expenditure section of the SCQ can be completed by anyone in the household with “any responsibility for the
payment of household bills...”. Wilkins and Sun (2010) show that around one quarter of households provide more than one
response each year.
35Altonji and Segal (1996) show that the identity weight matrix is superior to the ‘optimal’ weight matrix (the variance
of the sample moment conditions) when estimating models of covariance structures in short panels. Also, with unbalanced
panel data, there is no guarantee that the variance of the sample moment conditions will be positive semi-definite matrix,
a problem that we encountered occasionally.
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Table D.1: GMM Estimates of measurement error in expenditure data
(1) (2) (3)
Expenditure measure Groceries Groceries Groc. & meals out
Data source Head SCQ Partner SCQ Av. SCQ & HQ
Period 2006-2016 2006-2016 2004-2016
Var. of true cons. growth (Var(∆c?t )) 0.0483 0.0593 0.0205
(0.0158) (0.0172) (0.0018)
Variance of meas’nt error (σ2 ) 0.1001 0.0911 0.0699
(0.0142) (0.0158) (0.0025)
MA(1) coefficient (θ) 0.0969 0.0356 0.0454
(0.048) (0.0889) (0.015)
Proportion of Var(∆ct) due to Msmt. Error (%) 79 76 87
Num. of obs. 5502 5502 55554
Ψ
Standard errors in parentheses.
MA(1) coefficient is significant in the first and last cases.
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Chapter 4
Empirical evidence on the Frisch
elasticity of labour supply for
Australia
4.1 Introduction and related literature
The inter-temporal substitution (or Frisch) elasticity of labour supply is a key parameter across many
areas of economics.1 For example, it is an important factor in the optimal design of the tax system where
it determines the efficiency loss from labour taxation (e.g. Conesa et al. (2009) and Peterman (2013))
and is central to the economy’s business cycle dynamics (e.g. King and Rebelo (1999)).
Despite its importance, there is a dearth of empirical evidence on the value of the Frisch elasticity of
labour supply for the Australian population. In this paper, I use 17 waves of data from the Household,
Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) survey to estimate this important parameter. I find
that the overall elasticity of labour supply in Australia is relatively large; our estimates range from 1.5 to
2.3 when I account for both the intensive and extensive margins and include all men and women aged 25
to 60. It is even higher at 3.2 when I include older workers aged 61 to 65. Our paper also explores how
labour supply elasticity varies by partnership status and makes novel use of the HILDA survey including
its annual work diary to investigate the importance of intra-year labour supply patterns, which I find
is important in the case of women. Finally, I show that our main conclusions are robust to a range of
alternative assumptions, including non-separable preferences.
From a methodological standpoint, our study incorporates recent insights from the international labour
1As I explain further below, the Frisch elasticity measures the responsiveness of current labour supply to an increase in
the after tax wage holding the marginal utility of wealth constant. It therefore tells us to what extent individuals substitute
labour supply across time in response to anticipated growth in wages over the life cycle.
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supply literature.2 Much of this recent research represents an attempt to reconcile the well-known discrep-
ancy between micro- and macro-based estimates, whereby micro-based studies using panel data samples
of prime-age men typically find the Frisch elasticity to be small (between 0 to 0.5), while estimates cal-
ibrated from aggregate time series data tend to indicate a much larger elasticity, usually in excess of 2
(Chetty et al., 2011).3
In particular, recent empirical and theoretical contributions suggest that the conventionally-small micro
estimates probably understate the true aggregate wage elasticity of labour supply for a number of key
reasons.4 First, such estimates are typically based on samples of prime-age men, and extrapolating these
estimates to the whole population is unwarranted, as there is substantial evidence that the labour supply
responsiveness of women and other age groups is quite a bit higher (Keane, 2011). This is exactly what I
find for Australia below. Second, most micro studies have confined their focus to changes in labour supply
at the intensive margin, ignoring the additional – and potentially larger – response at the extensive margin
via movements into and out of employment. Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) and more recently Fiorito and
Zanella (2012) and Peterman (2016) incorporate all workers (both sexes and all working-ages) as well as
both margins of response and find much larger elasticities (1.1 to 3.1) using United States panel data.
Again, I demonstrate a similar pattern for Australia. Besides these two major reasons, the international
literature has emphasised how improvements to the realism of the economic environment can also result
in significantly higher estimates of the labour supply elasticity than conventional ones. Prime examples
include allowing for the impact of fixed costs of working (Rogerson and Wallenius, 2009; Erosa et al., 2016)
and human capital investment (Keane and Rogerson, 2012). Finally, there are a range of econometrics
factors that have likely contributed to the conventionally-small micro estimates of the labour supply
elasticity. These are mostly related to inadequate strategies for isolating the kind of variation in wages
that is needed to identify the Frisch elasticity.5 Our approach to estimation, particularly our use of a
pseudo panel, endeavours to overcome these challenges.
As far as I am aware, there are no existing panel data estimates of the Frisch elasticity for the Australian
population.6 There are however numerous Australian studies that estimate labour supply responses
within a static framework, a simplification which permits additional complexity to be added along other
model dimensions such as the way that childcare costs and demographics affect the reservation wage (see
for example Kalb (2002); Breunig et al. (2008)). While there are no Australian studies with which I can
2Throughout this paper, I only discuss the literature most relevant to my own study. Any attempt to summarise the
overall labour supply literature is beyond the scope of our paper given its formidable size. Interested readers are directed
to Keane (2011) for a detailed survey of the key issues and controversies within the labour supply literature.
3I use ‘micro’ to refer to estimates based on individual-level data and ‘macro’ to refer to estimates derived from cyclical
fluctuations in aggregate hours based on time series data. It would be interesting to compare the results of our micro
study with macro estimates for Australia. However I am not aware of any Australian study that derived a Frisch elasticity
explicitly from aggregate hours fluctuations.
4Within this paper, I use the term ‘aggregate elasticity’ to refer to the combined intensive and extensive labour supply
response to a wage change for the whole working-age population.
5As already noted and explained further below, the Frisch elasticity measures the labour supply response to wages
changes that leave the agent’s marginal utility of wealth unchanged. A predictable wage change falls into this category as
does an unexpected wage movement that is small and temporary so that its effects on lifetime wealth is negligible. See
Keane (2011) for a detailed discussion of the impact of identification strategies on elasticity estimates.
6Iskhakov and Keane (2018b) calibrate a life cycle model with human capital accumulation and discrete labour choice
for the Australian economy using HILDA data and simulate the response of labour supply to anticipated transitory wage
changes. Their results imply a Frisch elasticity that rises with age and averages about 0.5.
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directly compare, our range of estimates is well above conventional micro estimates in the international
literature, but is in line with the two recent US studies (i.e. Fiorito and Zanella (2012) and Peterman
(2016)) that also incorporate both margins of labour supply, both sexes and a broad age range. Our
estimates are intended to be used for a variety of purposes. Policy makers may find the dis-aggregated
Frisch elasticity estimates by gender and marital status of particular interest across a range of policy
areas, whereas economic modellers may be more interested in the traditional intensive margin estimates
which provide the most direct guidance for calibrating preference parameters.7
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the basic life cycle model of labour
supply upon which our estimates rest. Section 4.3 summarises some of the main difficulties faced in the
labour supply literature in attempting to estimate the Frisch elasticity and discusses different ways of
incorporating the extensive margin response. Section 4.4 briefly outlines the data used in our study.
Section 5.6 presents the results using various estimation approaches, undertakes some sensitivity tests
and discusses some extensions, caveats and implications. Section 4.6 provides a brief summary of our
paper’s main findings.
4.2 Standard life cycle model of labour supply
Early studies based on static models of labour supply focused on the Hicksian (utility compensanted) and
Marshallian (uncompensated) elasticity of labour supply, which are analogous to the well-known concepts
in standard consumer theory. However, MaCurdy and Heckman (see MaCurdy (1981) and Heckman and
Macurdy (1980)) showed that a third elasticity concept arises when the labour supply model is extended
to a life-cycle environment in which agents can save. This third measure, known as the Frisch elasticity,
measures the labour supply response to an increase in after tax wages holding their marginal utility of
wealth (λt) constant:
EF = ∂ lnn
∂ lnw(1− τ)
∣∣∣∣
λtfixed
where w is the hourly wage rate, τ is the tax on wages and n is the hours per period devoted to market
work. MaCurdy (1981) shows that in a standard life-cycle model the Frisch elasticity EF can be estimated
from a simple regression of hours worked on after tax wages using appropriate instruments to take account
of the likely endogeneity in wages. This is the approach that I essentially follow, but it is worth briefly
describing the underlying economic model from which it is derived.
First assume that agents maximise expected utility by choosing a sequence of consumption (ct) and hours
(nt, which is the complement of leisure lt) discounted at rate βt over their lives t = 1...T subject to a
period budget constraint ct + at+1 = wt(1− τ)nt + at(1 + r) where at is savings brought into period t. I
also assume that utility is separable across both time and commodities with an iso-elastic period utility
7For reasons explained below, the aggregate Frisch elasticity will generally not have a direct relationship with the
parameters in an agent’s utility function and is therefore not suitable for calibrating such parameters.
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function:
U(c, n) = c
1+σ
1 + σ − χ
n1+η
1 + η
where σ ≤ 0 governs the elasticity of inter-temporal substitution, η ≥ 0 governs the elasticity of labour
supply, and χ > 0 is the disutility of work. Taking logs of the first-order conditions with respect to
consumption and hours and the Euler condition gives:
ln ct =
1
σ
lnλt (4.1)
lnnt = lnχ+
1
η
(lnwt(1− τ) + lnλt)
lnλt+1 = lnλt + ln β(1 + r) + ζt
where ζt is the agent’s forecast error and the last condition is a first-order approximation. Now allowing
for individual variation through a vector of observables Xit that shift taste for consumption relative
to leisure with coefficient α and an unobserved taste shock uit, combining the first two conditions in
Equation 4.1 provides the following labour supply estimation equation for individual i at time t:8
lnnit =
1
η
lnwit(1− τ) + σ
η
ln cit − α
η
Xit +
uit
η
(4.2)
In this labour supply equation, consumption is therefore a direct control for the marginal utility of wealth
(λt). This means that the partial effect of a wage change can be interpreted as the Frisch elasticity,
which can be estimated given panel data on hours worked, after tax wages and consumption. With
these preferences EF = 1/η, although this direct mapping between preference parameters and the Frisch
elasticity does not hold in general.9
Differencing equation 4.2 and using an approximation to the agent’s Euler equation that links expected
consumption growth to the discount factor β, the interest rate r and a forecast error ζit results in an
alternative way of estimating the Frisch elasticity:
∆ lnnit =
1
η
∆ lnwit(1− τ)− 1
η
ln β(1 + rt)− α
η
∆Xit + ∆
uit
η
+ ζit (4.3)
In practice, time dummies are typically used in place of the interest rate r to capture movements in the
after tax return to saving, which is how I proceed below.
8See Altonji (1986) for further background on this derivation.
9In this case, the approximate Hicks and Marshallian elasticities are also functions of the preference parameters σ and
η and are given by EH ≈ 1/(η − σ) and EM ≈ (1 + σ)/(η − σ). These expressions are only approximate because the exact
elasticities also depend on the share of labour income in total income. Given the restrictions on σ and η, this implies that
the following relativity must hold: EF > EH > EM .
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4.3 Estimation issues
4.3.1 Estimation challenges and instruments
However, the simplicity of these equations belies the numerous practical challenges that arise in estima-
tion. Most importantly, estimating the parameter of interest 1/η in equations 4.2 or 4.3 requires variation
in hourly wages to be exogenous. The problem is that much of the observed variation in wages is likely
to occur endogenously with variation in hours worked. This occurs for a number of reasons. First, a
change in wage, unless very small, will affect lifetime earnings and therefore have an offsetting impact on
labour supply via a wealth effect, which means the wage change is not λt-constant. Secondly, unobserved
variation in taste for work could well be correlated with wages as well as with hours worked.10 The third
and perhaps largest problem in practice is the well known ‘ratio bias’ that arises because hourly wages
are not measured directly but are instead constructed by dividing reported earnings by hours worked.
The resulting wage measure means that hours worked effectively appears on both the left-hand-side and
right-and-side of equations 4.2 and 4.3. This induces a spurious negative correlation when the hours data
contain any measurement error.11
The labour supply literature has used several methods to deal with these endogeneity concerns. I follow
what I think is the most convincing approach, which is to instrument the wage in Equations 4.2 and 4.3
using the expected variation in wages over the life cycle. Such variation should be orthogonal both to
λt and to measurement error.12 To isolate the expected or predictable part of wage variation, I use the
fitted values from a regression of the wage on an age polynomial interacted with years of schooling and
father’s occupational status. In the levels equation (equation 4.2), we also need to instrument cit, as the
marginal utility of wealth (which is what cit embodies) is likely to vary endogenously with persistent wage
movements via wealth effects as noted above. I use a similar set of variables to isolate the predictable
component of consumption.
4.3.2 Accounting for the extensive margin
Equation 4.2 holds for an interior solution for hours worked so only defines the intensive margin Frisch
elasticity.13
I now define the combined elasticity as the sum of the intensive and extensive labour supply elasticities
10For example, productive workers might get greater enjoyment from work than less productive workers.
11This means that measurement error in the hours worked data has the effect of biasing labour supply elasticity estimates
towards zero.
12The other common approach is to use lagged values of wages as instruments for the current wage. I opt for our approach
because it is less prone to the ‘weak instruments’ problem (Peterman, 2016). See Keane (2011) for a detailed review of
alternative identification strategies in micro labour supply studies.
13Even for an interior solution, the direct mapping from η to EF breaks down when the agent is subject to a binding
borrowing constraint. This is because a household who experiences a negative wage shock may increase, rather than decrease,
their labour supply as a means of smoothing consumption when running down savings or borrowing is not possible (Domeij
and Flode´n, 2006). Domeij and Flode´n (2006) show that this is likely to be a qualitatively important source of downward
bias in estimating the true preference parameter.
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for the whole population:14
∂ ln n¯
∂ lnw =
∂ lnP (n > 0)
∂ lnw +
∂ ln n¯e
∂ lnw (4.4)
where average hours for the working age population (n¯) is equal to the product of average hours among
the employed (n¯e) and the proportion of the population employed (P ).
To account for the labour supply elasticity at the extensive margin we need a way of incorporating the
movement into and out of employment between periods in response to wage changes, and to perceived
wage changes for those not employed. I explore two ways of doing this.
Pseudo panel estimation
My first way of incorporating the extensive margin is through a pseudo panel methodology. This approach
involves transforming individual-level data into cohort averages for all relevant variables. For example,
for each cohort c, average hours worked becomes nct = 1/Nc
∑Nc
ic
nitIci where Ici is an indicator function
which equals 1 if individual i belongs to cohort c and 0 otherwise. I use an individual’s year of birth in
defining cohorts. In general, any exogenous, time-constant variable can be used to define cohorts. Using
year of birth respects these requirements and also balances the trade-off that must be made between the
total number of cohort groups and the number of observations used to form each cohort (Verbeek and
Vella, 2005). The resulting average hours series for each cohort incorporates people with both positive
and zero hours, which allows an aggregate (intensive + extensive) elasticity to be computed.
Apart from allowing the measurement of the extensive margin response, a pseudo panel also helps to
address some of the problems created by endogenous right-hand-side variables. For example, using
cohort-averaged data is likely to diminish the impact of measurement error in hours. On the other hand,
approximating the true cohort average of each variable using survey data introduces measurement error of
a different kind, namely, the deviation of the sample cohort average from the population cohort average.
While there is no exact guide, Verbeek and Vella (2005) suggest that the bias induced by this kind of
measurement error should not be too great if Nc > 100. In this case, Nc ranges from about 180 to 5200
across 50 cohorts.
Estimation is otherwise very similar to the approach for equation 4.3 described above. In particular,
predicted wages are used in place of actual wages to account for any measurement error in wages and
other sources of endogeneity such as shocks to unobserved tastes for work. This is now based on cohort-
averaged wages and right-hand-side variables (a quadratic in age, education and its interaction with the
age quadratic, household size, and a dummy for regional status). The predicted wages for non-employed
persons is imputed using a standard Heckman sample adjustment similar to that used for equation 4.6
described below. The relatively large sample size used here is likely to mitigate against the poor accuracy
14Note that the presence of borrowing constraints means that intensive elasticity for the whole population need not equal
1/η even if all households share the same parameter value. See previous footnote.
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of predicted wages from sample selection models shown in Breunig and Mercante (2010).
Probit fixed effects estimation
I also provide separate estimates of the intensive and extensive labour supply margins along the lines
of Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) using separate selectivity-adjusted fixed effects equations for hours and
employment. This is done separately for both genders.
Kimmel and Kniesner (1998) measure the extensive margin by modelling the binary employment choice
as a probit fixed effects function of the offer wage wit:15
P (eit) ≡ P (nit > 0) = Φ(µei + γ lnwit + pief(t) +Xeit) (4.5)
where P (nit > 0) is the probability of employment eit for individual i at time t, µei is an individual
effect, f(t) allows for nonlinear time effects, Φ(·) is the cumulative normal distribution, Xeit is a set of
exogenous variables relevant to a person’s labour supply decision including family characteristics and ueit
is an independently and normally distributed error term. The extensive elasticity of labour supply is
then derived as EeF = γφ(·)/Φ(·).
The offer wage for both working and non-working individuals is generated from a standard fixed effects
wage equation that has been adjusted for selection into employment:
lnwit = µwi + piwf(t) + βwXwit + uwit (4.6)
where µwi is an individual effect, Xwit is a set of variables relevant to a person’s market wage (which
includes quadratics in age and time, a set of dummies for education and a marital status dummy) and uwit
is an independently and normally distributed error term.16 Finally, the intensive labour supply response
is derived from a fixed effects regression of nit on Xnit which is restricted to have the same variable as
Xeit:
ln nˆit = µni + pinf(t) + βnXnit + 1/η ln wˆit + unit (4.7)
In all three equations, the estimates are adjusted for selection into employment by including the in-
verse Mills ratio as a regressor. The ratio is derived from a preliminary fixed effects probit equation of
employment status as a function of the union of Xeit and Xwit .
Allowing for fixed effects in all equations is designed to control for unobserved individual differences in
marginal utility of wealth, taste for leisure and fixed costs of work, among other things. The latter could
be particularly important in modelling women’s labour supply, where individual-specific fixed costs of
15Heckman (1981) shows that the well-known parameter bias in probit fixed effects models is small for T ≥ 8.
16Specifically, the educational dummies are defined over four groups – less than year 12, year 12, vocational training and
university degree.
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work are likely to explain a significant part of the variation in observed employment and hours (Kimmel
and Kniesner, 1998). In the estimation below, I also include the number of dependent children and a
dummy for marital status in Xeit and Xnit. Again this is likely to be of particular importance in explaining
women’s employment and hours choices. Finally, the inclusion of nonlinear time effects noted above is
designed to allow for shocks in the marginal utility of wealth.
4.4 Data
The HILDA survey began in 2001 and provides annual data on a broad range of economic and social
topics. The samples used in all the analysis are drawn from the first 17 waves of person-level data. For
hours worked, I use the variable coded jbhruc which is a combination of usual hours, or if hours vary,
average hours. The hourly wage is formed by dividing current weekly gross wages and salary for all jobs
(coded wscei) by hours worked. In the absence of reliable data on marginal tax rates, I focus on the
before-tax, rather than after-tax, hourly wage rate. 17 For equations that include consumption, I use the
household-level value for combined spending on food, groceries and meals out. Wages and consumption
are deflated using the Australian consumer price index. Years of schooling are based on the educational
attainment variable edhigh1 and father’s occupational status uses the variable fmfo6s which is based on
the father’s occupation when the respondent is aged 14. The sample is restricted to people aged 26 to
60 inclusive, except in one case where I extend the sample to 65. This leaves a total of about 97,000
observations for 15,800 unique individuals, which are fairly evenly split between men and women (see
Table 4.A.1 in the chapter’s appendix for further details). In forming cohort averages, I weight individuals
by their HILDA person weights (coded hhwtrps).
4.5 Results
I provide three sets of estimates:
1. An intensive margin Frisch elasticity by gender using the conventional approach of estimating equations
4.2 and 4.3. These regressions exclude individuals in borrowing constrained households and should
in theory provide estimates of the preference parameter η. I define an individual as being borrowing
constrained when the value of their household gross financial assets is less than one month’s earnings.
This results in the loss of about 70 observations in each period.18
2. An aggregate intensive plus extensive Frisch elasticity using a pseudo panel based on cohort-averaged
data for the combined sample of men and women. Conceptually, there is no direct mapping between this
17This may lead to a downward bias in the elasticity estimates, but this bias is likely to be small unless a significant
proportion of workers are situated at kink points on the tax schedule. The empirical evidence suggests that the extent of
bunching by Australian taxpayers is relatively small (Chapman and Leigh, 2009).
18Financial wealth data are available only in 4 waves of the HILDA survey, so only observations in these years are excluded
if they meet the criterion for being borrowing constrained. I also experiment with excluding an individual’s observations
from all 17 waves if they meet the criterion in any of the 4 waves where financial wealth data is available. This results in
the loss of an extra 70 or so observations per year but has no significant impact on the estimates.
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elasticity and the preference parameter η because we are no longer conditioning on an interior solution
for either hours or saving.
3. Separate intensive and extensive Frisch elasticities using a system of selectivity-adjusted fixed effects
equations. Again there is no direct mapping between these elasticities and the preference parameter η in
the presence of fixed costs of work and borrowing constraints.
The first set of elasticity estimates, which capture the intensive margin only, are shown in Table 4.5.1.
All estimates are significantly above zero but are also substantially less than one, ranging from 0.1 to
0.6. For men, the levels model suggests a small value of 0.12 (column I) with a somewhat higher number
of 0.62 in the difference specification (column III). When I confine the sample to male household heads -
the approach used in many previous studies – the estimate falls to 0.28 in the first difference specification
(column V). These values are squarely within the range of estimates typically obtained in international
studies based on samples of prime-aged men (Keane, 2011). For women, the estimates produced by the
levels and difference approaches are broadly consistent with one-another at 0.47 and 0.50 respectively.
Estimates based on differenced data tend to be more prone to problems of weak instruments, given the
typically low R-squared in the first stage regression of wages growth on the instruments (Altonji, 1986).
While Table 4.5.1 confirms that the standard errors are in fact larger in relation to the first difference
estimates, there does not appear to be a major problem with weak instruments, as the F-statistics from
the first-stage regressions all exceed 5.19 Conversely, levels-based estimates tend to be more prone to
model mis-specification and rely crucially on the availability of reliable consumption data.20 Indeed, the
positive estimated coefficient on consumption in column I is inconsistent with the (economically sensible)
restrictions imposed on η and σ in the underlying model described above. Further, I find that the
levels-based estimates are relatively sensitive to the specification used in the first stage wage regression.
Table 4.5.1: Intensive margin elasticities based on MaCurdy-style regression
I II III IV V
Dependent variable h h ∆h ∆h ∆h
Sample All men All women All men All women Male heads
Wage 0.12 0.47 0.62 0.50 0.28
(0.038) (0.029) (0.175) (0.185) (0.187)
Consumption 0.08 -0.07 - - -
(0.057) (0.051) - - -
Controls
Number of dependent children Dummies Dummies ∆ ∆ ∆
Year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
F-stat excluded instruments 271.58 322.1 5.52 5.18 5.18
Standard errors in parentheses; regressions use HILDA person weights.
Instruments: year dummies, number of dependent children, age, age-squared, education, education interacted
with age polynomial, father’s occupational status.
19Keane (2011) points to a rule of thumb that the F-statistic should be least 5 for the results to be trusted.
20For example, the levels based estimates are not robust to violation in my assumption that consumption and leisure are
separable within periods. In contrast, the first difference estimates are robust to this violation Altonji (1986).
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The second set of elasticity estimates, contained in Table 4.5.2, measure the combined intensive and
extensive response using a pseudo panel with cohort-averaged wage growth as the dependent variables.
These estimates range from 1.76 to 2.36 for the 26 to 60 age range. This suggests a substantial aggre-
gate labour supply response to wealth compensated wage changes, notwithstanding the relatively large
standard errors. When I extend the age range to include people aged 61 to 65 (as in Peterman (2016)),
the estimated elasticity increases to 3.29 from 2.36 (see column relative V versus column IV). This points
to labour supply being particularly elastic among older workers. This is perhaps unsurprising given that
people in the 60 to 65 age range are likely to have fewer constraints on their time that prevent them from
adjusting their labour supply in response to wage movements (such as childcare). A similar finding is
made in Peterman (2016).
Table 4.5.2: Combined elasticity estimates based on pseudo panel
I II III IV V
Wage 2.38 1.76 2.3 2.36 3.29
(0.593) (0.368) (0.607) (0.499) (0.556)
∆ HH size 0.43 0.137 0.461 0.447 0.381
(0.137) (0.1) (0.133) (0.135) (0.136)
Ages 26-60 26-60 26-60 26-60 26-65
Other controls:
Time effects None Dummies None Lin. trend Lin. trend
Region dummy No No Yes No No
F-stat excluded instruments 5.82 5.82 5.82 5.82 5.82
Standard errors in parentheses.
Instruments: age, age-squared, education dummies, education dummies interacted with age, regional dummy.
Again, weak instruments does not seem to be a major problem with the pseudo panel estimates. Moreover,
the F-statistic from the first stage wage equation is around 6, above the commonly cited threshold of 5.
To test whether the results are sensitive to the number of cohort groups, I split the sample by gender
and year of birth which gives a total of 100, compared with 50 in the main results. This alternative
definition of cohort does not greatly affect the estimates (see Table 4.B.1 the Appendix). The third set
of estimates, contained in Table 4.5.3, are broken down into the extensive (employment) and intensive
margin (hours worked conditional on being employed). Overall, these estimates are consistent with the
combined elasticity being well above 1 as in the pseudo panel estimates. A simple average across men
and women implies an elasticity for the whole population of about 1.84. However, I find women to be
substantially more elastic than men along both the extensive (1.35 versus 0.25) and intensive (1.66 v
0.41) responses.
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Table 4.5.3: Selectivity-adjusted extensive and intensive elasticity of labour supply
Men Women
Single
men
Married
men
Single
women
Married
women
Employment 0.25 1.35 0.31 0.1 0.93 1.95
(0.168) (0.372) (0.197) (0.111) (0.408) (0.531)
Hours worked 0.41 1.66 0.36 0.44 2.00 1.93
(0.062) (0.138) (0.109) (0.083) (0.203) (0.205)
Implied total 0.66 3.01 0.67 0.54 2.92 3.88
F-stat excluded instruments 116.94 404.95 21.77 276.75 36.95 533.88
Standard errors in parentheses.
Instruments: age, age-squared, education dummies, quadratic time trend, marital status.
For comparison with Kimmel and Kniesner (1998), I also provide estimates by marital status. The
main finding here is that married women appear to be more responsive than single women along the
extensive margin, whereas the reverse is true for men. My finding contrasts with Kimmel and Kniesner
(1998), who find that single women are more elastic than married women along the extensive margin, and
attribute this to “schedule co-ordination problems” between married couples that serve to enlarge the
wife’s reservation hours and reduce their wage elasticity. However, my finding that married women are
more elastic to wage changes than single women is in line with the idea that single women may operate
more like men in their labour supply behaviour. Given the changing nature of relationships and family
structures over time, I also explore a broader definition of partnership that includes de facto relationships
as well as legal marriages.21 This alternative definition had very little impact on the results as shown in
Table 4.B.2 in the Appendix. I also split the sample into households with and without children under 5
years of age. In this case, I found that women in households with children under 5 had a significantly
larger elasticity along the intensive margin than other women.
I find no evidence of weak instruments, consistent with the greater variation that comes from level rather
than differenced variables. This finding accords with the general experience in the labour supply literature
(e.g. Altonji (1986), Kimmel and Kniesner (1998), and Domeij and Flode´n (2006)). In particular, the test
of excluded instruments – which is based on the explanatory power of the assumed exogenous variables
in the wage equation – has a large F-statistic of more than 30 across all specifications investigated. As a
sensitivity test, I experiment with alternative ways of allowing for non-linear time effects in labour supply
by interacting the education dummies with the quadratic time trend. While the estimated coefficients
are generally somewhat lower, the broad conclusions are unchanged (see details in Table 4.B.3 of the
Appendix).
21In the HILDA survey, partners are either married or de facto and include same sex couples.
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4.5.1 Further exploration
Incorporating information from HILDA’s time use calendar
The idea underlying Equation 4.4 is that total labour supply can be decomposed into an average hours
for those already working (the intensive margin) and share of people employed (the extensive margin at
the population level). But as Blundell et al. (2013) note, the definitions of the intensive and extensive
margins really depend on the reference period being considered. When the reference period is a year (as
is the case with data used in this paper), they argue that it makes more sense to define the extensive
margin as the proportion of days during the year that an individual worked, rather than the conventional
approach of defining a binary variable for employment.
The HILDA survey includes information on the proportion of the financial year each individual spends in
market work (as well as other activities such as education), which is summarised in the variable capj. One
simple way is to expand the labour supply measure used in the first set of regressions to at least partly
take account of the extensive margin by simply multiplying usual hours worked by capj. When I re-run
the regressions in columns IV and V of Table 4.5.1 using this expanded definition of labour supply, the
elasticities rise to 0.70 (from 0.62) for men and to 1.36 (from 0.50) for women. For women, this indicates
that the proportion of the year spent working is an important labour supply margin in its own right.
Alternative measures of ‘age’
So far I have used a person’s age as a proxy for their level of work experience, which is a common approach
in the life cycle literature. In relation to employed men, the distinction between age and experience may
be of little empirical importance because of this group’s strong attachment to the labour force once they
begin their career after completing full time studies. However, for women the choice of work experience
variable may make a material difference to the results, given the greater prevalence of career breaks.
Conveniently, the HILDA survey includes the variable ehtjb which is a more direct measure of work
experience. Specifically, the variable ehtjb provides an estimate of each individual’s total number of years
in paid work. I can therefore investigate whether the results underlying Table 4.5.1 are sensitive to using
the variable ehtjb in place of age. After re-running the regressions in columns IV and V of Table 4.5.1,
the new estimates are 0.69 (up from 0.62) for men and 0.97 for women (up from 0.50). As anticipated,
the estimated elasticity for women is somewhat sensitive to this alternative way of defining experience,
while the estimate for men is largely unaffected.
Non-separable consumption and labour
I have made the strong assumption throughout the previous analysis that the period utility function is
separable in consumption and labour. If this assumption is wrong, consumption can no longer act as a
proxy for the marginal utility of wealth λt, as movements in consumption shift the supply of leisure, which
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alters the marginal utility of wealth. This means that the coefficient on the wage term in Equation 4.2 will
no longer equate to the Frisch elasticity, and the model will be mis-specified. The appropriate modification
of the estimation equation depends on the exact form of non-separability being assumed. While it is
notoriously difficult to empirically test for the existence of non-separability, the general consensus is that
there is a positive but small complementarity between consumption and labour (Chetty, 2006). To check
the robustness of my results to this possibility, I first run a regression of consumption growth on the
growth in wages, which I instrument using the same variables in the MaCurdy style regressions, along
with age and year dummies. In such a regression, the coefficient on wage growth should provide a measure
of the degree of complementarity between consumption and labour (Altonji, 1986). The estimates yield a
value of 0.22 but with a standard error of 0.2, consistent with there being a small, perhaps zero, degree of
complementarity. As an alternative check, I instead assume that agents have Cobb-Douglass preferences
[cρ(1−n)1−ρ]1−s/(1−s) thereby allowing for complementarity between consumption and labour.22 I then
re-run the MaCurdy style first difference-based estimates23 and find implied intensive Frisch elasticity
estimates of about 0.4 for both men and women.24 These estimates are similar to those in Columns III
and IV of Table 4.5.1 that are based upon separable preferences.
4.5.2 Omissions and caveats
The estimates have taken into account a number of important factors including the multiple margins of
labour supply, the existence of fixed costs of work and differences by gender, family structure and age.
However there are also numerous, possibly important, factors that have been ignored. One such factor
is the impact of human capital accumulation on labour supply choices. For example, Imai and Keane
(2004) argue that there are sizable human capital benefits to work experience, especially at younger ages,
in addition to the monetary wage received by the worker. This results in a much flatter total return on
labour supply (which the authors call the ‘shadow wage’) over the life cycle, which in turns implies a
much larger Frisch labour supply elasticity given the empirical profile of hours worked.25 In summary,
ignoring the impact of on-the-job human capital accumulation suggests that the estimates in this paper
could understate the true elasticity of labour supply.
From an econometric viewpoint, all my estimates of the Frisch elasticity ultimately hinge on a small set
of instrumental variables to identify λt-constant wages changes. The choice of instruments assumes that
the common life-cycle evolution in wages is both expected by the agent and exogenous to shocks in their
taste for work. While the first of these assumptions seems plausible, the second is more contentious and is
difficult to test. In an ideal world, the results would therefore be confronted with results from an entirely
different approach, for example, by using a quasi-experiment method. However, quasi-experimental
22Consumption and labour are complements if s > 1, which is the more likely case.
23Altonji (1986) claims that the first difference estimates in Equation 4.3 should be unaffected by non-separability, but
it is not obvious why this would be the case (Domeij and Flode´n, 2006).
24Proceeding with Cobb-Douglass preferences produces a leisure supply equation and an estimate of the wage elasticity
of leisure. This must be multiplied by (1− n¯)/n¯ to derive the labour supply elasticity. I assume a time endowment of 112
hours per week, noting that the resulting estimates will be sensitive to the value used for the time endowment.
25Interestingly, their model also implies a Hicks elasticity (in response to permanent after tax wage change) that is an
order of magnitude larger than conventional estimates (Keane, 2015).
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scenarios are often hard to find.26
Finally, I have also ignored the issue of infra-household labour supply, which may be another source of
bias in my estimates. In addition, estimating a joint model of couples’ labour supply would shed light on
how one member of a household responds to changes in his/her partner’s wage, which appears to be an
empirically important channel by which households react to wage shocks (Attanasio et al., 2005; Blundell
et al., 2016).
4.5.3 Implication for calibrating preference parameters and policy experi-
ments
It is worth reiterating that only the first of the three estimation approaches employed in this paper - the
‘conventional approach’ – can provide a direct estimate of the preference parameter η.27 These estimates
suggest that a value of η = 2 would be a reasonable calibration of the utility function, consistent with a
borrowing-unconstrained, intensive-margin Frisch elasticity of 0.5.
The aggregate elasticity being measured in the second and third approaches – which includes the extensive
margin response as well as households who face binding borrowing constraints – may have only a very loose
connection to η. Does this mean these estimates are less useful for the purposes of policy experiments?
As Chetty et al. (2011) point out, such aggregate elasticity estimates, while no longer equating to a deep
structural parameter, are still very valuable for considering policy experiments in cases where the interest
is on aggregate labour supply responses taking all these factors as given.
4.6 Conclusion
This paper has used a variety of estimation approaches to explore the responsiveness of labour supply
to changes in the after tax wage in Australia. Overall, my findings point to a relatively high Frisch
elasticity: my point estimates range from 1.7 to 2.3 for the population aged 26 to 60, rising to 3.3 when
the age range is expanded to 26 to 65. These large aggregate elasticity estimates reflect the combination
of incorporating the extensive margin (which I find especially important for women) and a more elastic
supply response from women and older workers in general. Both are ignored in much of the labour supply
literature.
Equally, this paper’s estimates appear to confirm that the hours worked (or intensive) response by em-
ployed men is relatively modest. The point estimates for men aged 26 to 60 range from 0.12 to 0.62
across the various specifications I have considered, and is 0.28 when I confine the sample to only house-
hold heads, broadly consistent with the international literature. Accounting for the additional effect of
26A classic example of a quasi-experimental labour supply study is Bianchi et al. (2001), which examines the impact of
Iceland’s 1987 tax holiday.
27Of course, this mapping also requires that the assumed model was an accurate representation of the underlying data
generating process and that the equation was not otherwise mis-specified.
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infra-year work intensity had little impact on the estimates for men but resulted in a substantially higher
estimate for women.
My findings may have important implications for policy design to the extent that existing policies are
based on the assumption that labour supply is uniformly inelastic across the population. For example,
changes in income tax rates may have a greater impact on aggregate labour supply than currently assumed,
via an increase in women’s participation.
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Appendix
Appendix 4.A Sample selection
Table 4.A.1: Sample selection
Removal criteria Observations dropped Observations remaining
Initial unbalanced panel 341,170
Missing education data 88,125 253,045
Outside age range 26 to 60 104,508 148,537
MaCurdy style regressions
Zero or missing hours 44,013 104,524
Missing instruments or controls 26,127 78,397
Appendix 4.B Sensitivity checks
Table 4.B.1: Combined elasticity estimates based on pseudo panel - extra cells by gender
I II III IV V
Wage 2.29 1.72 2.18 2.26 3.15
(0.602) (0.37) (0.617) (0.506) (0.565)
∆ HH size 0.432 0.137 0.463 0.449 0.385
(0.137) (0.1) (0.134) (0.136) (0.137)
Ages 26-60 26-60 26-60 26-60 26-65
Time effects None Dummies None Lin. trend Lin. trend
Region dummy No No Yes No No
F-stat excluded instruments 5.73 5.73 5.73 5.73 5.73
Standard errors in parentheses.
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Table 4.B.2: Extensive and intensive elasticity of labour supply - broader definition of partnered
Men Women
Single
men
Married
men
Single
women
Married
women
Employment 0.24 1.38 0.24 0.17 1.03 1.61
(0.161) (0.381) (0.169) (0.154) (0.522) (0.45)
Hours worked 0.45 1.59 0.33 0.51 1.83 1.64
(0.06) (0.133) (0.156) (0.068) (0.253) (0.166)
Implied total 0.68 2.97 0.56 0.68 2.86 3.25
Standard errors in parentheses.
Table 4.B.3: Extensive and intensive elasticity of labour supply - including education interacted with
time trend
Men Women
Single
men
Married
men
Single
women
Married
women
Employment 0.15 1.07 0.22 0.06 0.68 1.56
(0.102) (0.295) (0.142) (0.074) (0.304) (0.424)
Hours worked 0.27 1.05 0.34 0.19 1.21 1.19
(0.045) (0.109) (0.085) (0.059) (0.161) (0.16)
Implied total 0.42 2.11 0.56 0.25 1.89 2.75
116.94 110.87 123.93 196.08 38.45 636.55
Standard errors in parentheses.
Chapter 5
Optimal income taxation, marital
risk and family labour supply
5.1 Introduction
The issue of optimal taxation has occupied economists and policymakers since at least the time of Adam
Smith yet central questions remain unresolved. Chief among these is whether capital should be taxed
in the long run. On the one hand, the traditional public finance literature (e.g. Atkinson and Stiglitz
(1976)) suggests that the optimal tax on capital is zero. This follows from the uniform commodity taxation
principle being applied to consumption (and leisure) in different periods of time. Chamley (1986) and
Judd (1985) extend this result to a dynamic environment with a single infinitely-lived household.
However, subsequent studies have challenged this classical result. Within an infinitely-lived setting,
Aiyagari (1995) finds that the introduction of un-insurable idiosyncratic risk and borrowing constraints
causes precautionary saving among households that leads to excessive capital accumulation in aggregate.
This tendency towards dynamic inefficiency makes it optimal for the government to tax capital. Likewise,
a parallel line of studies based on a class of overlapping generations (OLG) models with elastic labour
supply (but lacking idiosyncratic risk) have also found that a positive tax on capital is generally optimal.
A key reason for this is that a household’s consumption and leisure are generally not constant over
the life cycle, so that uniform commodity taxation no longer applies. Instead, the typically increasing
life cycle profiles for consumption and leisure make it efficient to tax these goods more heavily as the
household gets older. Taxing capital achieves this objective indirectly by raising the relative price of
future consumption and leisure, as Erosa and Gervais (2002) show in their analytical study. Subsequent
numerical-based OLG studies seem to suggest that the result in Erosa and Gervais (2002) may generalise
to more complex and realistic model environments such as those with idiosyncratic risk, fixed differences
between workers’ productivity, an explicit retirement period, a social security system and the capacity to
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tax labour income progressively. Most notable is Conesa et al. (2009) who find an optimal long-run tax
on capital of between 21 and 36 per cent depending on the form of preferences. Fehr and Kindermann
(2015) and Peterman (2013) broadly confirm the result in Conesa et al. (2009).1
But how robust are these studies? In this paper, I re-examine the question of optimal income taxation
in an OLG model that features a more realistic representation of the household sector. In particular,
I extend the ‘lifelong bachelor’ model used in Conesa et al. (2009) by including two-earner married (in
addition to single) households, and by allowing each individual’s marital status to evolve scholastically
over their lifetime. I calibrate the model economy to the United States using an approach and target
values similar to those used by Conesa et al. (2009). This aids comparability with their study.
The main finding is that the introduction of these two aspects – a dual labour supply margin and marital
risk – results in an optimal tax on capital of zero. This contrasts with the optimal tax of 30 per cent
I find using a standard ‘bachelor’ version of my model (which roughly corresponds to the model used
in Conesa et al. (2009)). Secondly, I find that the optimal tax on labour income is a flat tax of 30 per
cent (compared with 26 per cent in the bachelor model) with a deduction equivalent to 16 per cent of
average income (compared with 22 per cent). The main results are robust to whether the interest rate is
endogenous or exogenous, and whether the tax system involves separate or joint filing by married couples.
What drives the zero tax on capital? As I demonstrate analytically in a simple 2-period model with wage
certainty and inelastic labour, the introduction of marital risk has two important competing effects on
saving. For married households, the possibility of divorce next period induces a form of precautionary
saving, which leads to higher saving than otherwise. Conversely, for single households the possibility of
becoming married next period reduces saving via a type of free rider problem, which leads them to save
less than they would otherwise. This latter effect is magnified by the economies of scale in consumption
available to married households. I show that the net effect of these two competing forces is to reduce
overall saving for plausible parameter values, an important insight for understanding the mechanisms at
play in the full OLG model. In particular, my analytical results imply that a relatively low tax on capital
may be optimal in the presence of marital risk as a way of mitigating the tendency towards under-saving.
In the full model, the interaction of wage uncertainty and dual labour supply re-enforces the benefits of
taxing capital lightly. Married households have an enhanced capacity to exploit the stochastic variation
in productivity so long as partners’ wages are not perfectly correlated. For married households, the
environment starts to look more like the complete markets model analysed in Pijoan-Mas (2006). While
precautionary saving can now be undertaken more cheaply, it is less valuable (given the ability to adjust
1That said, both Fehr and Kindermann (2015) and Peterman (2013) are more qualified in their conclusions than Conesa
et al. (2009) in the following respects. The former study highlights that the optimal long-run tax rate is sensitive to a
number of alternative model assumptions, including the life-cycle decline in the elasticity of labour supply generated by
the particular form of preferences assumed in Conesa et al. (2009) and the inclusion of accidental bequests in the tax base
for capital income. In the absence of compelling empirical evidence to the contrary, I retain the preference form that is
most sympathetic to a positive tax on capital as used in Conesa et al. (2009). In contrast with Conesa et al. (2009), I tax
bequests separately to other capital income to prevent the taxation of bequests being a driver of my main result (as argued
in Peterman (2013)) but I also experiment with the Conesa et al. (2009) approach as a sensitivity check. Meanwhile, Fehr
and Kindermann (2015) show that the optimal tax on capital is non-zero only in the long run, and that it falls to zero when
the welfare of transitional generations is taken into account.
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work effort along two dimensions) which makes saving more elastic to the interest rate.2 I illustrate
this channel in an extensive sensitivity analysis by examining the extreme case of zero correlation in
partners wage shocks. This allows an even larger capacity for self insurance through dual labour supply
adjustments, which results in an even higher interest rate elasticity of saving. At the other extreme –
when partners’ wage shocks are perfectly correlated – the sensitivity analysis shows that a large positive
tax on capital is instead optimal, reflecting a much lower interest rate elasticity of saving in this version
of the model. This finding confirms the well established theoretical link between the elasticity of saving
and the optimal tax on capital (e.g. Summers (1981); Engen and Gale (1997) and I˙mrohorog˘lu (1998)).
Therefore, the zero tax on capital result is driven by the presence of marital risk and family labour supply.
Given the empirical relevance of both these features, my study represents an important contribution to
the optimal taxation literature.
In addition, my paper relates to the study of ‘partial insurance’ – the mechanisms by which households
buffer themselves against income shocks over their life cycle in the absence of formal insurance markets.
Contributions to this field include Blundell et al. (2008) and Kaplan and Violante (2010) who look
at the transmission of inequality from earnings to consumption over the life cycle, and Blundell et al.
(2016) who extend these studies by allowing for endogenous family labour supply. My paper is novel
insofar as it analyses partial insurance within a general equilibrium setting, allowing issues of inequality
transmission to be examined in conjunction with questions of optimal taxation. By incorporating two-
person households and marital risk, this paper also adds to broader efforts at modelling households in a
more realistic way than the conventional bachelor representation used in standard macroeconomic models.
In addition to tax policy, this realism is especially relevant in the area of social security and retirement
income analysis where policies often depend on the specific structure and marital status of the household.3
It is worth highlighting that the optimal tax system I consider in the main policy experiment involves
a shift from joint to separate filing for married households. In this respect, my study closely relates to
Guner et al. (2012a) who also explore a shift to separate filing, as well as the welfare effects of moving
to proportional income taxation. However, in their study, this is carried out in two standalone shocks
and there is no attempt to search for the jointly optimal tax structure.4 Moreover, compared with the
model I use in this paper, their model lacks idiosyncratic earnings risk and changes in marital status.
This arguably makes my model more suitable for identifying the optimal income tax mix, as idiosyncratic
risk has been identified as an important determinant of optimal progressivity (Conesa et al., 2009), while
the absence of transitions in marital status is likely to provide misleading overall welfare changes. This is
because an empirically-consistent life cycle evolution of marital status creates an interplay in the welfare
functions of married and single households. A newborn generation can ex ante expect to spend time as
both a single and married household over their lifetime, and should rationally incorporate both these
2The dual labour supply margin also means that the zero borrowing constraint is less likely to bind than for single
households, which all else equal reduces the precautionary saving motive.
3Recent examples in this general area include Nishiyama (2019) who examines social security reform with dual-income
households, Kaygusuz (2010) who investigate the impact of United States tax reform in the 1980s on women’s labour market
participation and Guner et al. (2012b) who look at taxing married men and women at different rates.
4Interestingly, the welfare gains in my experiment turn out to be roughly half-way between those in Guner et al. (2012a)
for their two shocks.
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future possibilities into their optimisation decisions.5
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 5.2 develops some intuition for how the introduction
of marital risk and dual-earner households will affect saving and therefore optimal taxation of capital in
the full OLG model. This section begins by presenting some analytical results from a simple 2-period
model to isolate the impact of marital risk on the household saving of both single and married households.
This is followed by a qualitative discussion of the impact of dual labour supply on saving. Section 5.3
outlines the model and the recursive equilibrium. Section 5.4 discusses calibration and presents some
features of the baseline economy. Section 5.5 explains the policy experiment, while Section 5.6 presents
the main results, uses a sensitivity analysis to isolate the key factors behind the zero capital tax result and
discusses the connection between the optimal tax mix and partial insurance. Section 5.7 briefly outlines
some areas where further research is warranted.
5.2 Impact of adding marital risk and dual earner households
5.2.1 A two-period model with marital risk
There are relatively few studies that examine the channels by which marital risk affects household saving
in a multi period setting, either numerically or analytically. Exceptions include the numerical studies
by Cubeddu and Ro´s-Rull (2003) and Voena (2015) and the analytical results in Doepke and Tertilt
(2016).6 This section therefore presents a simple two period partial equilibrium model in order to derive
a number of useful analytical results about the impact of marital risk on the saving of married and single
households. To focus on the impact of marital risk and to facilitate analytical expressions, I assume
labour supply is exogenous and abstract from wage uncertainty in both periods.
Problem for a couple household
For a married household (denoted with a superscript c), I assume that the couple’s consumption (denoted
cc) is a public good among partners with economies of scale (or conversely congestion factor) governed
by 1 ≤ θ ≤ 2 and the man’s Pareto weight (or relative bargaining power) given by λ. In the first period,
the married household faces an exogenous probability D of becoming single in the second period. The
married household receives wm1 + w
f
1 = w1 in period 1 and wm2 + w
f
2 in period 2 if marriage continues,
where the superscripts denote male (m) and female (f). If divorce occurs, the divorced man and woman
separately receive wages wm2 and w
f
2 respectively in period 2, while the man receives α share of the assets
and the woman 1 − α. If β is the time discount factor, the couple household’s maximisation problem is
5On the other hand, Guner et al. (2012a) include childcare costs and fixed heterogeneity (via education differences)
in their model, consistent with their central focus on how tax policy changes could affect female labour supply at the
extensive margin. While my model does not allow for fixed costs of working, the choice of preferences nonetheless results
in a non-trivial extensive margin among married households.
6The life cycle study by Cubeddu and Ro´s-Rull (2003) analyses these competing effects using numerical simulations.
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therefore:
max
c1,ac
{
u(cc1/θ) + β[(1−D)vc(ac) +Dλvm(αac) +D(1− λ)vf ((1− α)ac)]
}
subject to
cc1 + ac = wm1 + w
f
1
where ac denotes saving, and the value functions for continued marriage and divorce for each spouse are
given by vc(ac) and vsg(ac) (g = m, g) respectively. A gross return of 1 + r is paid on ac, and period 2
income is fully consumed in either state, married or single.
The first order condition for a is given by:
φ = β(1−D)1
θ
u′(cc2/θ)(1 + r) + βD
[
λu′(cm2 )(1 + r)α+ (1− λ)u′(cf2 )(1 + r)(1− α)
]
where φ is the Lagrange multiplier on the budget constraint, and cc2, cm2 and c
f
2 are second period con-
sumption for married, single male and single female households respectively. Using the budget constraint
for each period to express in terms of ac and substituting φ = u′(cc1) gives:
1
θ
u′(w1 − a
c
θ
) =β(1−D)1
θ
u′(a
c(1 + r) + wm2 + w
f
2
θ
)(1 + r)+ (5.1)
βD
[
λu′(αac(1 + r) + wm2 )(1 + r)α+ (1− λ)u′((1− α)ac(1 + r) + wf2 )(1 + r)(1− α)
]
Assuming standard iso-elastic preferences u = c1−σ/(1−σ), optimal saving in the absence of divorce risk
(D = 0) is given by:
ac = [β(1 + r)]
1/σ
w1 − (wm2 + wf2 )
(1 + r) + [β(1 + r)]1/σ
which is notably independent of the economies of scale parameter θ.
When D > 0, a closed form expression for a is generally not available. However, even in the presence of
divorce risk, there are a number of special cases when the optimal saving will correspond with ac = ac.
This will occur if wm2 = w
f
2 , the asset distribution is equal (α = 12 ) AND:
• θ = 2, i.e., there are no economies of scale; or
• θ ≤ 2 and σ = 1, i.e., there are economies of scale and preferences are logarithmic.7
7In the case of u(c) = log( c
θ
), θ does not affect the marginal utility of consumption and therefore has no effect on optimal
saving behaviour even in the presence of marital risk. The related analysis in Doepke and Tertilt (2016) is confined to this
special case.
74
These results can be seen by first substituting α = 12 into Equation 5.1 and re-arranging:
1
θ
u′(w1 − a
c
θ
) =β(1 + r)
{
1
θ
u′(a
c(1 + r) + 2w2
θ
)+
D
[
λ · 12u
′(a
c(1 + r) + 2wm2
2 ) + (1− λ) ·
1
2u
′(a
c(1 + r) + 2wf2
2 )−
1
θ
u′(a
c(1 + r) + wm2 + w
f
2
θ
)
]
(5.2)
which implies that the term in square brackets in Equation 5.2 must be zero in order for ac = ac if D > 0.
In the first case (θ = 2) and assuming that σ 6= 1, this term becomes:
D
[
λ · (a
c(1 + r) + 2wm2
2 )
−σ + (1− λ) · (a
c(1 + r) + 2wf2
2 )
−σ − (a
c(1 + r) + wm2 + w
f
2
2 )
−σ
]
(5.3)
which is zero if wm2 = w
f
2 = w¯. The second case (θ < 2 and σ = 1) follows similar logic.
However, the saving choice in the presence of divorce risk will generally differ from ac. Notably, this
will occur when there are economies of scale in consumption (θ < 2) and σ 6= 1 even if wm2 = wf2 and
α = 12 . In the more interesting situation when wm2 6= wf2 , saving is at least as high as a′ if we assume that
the distribution of assets and bargaining weights are equal across partners (α = λ = 12 ), which are the
assumptions used in the full life cycle model described below.8 This follows from the convexity of u′(·),
which guarantees that 12u′(wm2 ) +
1
2u
′(wf2 ) ≥ u′( ¯12wm2 + 12wf2 ) by Jensen’s inequality. Thus Equation 5.3
is non-negative when θ = 2 (no economies of scale), which by Equation 5.2 requires ac ≥ ac. When
there are economies of scale (θ < 2), by similar logic, the term in square brackets is now strictly positive
so Equation 5.2 implies ac > ac. Thus economies of scale in consumption reinforces the demand for
precautionary saving in the presence of divorce risk.
Problem for a single household
In contrast, the possibility of becoming married next period tends to reduce saving by single households.
Without loss of generality, this can be seen by considering the problem of a male household that is single
in period 1:
max
cm1 ,a
{
u(cm1 ) + β[(1−M)vm(a) +Mvc(am + af )]
}
subject to
cm1 + a = wm1
8For other combinations of λ and α, divorce risk can increase or decrease saving compared with ac. Doepke and Tertilt
(2016) show for log preferences that divorce risk increases saving if the asset share exceeds the bargaining weight of the
spouse who is made worse off by divorce.
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where M is the probability of becoming married next period and af is the saving of the prospective
female partner. Given af , the first order condition for am is:
u′(wm1 − am) = β(1−M)u′(am(1 + r) + wm2 )(1 + r) + βM
1
θ
u′(a
m(1 + r) + af (1 + r) + wm2 + w
f
2
θ
)(1 + r)
(5.4)
For M = 0 the expression for optimal saving am is almost identical to the one for the married household.
For M > 0, the right hand side of Equation 5.4 can be re-arranged to give:
βu′(am(1 + r) + wm2 )(1 + r) + βM [θσ−1u′(am(1 + r) + af (1 + r) + wm2
+wf2 )− u′(am(1 + r) + wm2 )](1 + r) (5.5)
Whether saving is greater or less than am again depends on the sign of the term in square brackets,
which in turn depends on the prospective partner’s saving choice af . Assuming a symmetric equilibrium
(with shared preferences and wages), the single male’s saving choice will always be lower than without
marital risk. More generally, the single male’s optimal saving is decreasing in their prospective partner’s
wage and the economies of scale in married partners’ consumption. Notably, when economies of scale
are highest (θ = 1), the single male’s saving will be less than a as long as wf2 > −af (1 + r), which is a
relatively weak requirement. This tendency towards lower saving is magnified when a single household
has a lower wage than their prospective partner (wm2 < w¯2). In summary, the possibility of marriage next
period tends to reduce saving, which is essentially a free rider problem.
Net effect of saving
The effect of introducing marital risk on combined household saving (ac + am + af ) is ambiguous and
depends on all parameter values and the fraction of single and married households in the population.
However, if we confine our attention to the most empirically-plausible parameter values and assume an
equal proportion of people are married and single in period 1, numerical results indicate that marital
risk tends to reduce overall saving when wages are not too different between genders. This is shown in
Table 5.2.1, which tabulates overall saving for different combinations of marital risk9 and relative wages
between men and women. Saving in each cell of the table is expressed as proportion of saving in an
otherwise similar economy without marital risk. Numbers less than 1 therefore indicate that marital risk
has the effect of reducing saving. I also assume that the economies of scale factor is given by θ =
√
2
(as per the McClements scale for a two-adult household) and that σ = 32 as in the calibrated life cycle
model below.10 Saving in the absence of marital risk is the numeraire. As can be seen, total saving is
lower than the corresponding equilibrium with no marital risk except where men and women’s wages are
very unequal.11
9In doing so, I constrain the marriage rate to be twice the divorce rate. If anything this is an understatement – age-specific
marriage rates tend to be more than twice the divorce rate according to CPS data.
10The Pareto weight λ and the asset distribution share α are both assumed to be 12 .11I am also ignoring any general equilibrium effects that saving has on the interest rate.
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Table 5.2.1: Combined married and single saving
Divorce rate (D =1/2 M)
wm/wf 0.00 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.13 0.17 0.20 0.23 0.27 0.30
0.67 1.00 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.46 0.37
0.83 1.00 0.92 0.83 0.74 0.65 0.55 0.44 0.33 0.21 0.09
1.00 1.00 0.91 0.81 0.71 0.61 0.50 0.38 0.26 0.13 -0.01
1.17 1.00 0.92 0.83 0.74 0.65 0.55 0.44 0.33 0.21 0.09
1.33 1.00 0.95 0.89 0.83 0.77 0.70 0.62 0.55 0.46 0.37
Values are expressed as a fraction of saving in the no marital risk equilibrium; the probability of marriage is fixed at
two-times the probability of divorce.
5.2.2 Dual labour supply and partial insurance
There is a growing literature exploring the mechanisms by which households are insured against wage
and other income shocks in the absence of formal insurance markets. These mechanisms include family
labour supply, social security and the progressivity of the tax system in addition to the much-researched
mechanism of precautionary saving (see Blundell (2014) for a survey).12 By introducing two-person
married households, this paper focuses on the impact of a dual labour supply margin on the dynamics of
household saving and consumption, and what this means for optimal taxation. In order to understand
the impact that dual labour supply might have on optimal taxation, it is worth emphasising some key
aspects of the optimal tax literature. First, early life cycle studies that ignored wage uncertainty and
elastic labour supply tended to find large welfare gains from eliminating capital taxation. The most
prominent example is Summers (1981) who shows that the interest elasticity of aggregate saving in
such models is relatively large meaning that there are substantial welfare gains from eliminating capital
taxation. However, subsequent studies have shown that the magnitude of this elasticity is very sensitive
to key model parameters. For example, Evans (1983) finds that using different values for key parameters
such as the EIS and the rate of time preference can substantially reduce the interest elasticity of saving
and reverse the main conclusion in Summers (1981). The result in Summers (1981) is also sensitive to
various features of the model environment. This includes the presence of idiosyncratic wage uncertainty,
which creates a precautionary saving motive in addition to the purely life-cycle saving motive present in
Summers’s deterministic OLG model. Whereas life-cycle saving is by its nature sensitivity to changes
in the inter-temporal price of consumption, Engen and Gale (1997) and Cagetti (2001) show that the
presence of precautionary saving reduces the interest rate elasticity of saving. In both cases, the large
welfare gains from eliminating capital taxation found by Summers (1981) disappear or are at least greatly
diminished.
However, the picture is more complicated again when households can freely adjust their labour supply.
Low (2005), Flode´n (2006) and Pijoan-Mas (2006) show that, in the presence of wage uncertainty, pre-
cautionary motives also give rise to longer work hours, especially when households are young with low
assets. Higher hours worked before shocks are realised provides households with more income, which
reduces the cost of precautionary saving. At the same time, Low (2005) shows that the ability to adjust
12Blundell (2014) surveys the ‘partial insurance’ models – the ways in which households insure themselves against id-
iosyncratic risk. I use the term dual labour supply throughout this paper as a specific case of the ‘family’ labour supply
channel used in Blundell et al. (2016).
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hours worked after shocks have been realised makes precautionary saving less valuable, meaning the
overall impact on precautionary saving is ambiguous. However, it seems reasonable to conjecture that
elastic labour supply will make saving more elastic to interest rate changes than if labour supply were
fixed. Further, the introduction of a dual labour supply margin should make married households’ saving
even more interest rate elastic, a proposition that I demonstrate numerically in Section 5.6.13 In essence,
I show that the additional capacity to self-insure via labour supply adjustments makes an economy with
married households look more like a complete markets setting. In such a setting, households can focus
on substituting their hours worked towards favourable productivity states (Pijoan-Mas, 2006). I demon-
strate this important channel by computing the within-age correlation between productivity and hours
worked, highlighting the much greater correlation for married households.
5.2.3 Empirical evidence on saving by marital status
The results from the model presented in Section 5.2.1 suggest that married households will save propor-
tionally more of their income than single households. This reflects that being married is a better state
than being single because of the economies of scale in consumption. This leads to precautionary saving
during marriage by married households and a free rider problem for single households which lowers their
incentive to save. Moving from the two period model to the full OLG model (presented in the next
section) is likely to strengthen this tendency. This is because the addition of a dual labour supply margin
for married households increases the desirability of being married, a point that I elaborate upon in 5.6.3.
The stochastic process for marital status in the OLG model means that being single and married are
transient states over the life cycle. The desire of households to smooth their consumption between these
divergent income states induces higher saving while married and lower saving while single.
These theoretical predictions are supported by the small number of empirical studies that have examined
these questions. Firstly, household level data show that married households do in fact save at more than
twice the rate of single households, on average. In the United States, this is shown by Lupton and Smith
(1999) using the United States Panel Survey of Income Dynamics, while similar patterns have been found
using other data sets and in other countries (e.g., see Zagorsky (2005)). Perhaps more importantly, there
is also empirical support for the specific economic mechanisms behind these differences in saving rates.
Kureishi and Wakabayashi (2013) show that the saving rates of single households with a high probability
of being married within three years are much lower than for single households with a low probability.
This difference is attributed to both precautionary and retirement saving motives. In relation to the
impact of divorce risk on saving, multiple studies have shown that this risk leads to higher saving by
married households. This includes Finke and Pierce (2006) who use the Panel Survey of Income Dynamics
(PSID) to show that spouses who end up getting divorced have a substantially higher saving rate in prior
years than spouses that remain married. Also using PSID data, Voena (2015) finds that the introduction
of unilateral divorce laws with equal division of assets led couples in those State jurisdictions to save
13However, as noted above, the introduction of divorce risk provides a distinct motivation for precautionary saving by
married households.
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more than couples in other States. Similarly, Gonza´lez and O¨zcan (2013) use a difference-in-difference
methodology to examine the effect of divorce law changes in Ireland and find that the increased divorce
risk resulted in higher (precautionary) saving by married households. Finally, the Italian panel study by
Pericoli and Ventura (2012) develops a probabilistic measure of divorce and shows that this variable is
significantly correlated with higher rates of saving among married households because of precautionary
motives.
While there is some evidence on the partial effect of marriage and divorce risk on saving, there is little
evidence on the net effect of both sources of risk. This is an inherently difficult thing to empirically
quantify, as it depends on the saving response of both single and married households to both sources
of marital risk and the proportion of married and single households in the population. In reality, age-
specific probabilities of both divorce and marriage have exhibited large changes in recent decades, which
has flowed through to trend movements in the shares of marital status in the population. These sources
of non-stationarity compound the difficulty in isolating the general equilibrium effect on saving of higher
marriage risk.
Nonetheless, Figure 5.4.1 shows that the baseline OLG model is at least able to endogenously generate the
main empirical regularity noted above, namely, that married households save more than single households
on a per adult basis.14
5.3 The model
Demographics and household transitions
The model is populated by an equal mass of males (g = m) and females (g = f) who enter the economy
at j = 1 and live a maximum of J years. While alive, both genders face an age-specific probability ψj of
surviving from age j to j + 1.
At each age, a fraction of each gender pij is in a marriage with marital status msj = c while the remaining
fraction is single with marital status ms1 = s. A fraction pi1 of individuals begin life married and 1− pi1
begin life single, and thereafter each individual’s marital status evolves exogenously over their lifetime
as a first-order Markov process Q(ms′|ms): single households are subject to a potentially age-varying
marriage rate Mj and similarly married households face a divorce rate Dj . When a marriage ends in
divorce, assets are divided among the divorcees with α ∈ (0, 1) share going to the man and 1− α to the
woman.15 New marriages take place randomly among newlyweds both of age j drawn from their gender’s
asset distribution for that age. This process is understood by households and incorporated rationally into
their decision rules.
14Also of note, the model is able to capture the empirical observation that assets are an increasing function of marriage
duration (Lupton and Smith, 1999).
15In other words, I assume an ‘equitable division’ rather than a title-based regime. See Doepke and Tertilt (2016) for a
survey of the area of macroeconomics and families.
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Mortality operates at the household level, so that both members of a married couple die together. This
restriction is imposed for tractability and means that the population contains no widows. The assets a
of those who die (that is, accidental bequests) are redistributed as a lump-sum B to all currently living
individuals.
Individual labour productivity
The average productivity of workers aged j is governed by an efficiency index ej , which is allowed to vary
by a scale factor γg,ms for each gender-marital status combination. Around these deterministic age-trends,
an individual’s productivity evolves as an auto-regressive process zj in which shocks are independently
and identically distributed among workers. Pre-tax earnings yj are then given by the product of these
factors, along with the wage (per efficiency unit) w and the individual’s labour supply nj :
yj = γg,msejzwnj (5.6)
All agents retire at jr, and retirement is an absorbing state. Each individual is therefore summarised by
the state vector (a, j, z, g,ms) in the joint state space A×J ×Z ×G ×MS. I denote φmsg (a, j, z) as the
measure of individuals for each combination of gender (g = m, f) and marital status (ms = s, c).
Preferences
Individuals are endowed with one unit of time per period, which they allocate between labour n and
leisure l during their working age years. Married couples maximise joint utility, which is separable in
consumption c and both partners’ leisure. Within the household, consumption is assumed to be a public
good with possible congestion, where θ regulates the degree of congestion. Lastly, the Pareto weight
λ determines the relative importance of each partner’s leisure in joint utility, which gives the following
functional form for a married couple’s utility:
uc = (c/θ)
1−σ
1− σ + λχ
c
m
l1−ηm
1− η + (1− λ)χ
c
f
l1−ηf
1− η (5.7)
Analogously, a single household’s momentary utility function for each gender g is given by:
usg =
c1−σ
1− σ + χ
s
g
l1−ηg
1− η (5.8)
While the empirical support for separable preferences is mixed (e.g. Blundell et al. (2016) and Chetty
(2006)), the decision to use this form of preferences is made partly to ensure that the computational
exercise remains tractable. Moreover, most of the related literature (including Peterman (2013) and
Conesa et al. (2009)) have used this functional form in either their main model or sensitivity analysis,
which permits a comparison of results across studies.
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Government
The government administers a compulsory social security system into which workers pay τSS fraction of
their annual earnings, and retirees receive a gender- and marital status-specific pension Pg,ms based on
a replacement rate Ψ.16 The tax rate τSS adjusts to ensure that the social security system is always in
balance. The government undertakes unproductive consumption spending G which it finances by taxing
adjusted-earnings y˜j = yj(1− τSS/2) according to a possibly progressive tax function T (·), and through
a flat tax τc on household consumption and a flat tax τk on capital income ar. In the main policy
experiment below, T (·) is applied separately to each member of the married household’s labour income.
In other words, the main experiment entails a shift from joint to separate filing, although I also consider
a joint filing regime in the sensitivity section. Finally, there is a separate tax τB levied on accidental
bequests.
Technology
The production side of the economy is standard, comprising a representative firm operating with Cobb-
Douglass technology:
Yt = AtKαt N1−αt (5.9)
where At, Nt and Kt represent aggregate productivity (set to 1 as the numeraire), labour supply and
capital stock respectively. The latter is subject to a depreciation rate δ.
Market structure
While households do not have access to formal insurance markets, they can self-insure themselves against
wage and marital risk through their holdings, a, in 1-period bond, which pays an interest rate r. However,
this insurance is limited by the requirement that a be non-negative at all times.
Competitive equilibrium
With this form of preferences, the household’s problem can be presented recursively. For a single house-
hold the problem is:
vsg(a, z, j) = max
c,n,a′
{
usg(c, l) + (1−Mj)ψjβEz,φsg∗(a,j)vsg(a′, z′, j + 1) +MjψjβEzvc(a′, z′, j + 1)
}
16Consistent with Conesa et al. (2009) and most other related studies, an individual’s pension is unrelated to his or her
unique earnings history. This assumption facilitates tractability but it would be interesting to investigate the effect of more
realistic set ups.
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subject to
c(1 + τc) + a′ = (1 + r(1− τk))a+ yg,s(1− τSS) +B − T (y˜g,s), if j <= jr
c(1 + τc) + a′ = (1 + r(1− τk))a+B + Pg,s, if j > jr
y˜g,s = (1− τSS)yg,s = (1− τSS)γg,sezwng
a ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, g = m, f
and the expectation operator Ez,φsg∗(a,j) indicates that a single household’s saving decision takes into
account the distribution of assets among the opposite gender g∗, which is the pool of potential spouses
in period j + 1. The married household’s problem is:
vc(a, z, j) = max
c,nm,nf ,a′
{
uc(c, lm, lf ) + (1−Dj)ψjβEzvc(a′, z′, j + 1)+
DjψjβEz
[
λvsm(
a′
2 , z
′, j + 1) + (1− λ)vsf (
a′
2 , z
′, j + 1)
]}
subject to
c(1 + τc) + a′ = (1 + r(1− τk))a+ ym(1− τSS) + yf (1− τSS) + 2B − T (y˜m)− T (y˜f ), if j <= jr
c(1 + τc) + a′ = (1 + r(1− τk))a+B + Pm,c + Pf,c, if j > jr
y˜g,c = (1− τSS)yg,c = (1− τSS)γg,cezwng
a ≥ 0, n ≥ 0, g = m, f
2. The factor prices w and r satisfy:
r = α
(
N
K
)1−α
− δ and w = (1− α)
(
N
K
)α
3. The social security system is in balance:
τsswN =
∑
g
∑
ms
Pg,ms
∫
φmsg (da× dz × dj)
4. Transfers equal after-tax accidental bequests:
B = (1− τB)
∑
g
∑
ms
∫
(1− ψj)a′(a, z, j, g,ms)φmsg (da× dz × dj)
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5. The Government’s budget is in balance:
G =τB
∑
g
∑
ms
∫
(1− ψj)a′(a, z, j, g,ms)φmsg (da× dz × dj) +
∑
g
∑
ms
∫
τkarφ
ms
g (da× dz × dj)
+
∑
g
∑
ms
∫
T (y˜)φmsg (da× dz × dj) +
∑
g
∑
ms
∫
τcc(a, z, j, g,ms)φmsg (da× dz × dj)
6. Markets clear:
K =
∑
g
[∫
a
2φ
c
g(da× dz × dj) +
∫
aφsg(da× dz × dj)
]
N =
∑
g
∑
ms
∫
γg,msejzn(a, z, j, g,ms)φmsg (da× dz × dj)
AKαL1−α + (1− δ)K
= G+
∑
g
[∫
c
2φ
c
g(da× dz × dj) +
∫
cφsg(da× dz × dj)
]
+
∑
g
[∫
a′(a, z, j, g, c)
2 φ
c
g(da× dz × dj) +
∫
a′(a, z, j, g, s)φsg(da× dz × dj)
]
7. The share of single and married households in the population is consistent with the survival-adjusted
measure of individuals in the state space A×Z and is symmetric by gender for all j:
pij,g =
∫
φcg(da× dz × {j})/
j∏
q=1
ψq
1− pij,g =
∫
φsg(da× dz × {j})/
j∏
q=1
ψq
pij,m = pij,f
8. Law of motion:
φmsg = Pφmsg
where P is a one-period recursive operator that incorporates the joint processes for marital status Q,
idiosyncratic productivity z and mortality.
5.4 Calibration
The key calibrated parameters are contained in Table 5.4.1.
Demographics
Individuals enter the economy at a real life age of 20 (j = 1) and live to a maximum age of 99 (J = 80).
The survival rate ψj is based on the mean male and female death rates. Population growth n is set to
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zero. There is no data readily available for annual marriage and divorce events by age. Therefore I rely
on marital transition probabilities derived in a previous study (Cubeddu and Rios-Rull, 1997), while also
maintaining consistency with the shares of married and single households by age contained in the Current
Population Survey (CPS).17
Preferences
The parameter governing relative risk aversion, σ is set to 1.5. This implies an elasticity of inter-temporal
substitution (EIS) of 23 , which is slightly higher than the
1
2 assumed in Conesa et al. (2009) but is arguably
more consistent with recent panel data evidence (Alan et al., 2009) and with the plausible upper bound
on relative risk aversion derived by Chetty (2006). The parameter η is chosen to achieve an unconstrained
intensive Frisch labour supply elasticity of 23 . This is towards the upper end of conventional estimates
of the Frisch elasticity based on micro data samples of prime-age men, but is arguably consistent with
more recent studies that include women (see Keane (2011) for a review of the empirical labour supply
literature).18 For married couples, the congestion factor for consumption θ is set to 1.42 consistent with
the McClements scale for two-adult households. The values for χg,ms are chosen to be consistent with
the relativity in work hours between men and women in the CPS. In particular, I target the work hours
of single women to be 93 per cent of single men, and the work hours of married women to be 86 per cent
of married men. I also target an overall mean work time (n¯) of 13 , the value used in the vast majority of
past studies.
Government policy
In the baseline economy, government consumption is equivalent to 17 per cent of GDP, and is funded
through a progressive tax on the sum of labour and capital income, which is levied at the household level
consistent with joint filing. This is done according to the Gouveia-Strauss tax function:
T (y˜, κ0, κ1, κ2) = κ0(−(y˜κ1 + κ2)−1/κ1) (5.10)
where the values for κ0 and κ1 are based on the estimates from their 1994 paper (Gouveia and Strauss,
1994). The remaining parameter, κ2, is adjusted to balance the government’s budget. The flat tax
on household consumption is set τc = 0.05, consistent with available data and comparable studies.
Redistributed bequests are not included in the capital income tax base and are instead taxed separately
at a rate τB = 0.5 to avoid the confounding results of taxing them together demonstrated by Peterman
(2013).19 The replacement rate for social security pensions is set at 50 per cent of average earnings for
each of the four household types.
17I fit a simple log function to the age profile in Cubeddu and Rios-Rull (1997), so that marriage rate falls log-linearly
from 0.25 at age 23 to 0.1 at age 99. Similarly, the divorce rate begins at 0.15 and falls to 0.01 by age 99.
18With these preferences, the intensive Frisch elasticity depends in general on the value of n. The elasticity of 23 is based
on a mean value of nj of 13 .19Peterman (2013) shows that taxing the lump-sum B is non-distorting, so the ‘optimal’ tax on the combined ar + B is
always higher than the optimal rate on ar alone.
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Individual productivity
I use PSID data on average hourly wages by age, gender and marital status as targets for calibrating
γg,ms. Similarly I use CPS data on mean annual hours by gender and marital status to calibrate the
preference parameters χg,ms.
I approximate the stochastic process for individual productivity using a first-order Markov process. The
underlying AR(1) process that I seek to mimic contains a number of parameters that need to be chosen
for each household type: the autoregressive parameter ρg,ms, the variance of the shock σ2η,g,ms, and the
initial variances Var(z1,g,ms). For married households I also need to set the value of ρmf in the bi-variate
AR(1) process, which governs the correlation between the husband’s and wife’s productivity processes.
My choices attempt to match a number of empirical moments in the wages data. Firstly, I target the
observed life-cycle pattern of wage inequality described in Storesletten et al. (2004). However, to achieve
this I must take account of the impact of marriage transitions on the life-cycle evolution of wages for
each household type. I do this by simulating the processes for marriage and z jointly then targeting the
resulting life-cycle wage profiles by varying σ2η,g,c, Var(z1,g,ms) and ρmf . In particular, I target an initial
(at age 20) variance of 0.15 for log wages, and a total increase over the working-age period of around 0.6
log points. For married households, I target an average correlation in partners’ wages of 0.4 to 0.5 over
the working age years consistent with Hyslop (2001).20 By adjusting the initial conditions of the AR(1)
process I am also able to incorporate an upward trend in this correlation over the life cycle, consistent
with the empirical evidence on the intra-family covariance in wage shocks (see for example Shore (2015)
and Krueger and Wu (2018)).
Key features of the baseline economy
Before proceeding to the policy experiment, I highlight some features of the baseline economy in order to
provide context for the optimal tax results below. First, the discount rate (β = 0.995) needed to achieve
the target capital-to-output ratio of 2.92 is higher than in a otherwise similarly-calibrated bachelor model
(β = 0.986). This largely reflects the presence of marital risk, which reduces the motivation for single
households to save because of a free rider problem.21
The different saving incentives between single and married households can be seen in the first two panels
of Figure 5.4.1, which show the mean life cycle profiles for assets and consumption. Married households
accumulate greater assets than single households and this is accompanied by a consumption profile that
peaks at a later age. More generally, the cost of precautionary saving, and therefore the overall profile for
life cycle assets, will depend on the extent to which married households use labour supply to self insure
early in life. This in part depends on the correlation between partners’ wages in different states of the
20As Hyslop (2001) notes, part of the overall correlation in partners’ wages reflects assortative matching. My calibration
is therefore a simple way of incorporating the effects of assortative matching without modelling it explicitly.
21As I show below, the disincentive to save from the free rider effect is quantitatively more important than the precau-
tionary saving motive induced by wage uncertainty.
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Table 5.4.1: Calibration
Value Target Source
Demographics
Lifespan (real age) (J) 79 (99) Assumed
Retirement age (real age) (jr) 45(65) Assumed
Survival probabilities (ψj) - Data Bell and Miller (2002)
Marriage and divorce rate (Mj ,Dj) - Data: marital status by age CPS
AR(1) productivity process
Married
Correlation (ρmf ) 0.04 Partner wage corr.=0.4-0.5 Hyslop (2001)
Women wage ratio (γc,f/γc,m) 0.6 Data CPS
Single
Persistence parameter (ρs) 0.98 Data: earnings by age Storesletten et al. (2004)
Variance of AR(1) process (ηs) 0.025 Data: earnings by age Storesletten et al. (2004)
Women wage ratio (γs,f/γs,m) 0.8 Data CPS
Household preferences
Discount factor (β) 0.995 K/Y=2.92 NIPA
Relative risk aversion (σ) 1.5 Assumed Micro evidence
Paramater governing Frisch (η) 3 Frisch ELS=2/3 Micro evidence
Consumption congestion factor (θ) 1.4023 McClements scale
Disutility of labour
Male married (χmm) 2.45 n¯f,c/n¯m,c = 0.86 CPS
Female married (χfm) 1.75 n¯f,c/n¯m,c = 0.86 CPS
Male single (χms ) 3.3 n¯f,s/n¯m,s = 0.93 CPS
Female single (χfs ) 3.6 n¯f,s/n¯m,s = 0.93 CPS
Technology
Capital share (α) 0.36 Data NIPA
Depreciation (δ) 0.0833 I/Y=0.255 NIPA
Government
Replacement rate (Ψ) 0.5 Assumed Past studies
Social Security Tax Rate (τss) 0.1651 Endogenous
Government consumption (G) G/Y=0.18 Data NIPA
Flat consumption tax (τc) 0.05 Mendoza et al (1994)
Flat capital tax on capital (τk) 0 in baseline
Income tax function
Marginal tax parameter (κ0) 0.258 Data: tax payments Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
Tax progressivity parameter (κ1) 0.768 Data: tax payments Gouveia and Strauss (1994)
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world, which I calibrate to around 0.4 in the baseline. Below I explore the two extreme cases of zero and
perfectly correlated wage shocks, and show that the optimal tax system is very sensitive to this single
parameter.
Another important aspect of the baseline economy is that hours worked decline monotonically for all
household types over the life cycle (see Figure 5.4.1), implying that the optimal age-dependent labour
tax (if it could be implemented) would tend to have a similar profile (Erosa and Gervais, 2002). However,
the mean marginal income tax rate in the baseline tax system does not do a very good job of mimicking
this theoretical optimum as I elaborate upon below, instead having a very flat profile over the life cycle.
This flatness reflects that the progressive tax function in the baseline economy is based on a household’s
combined labour and capital income, and the joint filing requirement for married households. A similar
observation is made in Gervais (2012).
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Figure 5.4.1: Mean life cycle profiles for assets, consumption, hours worked and marginal tax rates
87
5.5 The policy experiment
Following the related literature, the main experiment consists of switching from the current tax system
(in which the sum of labour and capital income are taxed progressively) to a system that features a
(possibly progressive) tax on labour income and a separate flat tax on capital τk. The computatishiional
exercise is therefore to choose a combination {κ?0, κ?1, τ?k} that maximises social welfare SW (κ0, κ1, τk)
subject to parameters and government consumption being fixed at their baseline values. The parameter
κ2 is used to balance the budget and I rule out tax systems where no such κ2 exists. In the case of a flat
tax (κ1 →∞) with deduction, κ2 determines the deduction consistent with a balanced budget. I further
assume anonymity of the tax code, rule out age-dependent and negative tax rates, and restrict the tax
function’s parameters to be the same across gender and marital status. In the main experiment, I consider
a tax system based on separate filing although I later relax this restriction in the sensitivity analysis.
SW is given by the expected lifetime utility of a newborn individual weighted by the distribution of the
initial productivity shock and the proportion of households of each type.
5.6 Results and discussion
5.6.1 The optimal tax system in the benchmark economy
I find an optimal tax mix {κ?0, κ?1, τ?k} = {0.31,∞, 0}. Thus I find that the optimal long-run tax on capital
is zero as per the classic Chamley-Judd result but contrary to the finding of recent life cycle studies. In
relation to the taxation of labour income, the optimal parameters imply a flat tax of 31 per cent combined
with a deduction equivalent to 16 per cent of mean income.
As a reference point, I also compute the optimal tax mix in a ‘bachelor’ version of the economy, a speci-
fication that basically corresponds to the models used in Conesa et al. (2009) and Fehr and Kindermann
(2015). Broadly consistent with these studies, I find that the optimal tax parameters in a bachelor econ-
omy are {κ?0, κ?1, τ?k} = {0.26,∞, 0.31} with a deduction on labour earnings equivalent to 20 per cent of
average income.22 Therefore, compared with the case of a bachelor economy, the optimal tax structure
in this paper’s benchmark model involves a higher tax burden on labour income via both a higher tax
rate and smaller deduction, which makes up for the much lower (zero) tax on capital.
Moving to the optimal tax system would yield an ex ante expected lifetime welfare gain for a newborn
household of 1.2 per cent measured in consumption equivalent variation (CEV). Conversely, assuming the
‘wrong’ model and imposing the optimal tax parameters from the bachelor economy would reduce welfare
by about 0.3 per cent. As can be seen in Table 5.6.1, the welfare gain from moving to the optimal tax
system reflects a fall in mean hours worked, balanced by a fall in mean consumption. As discussed further
below, part of the welfare gain stems from reduced life cycle consumption inequality, made possible by
better targeting of progressivity in the taxation of labour income and the shift to separate filing which
22For separable preferences, Conesa et al. (2009) find a tax on capital of 21 per cent along with a flat tax on labour
income of 34 per cent and a deduction of about 20 per cent of GDP per person. One reason for the slight differences
with the bachelor results could be the surprisingly large and persistent earnings shock assumed in Conesa et al. (2009) for
the separable preferences case, namely σ2η = 0.0841 and ρ = 0.995. These parameters differ from those used in the main
(non-separable preferences) section of their paper and the parameters I use in my benchmark model, both of which are
based on Storesletten et al. (2004).
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allows married households to use their dual labour supply margin to exploit the stochastic variation in
their joint productivity realisations.
Table 5.6.1: Optimal tax results
n¯ N K Y K/Y C CEV
Baseline (level) 33.12 0.35 1.86 0.64 2.92 0.37 -
Optimal (% change) -0.82 -2.51 -0.05 -1.63 1.61 -2.61 1.150
Bachelor optimum (% change) 1.66 -0.90 -7.48 -3.32 -4.30 -2.33 -0.267
5.6.2 Sensitivity
To further explore why the optimal tax system in the benchmark model differs from that in the standard
bachelor economy I now undertake an extensive sensitivity check. This involves shutting down key
elements of the benchmark model and re-computing the optimal tax structure in each of these versions
of the model. In each case, the baseline economy is re-calibrated (for relevant variables) to achieve the
same target values in the benchmark economy. The results are shown in Table 5.6.2 where the first two
columns show the results already discussed for the benchmark and bachelor versions of the economy,
while the remaining columns show the features and optimal tax results for the alternative models A1 to
A7.
Table 5.6.2: Optimal tax sensitivity analysis
Bench. Bach. A1 A2 A3 A4 A5 A6 A7
Dual-earners Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Marital risk Yes - No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes
Wage uncertainty Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No No Yes
Tax filing in optimal Single Single Single Single Single Single Single Single Joint
Endog. interest rate Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Fixed prod. diff. Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Corr. partners’ wages 0.4 - 0.4 0.4 0 1 - - 0.4
Discount factor (β) 0.995 0.983 0.9868 0.995 0.999 0.972 1.023 0.995 0.995
Interest rate (r(1− τK)) 3.8 3.18 3.1 4.01 3.78 2.91 3.34 3.09 4
Flat tax - labour (τL) 31 26 27 33 31 22 19 16 35
Deduction (% GDP/head) 16 20 24 18 17 14 0 0 26
Flat tax - capital (τK) 0 31 32 0 0 32 0 24 0
This exercise provides a number of key insights. First, as I argued above, the presence of marital risk
is crucial to the zero capital tax result. Model A1 turns off this feature and keeps all other aspects of
the model unchanged, so that the model still includes both married households and single households but
marital status is now fixed over an individual’s lifetime.23 The share of married and single households is
re-calibrated to match the aggregate share across all ages. This produces an optimal tax on capital that
is roughly the same as in the bachelor model, namely, about 32 per cent. Next Model A2 shows that the
benchmark result of a zero capital tax carries over to an ‘open economy’ where the interest rate is now
held constant at its baseline value.
23Having a fixed proportion of married and single households greatly reduces the computational challenge. Many previous
studies that have incorporated family structure have therefore opted to ignore marital risk. The recent study by Nishiyama
(2019) is a case in point.
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Model A3 shows that the presence of marital risk interacts with the dual labour supply margin, the two
novel features in this paper. In the extreme case when partners’ wages are uncorrelated (rather than the
coefficient of correlation of 0.4 used in the benchmark model), the benefits of family labour supply are
significantly larger. This makes being married an even more desirable future state for currently single
households, further reducing their saving and necessitating an even higher calibrated discount factor to
achieve the target capital-to-output ratio. Married households now have a greater willingness to exploit
variation in productivity across states. As noted in the following sub-sections, this makes precautionary
saving – and therefore aggregate saving – more interest rate elastic (see Table 5.6.3) as well as inducing
a stronger within-age correlation between married households’ wages and hours worked. These factors
strengthen the zero capital tax result. At the other extreme, Model A4 imposes a perfect correlation in
partners wages (i.e. a correlation of unity), which results in the optimal tax on capital reverting back to
the bachelor optimum of around 32 per cent. This reflects a reversal of the factors at play in A3 with a
much lower interest rate elasiticty of saving (see Table 5.6.3) and reduced within-age correlation between
wages and hours. This necessitates a much lower discount factor to hit the capital-to-output target
ratio, which provides greater welfare gains from taxing saving and inducing flatter consumption profiles.
Model A5 eliminates wage uncertainty, which has no effect on the zero capital tax result if marital risk is
retained. This model is essentially an extension of the 2-period model studied in Section 5.2.1, with the
presence of marital risk reducing the tendency for saving. Without a motive to undertake precautionary
saving to buffer against wage risk, this means an even higher discount factor is needed to reach the target
capital-to-output ratio. Also, in the absence of wage risk, the optimal taxation of labour income is no
longer progressive, which is unsurprising. Model A6 has neither marital nor wage risk, which results in
an optimal tax on capital that is about 24 per cent. Again, this highlights the importance marital risk
and its interaction with dual labour supply in contributing to the zero tax on capital result. Model A7
retains joint filing among married couples instead of imposing a shift to separate filing as in the previous
experiments. The optimal tax on capital continues to be zero, indicating that this paper’s main result is
robust to the way in which married couples file their tax returns. In a final sensitivity check (not shown
in the table), I experiment with taxing the return on bequests at the same rate as capital income τk but
keep all other features the same in the benchmark economy. The optimal tax on capital remains zero,
although the optimal flat tax on labour income is slightly higher and the deduction slightly smaller.
5.6.3 Dual labour supply and insurance
So what impact does dual labour supply have in this model? First and foremost, the presence of dual
labour supply allows married households to exploit the stochastic variation in wages, which is welfare
enhancing. This mechanism is similar to the one noted in Pijoan-Mas (2006), namely, married households
can readily adjust their hours worked in line with variations in their joint productivity realisations. This
is in contrast to asset-poor single households who must work even when their productivity is low for
precautionary reasons. This can be seen in Figure 5.6.1 which plots the correlation between within-age
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productivity and hours worked under the optimal benchmark economy.24 The labour supply of married
women is most sensitive to variations in wages while single men are least sensitive. Clearly, the value
to married households of dual labour supply is a function of the (lack of) correlation between partners’
wages. In the benchmark model, which is calibrated to the empirically observed correlation, the results
show that the presence of dual labour supply is a very valuable aspect of being married. It adds to the
economies of scale benefit of being married (identified in Section 5.2.1), accentuating the tendency towards
lower saving by single households who anticipate the possibility of becoming married in the future. This
is highlighted in the extreme cases of zero correlation. In this case, the fraction of the capital stock held
by single households is just 22 per cent compared with 26 per cent when there is perfect correlation in
partners’ wages (see Models A3 and A4).
20 25 30 35 40 45 50 55 600
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
Age
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
of
co
rr
el
at
io
n
Married male
Married female
Single male
Single female
Figure 5.6.1: Correlation between hours worked and productivity realisation
Secondly, dual labour supply affects the degree to which wage inequality maps into consumption inequal-
ity. As discussed earlier, there is a growing focus in macroeconomics on the various means by which
households can insure themselves against idiosyncratic wages shocks in an incomplete markets setting.
This research agenda has involved attempts to both measure these partial insurance mechanisms empiri-
cally (e.g. Blundell et al. (2008, 2016)) and to investigate whether calibrated OLG models are capable of
generating empirically-consistent amounts of partial insurance (e.g. Kaplan and Violante (2010); Krueger
and Wu (2018)). Figure 5.6.2 shows that the increase in life cycle consumption inequality (measured as
the variance of log consumption) that is endogenously-generated by the model. The overall life cycle in-
crease lines up well with the actual data presented in Storesletten et al. (2004). This consistency provides
some comfort that the model does a good job of capturing consumption-saving dynamics over the life
cycle. Figure 5.6.2 also shows that the transmission of wage to consumption inequality is more muted
for married households than for single households, consistent with the capacity for couples to risk share.
It is also worth reiterating that the optimal tax system provides more insurance than the tax system in
24Note that the plotted correlation has only a very weak connection with the Frisch (wealth compensated) elasticity, in
part because variations in productivity in this model are very persistent and therefore carry significant wealth effects.
91
the baseline economy as indicated by lower consumption inequality. This is driven by the significant tax
free threshold in the optimal tax system (similar to the finding in Conesa et al. (2009)) along with the
shift to separate filing which de-couples marginal tax rates among spouses.
Related to the previous two points, the dual labour supply margin means saving by married households
is more elastic to the after tax return on savings. This increases the overall elasticity of saving in the
benchmark economy (1.22) compared with a bachelor economy (1.09), which plays a well known role in
determining the optimal tax on capital as discussed earlier in relation to Summers (1981) and Engen and
Gale (1997) among others. The relationship between dual labour supply and the interest rate elasticity of
saving is highlighted by comparing models where the correlation in partners’ wages is zero (A3) and unity
(A4). In the first case, the elasticity is 1.4, while in the second it falls to 0.54. These results are shown
in Table 5.6.3. Finally, the interest rate elasticity of saving is likely to depend closely on the elasticity
of inter-temporal substitution (EIS), given by the reciprocal of the preference parameter σ. The final
row shows the result of reducing the EIS to 1/2 from the value of 2/3 used in the benchmark economy.
Unsurprisingly, the interest elasticity falls (from 1.22 to 0.92) and the associated optimal tax on capital
becomes positive, at 9.6 per cent. Clearly the EIS is a critical assumption in determining the optimal
structure of the tax system, consistent with the findings of past optimal income tax studies including
Conesa et al. (2009).
Table 5.6.3: The interest rate elasticity of saving
Discount
factor (β)
After tax
return
(r(1− τk))
Capital stock
(K)
Elasticity of
saving
Benchmark 0.995 3.81 1.87 1.22
Bachelor 0.983 3.18 1.68 1.09
Zero correlation (A3) 0.999 3.78 1.96 1.42
Perfect correlation (A4) 0.972 2.91 1.63 0.54
Lower EIS (1/σ=1/2) 0.991 3.65 1.75 0.92
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Figure 5.6.2: Inequality transmission over the life cycle
5.6.4 Relationship to Erosa and Gervais (2002) and Gervais (2012)
The study by Erosa and Gervais (2002) uses Ramsey taxation principles to establish some important
optimal taxation results in a deterministic OLG model with elastic labour. In particular, Erosa and
Gervais (2002) show within this framework that it is almost always optimal to tax labour and consumption
at different rates over the life cycle. When labour supply falls over the life-cycle – as it does in this study’s
baseline economy (see Figure 5.4.1) – Ramsey principles mean it is optimal to tax it labour earnings more
heavily at younger ages. When the labour tax code cannot be conditioned on age, they show that this
can be achieved (imperfectly) by a positive tax on capital.
However, there are a number of reasons why the result in Erosa and Gervais (2002) does not directly apply
here. First, the models considered in Erosa and Gervais (2002) (as well as in the related study by Gervais
(2012)) are deterministic and therefore ignore the efficiency implications of having within-age variation
in productivity and hours worked. While a tax on capital may be able to mimic the variation in hours
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over the life cycle, such a tax cannot easily mimic variation in hours by age across productivity states.
This is not very important in a bachelor model because the substitution effect from wage variations is
dominated by the wealth effect given the persistence of the productivity shock, which limits the within-
age variability in hours worked. However, the picture is very different for married households whose dual
labour supply margin allows a much larger substitution effect. This in turn results in a much stronger
within-age correlation in hours worked and productivity for workers in married households (see Figure
5.6.1). A tax on capital is therefore no longer an effective way of taxing labour more heavily when it is
high (and therefore inelastic), which is the mechanism underlying the results in Erosa and Gervais (2002)
and Conesa et al. (2009).
Second, the results derived in Erosa and Gervais (2002) consider only proportional taxation. But in a
closely related study, Gervais (2012) demonstrates that a progressive tax on labour can mimic optimal
age dependent taxation. In this sense, Gervais (2012) argues that progressive taxation can be justified
purely on efficiency grounds. It turns out that the average marginal tax rate in the benchmark economy
does a good job of mimicking optimal age taxation, especially compared with the tax system in the
baseline economy which taxes capital and labour income together. Figure 5.6.3 shows the mean marginal
tax rates by age for each household type. As can be seen, the marginal tax rate on labour income tends
to fall over the working life, consistent with the trend in hours worked which is similar to that shown in
Figure 5.4.1. Notably, this progressivity is achieved entirely through having a tax free threshold.
Third, Gervais (2012) notes that a tax system can confer welfare gains by inducing flatter life cycle
profiles for consumption and leisure. Thus a tax on capital (or saving) can have welfare implications
simply by encouraging flatter consumption and leisure profiles. However, the magnitude of this welfare
gain depends on the calibrated discount factor used to target the capital-to-output ratio. All else equal,
a higher discount factor (more patient households) reduces the welfare benefit from capital taxation. As
discussed above, the tendency for marital risk to reduce saving by single households means that a relatively
high discount rate is needed to achieve the target capital-to-output ratio in the baseline economy. This
is another factor contributing to the relatively low optimal tax on capital in the benchmark economy.
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Figure 5.6.3: Marginal tax rates faced by average earner
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5.7 Further work
This paper has demonstrated that the optimal long-run structure of the tax system depends on the
presence of both marital risk and family labour supply, both of which are empirically important features.
While my results show relatively modest welfare gains from moving to the optimal tax system of zero
capital taxation – especially compared to the huge gains found in Summers (1981)25 – my paper at the
very least calls into question the robustness of recent OLG studies such as Conesa et al. (2009) based on
bachelor economies.
However, further work is needed to understand the precise factors behind this paper’s contrary result.
While a number of main channels have been uncovered including the importance of the EIS and interest
elasticity of saving, further work is needed to see whether the results are robust to alternative assumptions
about other key parameters and the assumption of separable preferences. This includes the divorce regime,
the bargaining weights among spouses and the stochastic properties governing marriage and divorce. In
addition, a natural extension to the model presented in this paper would involve introducing further
realism into the household structure by capturing the presence of children (via an age-varying economies
of scale term θ), which has been identified as an important factor behind observed patterns in life-cycle
consumption. Similarly, further investigation of the impact on the optimal tax structure of social security
settings and alternative ways of modelling of bequests will be important given their interplay with the
insurance role played by private saving and dual labour supply. While the OLG model studied in this
paper already incorporates an extensive margin of labour supply adjustment by married households,
adding fixed costs of work could provide a larger and more empirically-consistent degree of extensive
adjustment.
Further analytical studies are also needed to understand the channels through which the dual labour
supply margin affects consumption and saving, and therefore optimal taxation, over the life cycle. This
could involve extending a study like Erosa and Gervais (2002) to allow for dual labour supply and wage
uncertainty, or at the very least exploring these features in a simplified two period model.
25As discussed in Section 5.6.3, Summers (1981) was based on a highly stylised model and its main findings have largely
been discredited by subsequent OLG studies.
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Appendix 5.A Computational appendix
5.A.1 Household decision rules and marginal value functions
I solve the household decision rules and value functions using an extension of Chris Carroll’s method of
endogenous grid points (Carroll, 2006). The decision rules for married households of working age (which
is the highest dimensional case) are defined over the joint state space:
(a, j, z, g,ms) = [0,∞]× {1..., J} × {z1, ...z36} × {m, f} × {c, s} (5.11)
where the couple’s two dimensional 6 × 6 productivity space is vectorised into a 36 point grid and the
continuous asset space a is discretised into aˆi using 215 grid points from a1 = 0 to a215 = 50. The solution
operates via backward induction from the last period of life in which the agent dies with certainty and
leaves no bequest.
1. In j = J , the agent consumes all their income, which allows the state-contingent consumption rule and
marginal value function, denoted va(aˆ, j, z, g,ms), to be approximated at each grid point aˆi for beginning
period assets.
2. With period J marginal value function in hand, the consumption rule in period J−1 can be calculated
on the basis of the assumed vector of next period’s assets (saving) aˆ′i by inverting next period’s marginal
value function va(aˆ′, j, z, g,ms) obtained in step 1, which is weighted by the probabilities of marital status
transition matrix . For single households, the marginal value function is also weighted by the distribution
of assets of prospective partners conditional on becoming married next period.
3. With consumption calculated, the implied cash in hand (m) can also be calculated at each grid point
for aˆ′i using the identity m = c+ aˆ′i.
4. Using the expressions for household income shown in Section 5.3, income is calculated at each point
aˆi.
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5. Using the decision rule from 2 and the associated values of m, the consumption decision rule in terms
of income derived in step 4 is generated using linear interpolation. This gives the consumption rule in
terms of on beginning period assets aˆi.
6. Income from step 4 and the consumption rule from step 5 are combined to generate the saving rule,
while the current period marginal value function is calculated at each aˆi using the consumption decision
rule and the envelope condition.
We can then iterate backwards until period jr. Subsequent iterations need to incorporate the agent’s
continuous choice of hours. The steps are similar for the retired agent except that the decision rule for
hours n is now found for each value of the consumption rule generated in step 2 using the first order
conditions for consumption and hours. This is more complicated than models featuring proportional
taxation because the non-linear tax function makes a closed form solution unavailable. Further, the
expected marginal value function in step 2 must now incorporate the additional state variable associated
with the joint productivity process. Next, the hours rule can be used to calculated tax payable at each
point in next period asset grid aˆ′i. The income and tax payable values for each point on this grid is
used to reverse engineer beginning period assets using the budget constraint shown in Section 5.3. This
generates a relation between aˆ′i and aˆi that can be inverted using linear interpolation to generate the
saving rule in terms of aˆi. Next, this saving rule is combined with next period’s marginal value function
to infer consumption and then hours rules as a function of current assets aˆi. The consistent values for
income, tax payments and marginal tax rates can then also be derived. Finally, the envelope condition
and consumption rule is used to generate the current period’s marginal value function va(aˆ, j, z, g,ms)
and the process continues back until the first period of life. At each period, the value function itself is
also evaluated and saved for later use in welfare calculations.
The task of finding the household decision rules in the baseline economy is somewhat more difficult
because the progressive tax function is applied to combined capital and labour income consistent with
the current US tax system. This requires a slightly different algorithm. To ensure acceptable run time,
we use a binary search routine to find beginning period of assets conditional on next period assets by
exploiting the montonicity in the decision rule for hours worked. This exploits the pre-computated values
of the inverted progressive tax function, which considerably shortens the run time.
5.A.2 Calculation of stationary asset distribution and optimal tax mix
The following steps describe the procedure for finding the economy’s stationary equilibrium in the post-
reform world.
1. With the decision rules in hand, the asset distribution is calculated by iterating on the saving rules
and joint law of motion described in Section 5.3. To achieve an acceptable degree of precision, the asset
space is finer than the one used to calculate the decision rules. This produces the aggregate supply of
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saving conditional on an assumed set of factor prices, tax rates and pension benefits.
2. Because of the presence of marriage risk, we must also iterate on agents’ expectations of the distribution
of prospective partners’ assets, which was also taken as given in the first step, until it converges to the
actual distribution, as explained in Section 5.3. In practice this can take place very efficiently by including
this iteration as part of the outer loop that finds the economy’s general equilibrium.
3. In the outer loop, we iterate on the factor prices until the supply of saving from 2 matches demand
for capital.
4. The search for the optimal tax system is undertaken across the tax space {κ0, κ1, τk} which is discretised
into a three dimensional grid with the value of the remaining tax parameter κ2 implied by the balanced
budget restriction. We restrict the grid points such that the optimal marginal tax rate for labour (κ0)
and capital (τk) lie in the interval [0, 0.5]. This was never found to be binding. In practice, all optimal
tax systems entailed either a very small or very large value of κ1 corresponding to purely proportional
taxation of labour income or a flat tax with deduction. This simplified the search in many cases. All
computation was undertaken in MATLAB, with the run time in finding the optimal tax system greatly
reduced by utilising parallel processing.
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